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Abstract 
 
In the last two decades, ambivalence has emerged as one of the primary concerns of 
attitude researchers. The acknowledgement that individuals can simultaneously 
evaluate an attitude object as both positive and negative has challenged a number of 
the status quos of the attitude literature. This thesis utilises an unfolding approach to 
investigate the implications of ambivalence for the conceptualisation of attitudes and 
their measurement.   
Firstly, the assumption that ambivalence is at odds with the bipolar 
understanding of attitudes was investigated. The results suggested that ambivalence 
is consistent with bipolarity, whereby ambivalent attitudes are located at the centre of 
the bipolar dimension. Secondly, attitude scales for the abortion, euthanasia and 
Aboriginal Australians issues were constructed to reflect this bipolar understanding. 
The fit of these statements to Coombs’ (1964) unidimensional unfolding theory 
provided evidence that ambivalence is also consistent with the quantitative 
conceptualisation of attitudes. Together these results provided further validation of 
the unfolding approach to attitude measurement. These models alleviate many of the 
problems faced by the ubiquitous method of summated ratings, including the 
assessment of ambivalent evaluations. 
 Finally, these scales were used to investigate the latent structure of attitudes 
and its relationship with meta-psychological judgements of ambivalence. The 
conclusions drawn from these analyses were limited by a number of issues, 
highlighting the importance of rigorously considering measurement issues for all 
attitude parameters. Nonetheless, they presented preliminary validation of these 
scales’ ability to measure ambivalent evaluations and suggested a systematic 
  iv 
relationship between proximity to the centre of the evaluative dimension and meta-
psychological ambivalence. 
 Overall, it is concluded that a number of assumptions regarding the 
implications of ambivalence are misplaced and the proposed solutions are even more 
troublesome. Suggestions for future research are made, particularly with respect to 
differentiating between ambivalent, indifferent and uncertain evaluative states. 
Furthermore, attitude researchers are encouraged to discard their operationalist biases 
in order to engage with the measurement issues illuminated throughout this thesis. 
This is necessary to account for the complexity of the attitude construct, which 
ambivalence is testament to. 
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Chapter 1 - An introduction to attitudes, ambivalence and 
their measurement 
 
1.1 Introduction  
The attitude concept has a rich history. In fact, a recent PsycINFO keyword search 
revealed 197, 950 matches for this term over the last century. That is an average of 
approximately 38 publications per week. It is little wonder, therefore, that Allport 
(1935) described it as the most fundamental concept in social psychology. Despite its 
ubiquity and longevity a number of problems remain unresolved. This thesis will 
examine ambivalence and its implications for our understanding of attitudes. 
Ambivalence brings in to question some of the most invariant factors in the 
conceptualisation and measurement of attitudes. Specifically, the assumptions that 
attitudes are bipolar and quantitative constructs (Cacioppo, Gardner & Berntson, 
1997; Michell, 1990, 1994; Thompson, Zanna & Griffin, 1995). 
With respect to the assumption of bipolarity, the positive and negative 
elements of individual’s attitudes have typically been approached as reciprocally 
related (Cacioppo et al., 1997). In this sense, the attitude continuum since the time of 
Thurstone (1928) has been presented as ranging from various degrees of positivity to 
various degrees of negativity with ‘neutral’ standpoints in-between. Typically, 
‘Neutral’ attitudes have been approached as the absence of any evaluation, or what is 
termed indifference (Cacioppo et al., 1997).  
Such a conception seems intrinsically sensible, as many such dichotomies 
exist around us in every day life (Thompson et al., 1995). The layperson and 
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psychologist alike tend to think in terms of good versus evil, liberal versus 
conservative, hot versus cold. However, over the past decades a number of theorists 
have disputed this understanding, as they believe it ignores attitudinal ambivalence 
(Cacioppo & Bernston, 1994; Kaplan, 1972; Scott, 1966; Thompson et al., 1995).  
Ambivalence is the phenomena whereby an individual evaluates an attitude 
object as both positive and negative or may feel both for and against some issue 
(Conner & Armitage, 2008). It seems unlikely that any individual has not felt torn or 
conflicted toward some issue at one point in time. When evaluating social issues 
individuals are typically faced with a large amount of competing information or 
interests and these can result in ‘mixed’ evaluations. Typically, it is attitudes toward 
these sorts of issues that social scientists are most interested in.  
In fact, ambivalence has been identified as a crucial moderator in a number of 
attitude-related issues including the attitude-behaviour and attitude-intention 
relationships (Conner & Sparks, 2002; Sparks Harris & Lockwood, 2004). 
Additionally, Jonas, Bromer and Diehl (2000) demonstrate the importance of the 
consideration of ambivalence in the study of attitude change. At a more fundamental 
level, the emergence of ambivalence has led to the reassessment of the nature of 
attitudes (Sparks et al., 2004). Ambivalence appears to be a very real and important 
phenomenon and therefore any theory of attitudes and their assessment must account 
for it (Thompson et al., 1995). Thus, whether ambivalence fits with a bipolar 
understanding of attitude must be investigated. 
Furthermore, attitude researchers have been guilty of what has been described 
as a ‘pathological’ preoccupation with the concept of measurement (Michell, 1999). 
This preoccupation has lead to the subversion of the concept as it is conceived in the 
natural sciences, and resulted in the widely held belief that quantitative structure is 
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something that can decided by the researcher. When one talks of measuring some 
thing, one is in fact speaking of a process whereby the measurer attempts to 
approximate the empirical properties/relations of that thing. By this understanding, 
quantitative structure is a property of something belonging to the spatio-temporal 
world and not something that can be artificially imposed (Michell, 1990). Hence, the 
assumption that attitudes are quantitative is in fact an empirical hypothesis and must 
be critically tested (Haack, 1993). 
Consequently, given the importance of these issues for the attitude concept 
and its use in social psychology, this thesis will attempt to clarify the implications of 
ambivalence for the bipolar understanding of attitudes. Furthermore, it will attempt 
to reconcile the measurement of ambivalent attitudes with the traditional theory of 
measurement. This chapter will introduce and overview the key concepts of attitude, 
particularly attitudinal ambivalence, and measurement, specifically with respect to 
the measurement of ambivalence.  
  
1.2 What is an attitude? 
Throughout the history of the attitude concept there have been recurring debates 
regarding its definition (see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Fazio, 1995; Gawronski, 2007; 
Zanna & Rempel, 1988;). One of the most enduring theories is the Tripartite model 
proposed by Rosenberg and Hovland (1960), which postulates that there are distinct 
affective, cognitive and behavioural components of attitudes. This model subsumes 
the emphases of others such as Thurstone (1928) who defined attitudes as purely 
affective in nature, Heider (1946) and Maze (1973) who defined them as cognitive 
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evaluations1, and Allport (1935) who generalised attitudes as psychological states of 
readiness to behave in a certain way. Whilst it seems sensible to suggest that affect, 
cognition and behaviour are all causally relevant to our evaluations, this model only 
provides a very general sense of what we mean by attitude and provides no 
explanation of how these various components come to influence and form our 
attitudes. 
 A stark illustration of the ongoing ambiguity in the definition of attitude is 
the recent dedication of an entire edition of the journal Social Cognition to this issue 
(see Gawronski, 2007). In this edition, Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2007) explicate 
an attitude model that despite still being in its formative stages promises to serve as a 
far more thorough account. This Associative-Propositional Evaluative (APE) model, 
as the name suggests, distinguishes between two forms of evaluations, the 
associative and the propositional. Associative evaluations are characterised as the 
affective reactions resulting from the associations automatically activated when one 
encounters an attitude object (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). Crucially, these 
associations do not possess any truth entailment. For example, an Australian visiting 
North America for the first time is likely to encounter many African Americans 
whose appearances are consistent with the stereotype of gang member, which they 
have been exposed to viewing American films and television shows. Under this 
model, such an encounter would lead to the automatic activation of the associations 
learnt from these mediums such as crime, firearm possession, intimidatory behaviour 
etc., which may in turn lead to the affective reactions of increased heart rate, 
increased breathing rate and intense feelings of fear. The activation of these 
                                                
1 Maze (1973), in fact, referred to them as a form of pseudo-cognition as they relate 
to pseudo-properties of an object, e.g., the property of ‘goodness’. 
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associations and the experience of these affective reactions may come about 
irrespective of whether the individual believes them to be a valid response. 
 Propositional evaluations, on the other hand, are cognitive in nature and 
dependent upon propositional reasoning processes (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 
2007). The model assumes that the spontaneous affective reactions are translated into 
an evaluative propositional form and this proposition is then subjected to syllogistic 
inferences to assess its truth. The assessment of its validity is dependent upon its 
consistency with other propositions that are deemed to be relevant to the judgement 
in that particular moment. This validation process leads to a final evaluative 
judgement. For example, the abovementioned negative affective reaction to the 
African American person may be translated to the evaluative proposition ‘I dislike 
African American people’. This is then compared with the non-evaluative 
proposition that, ‘American film and television misrepresents African Americans’ 
and the evaluative proposition that, ‘it is bad to judge people based upon media 
misrepresentations’. If both of the latter propositions are accepted as true, then the 
affective reaction will be rejected as a basis for a final evaluative judgment. 
However, if either of these latter propositions is deemed to be false, then the 
affective reaction may be consistent with the final evaluative judgement [NB. 
Although this example depicts this process as a conscious one, in many cases it will 
not be (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006)]. 
 Whilst this model contains a number of shortcomings, such as its lack of 
explanation of how the associations activated by an attitude object transform into an 
affective reaction and in turn how this manifests into a propositional form, it 
integrates and explains a number of findings and shortcomings in the recent attitude 
literature (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). These include accounting for both 
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implicit attitudes, treated as synonymous with associative evaluations, and explicit 
attitudes, interpreted as synonymous with propositional evaluations (Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). It provides explanations of attitude 
change at both the explicit and implicit level that are supported by the existing 
evidence (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2007). Furthermore, it resolves the 
controversy of whether attitudes are stable, enduring dispositions or context 
dependent constructions as either perspective is consistent with the model  
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2007; Schwarz, 2007).  
 Crucially for this thesis, given the independence of the affective and 
propositional systems under this model, it provides justification for an examination 
of the cognitive/propositional component of attitudes independently of the 
affective/associative component. Henceforth, for simplicity, this thesis will focus 
upon attitudes as cognitive constructs and the term will be used to refer to an 
evaluative judgement (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2007). It should be noted that this 
definition goes beyond the typical cognitive understanding of attitude, such as 
Maze’s (1973), as an evaluative belief. The evaluative judgement is a special case of 
an evaluative belief, which necessitates a process of subjective validation.  
This is an important distinction to make as a person may stand in a certain 
evaluative belief relation, but it should not be considered an attitude unless it is 
deemed subjectively valid. For example, I may be aware of the evaluative belief that, 
‘blue-vein cheese tastes good’, but this cannot be considered my attitude unless I 
endorse it as true based upon its consistency with my other beliefs.  
 This point also relates to a major departure this thesis will take from the APE 
model. Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006) argue that the propositional reasoning 
processes underlying the evaluative judgement are chiefly concerned with cognitive 
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consistency. Propositions are taken to be consistent with one another when they are 
both deemed subjectively true and one does not entail the opposite of the other. Such 
a view leads them to reject the possibility of an ambivalent evaluative judgement, as 
by definition ambivalence is the endorsement of mutually opposing evaluative 
propositions. Interestingly, this aspect of the APE model reiterates a bias in the 
literature that lead to the ignorance of ambivalence in attitude literature for decades 
(Thompson et al., 1995). A refutation of this aspect of the model will be provided, 
but firstly it is necessary to overview the history and the definition of the 
ambivalence concept in psychology. 
 
1.3 What is ambivalence? 
The psychological phenomenon of ambivalence has a long history in modern 
academic psychology and it is testament to the complexity of the human cognitive 
and affective systems. The term was first introduced in the work of Bleuler (1908, 
cited in Meerloo, 1979) and was adopted by Freud (1998) and his psychodynamic 
successors who used it to describe the conflict between the repressed instinctual 
forces and the internalisations of the prohibitions of such forces.  
It has also played a central role in the theories of the development of infant 
attachments and intimate adult relationships, particularly with respect to the tripartite 
classification of infant attachment styles which include the anxious-ambivalent 
classification (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978). In this context, ambivalent 
style refers to infants who become quite distraught when their parent leaves the room 
and show no reassurance or comfort when the parent reenters the room. They are 
ambivalent in the sense that they desire the parent in the room before departure and 
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reject their presence in the room upon reentry. Intriguingly, despite the fact that 
concepts of ambivalence were playing central roles in such areas of psychology 
throughout the 20th Century, it remained mostly ignored in the attitude domain until 
very recently (NB. exceptions to this include: Diab, 1967; Green & Goldfried, 1965; 
Kaplan, 1972; Klopfer & Madden, 1980; Moore, 1973; Scott, 1966). 
  Ambivalence emerged as a priority in the attitude domain predominantly 
through the publication by Thompson et al. (1995), which implored attitude 
researchers to care about the issue when constructing their theories and measures. 
This was bolstered by the earlier publication of Cacioppo and Bernston (1994), 
which put forth a bivariate structural model of attitudes that accounted for both 
attitudinal ambivalence and indifference. By the beginning of the 21st Century, 
ambivalence had firmed as a fundamental consideration of attitude research (Conner 
& Armitage, 2008; Conner & Sparks, 2002). 
 The ensuing research has identified a number of sources of attitudinal 
ambivalence including conflicting affective reactions whereby an individual may feel 
both positive and negative affect toward an object at the same time (Larsen, McGraw 
& Cacioppo, 2001).  It has been found to stem from conflict between affective 
reactions and cognitive evaluations (Maio, Esses & Bell, 2000). For example, a 
shark-loving person may have conflicting affective reactions (e.g., extreme fear) to, 
and cognitive evaluations (e.g., ‘I believe they are good animals’) of sharks the first 
time they scuba dive with them. Priester and Petty (2001) found that ambivalence 
may also be caused by perceived evaluative conflict between yourself and significant 
others in your life. Of most relevance to the current research is the finding that 
ambivalence may come from conflict between cognitive evaluations whereby an 
individual may evaluate an attitude object as both good and bad (Conner et al., 
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2002). As this thesis is focusing upon attitudes as evaluative judgments, it will use 
the term ambivalence to refer to the conflict between evaluative propositions, which 
manifest in to an evaluative judgement that is both positive and negative. 
 As alluded to earlier, this view of ambivalence is at odds with the APE 
model, which postulates that conflict between evaluative propositions is 
psychologically untenable. Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006) argue that this 
conflict must be resolved by the invalidation of one of the conflicting propositions, 
which would preclude the emergence of an ambivalent evaluative judgement. This 
aspect of their theory is heavily influenced by Festinger’s (1957) cognitive 
dissonance theory, which argues that humans find any level of cognitive conflict 
inherently uncomfortable and hence are motivated to resolve this conflict by 
modifying one of the beliefs or acquiring a new belief.  
 Although there is great deal of empirical support for cognitive dissonance 
theory, a number of studies have failed to support the central assumption that 
discomfort necessarily follows from cognitive conflict (Harmon-Jones & Mills, 
1999; Newby-Clark, McGregor & Zanna, 2002; Zanna, Lepper & Abelson, 1973). 
Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006) make another questionable assumption that 
cognitive consistency, “results from a propositional process of consistency 
assessment that is based on the assignment of truth values and the application of 
syllogistic rules and logical principles” (p. 695). They do contend in a footnote that, 
“logical consistency is intended to refer more broadly to subjective consistency 
resulting from any kind of inferential rule that is considered to be valid, rather than to 
strict logical consistency in terms of normative syllogistic rules” (p. 695). Thus, 
although formal logic would preclude the acceptance of two propositions that entail a 
contradiction, e.g., ‘Chocolate cake is good’ and ‘Chocolate cake is bad’, the onus is 
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upon Gawronski and Bodenhausen to demonstrate that this applies to the subjective 
inferential rules referred to in their footnote. Particularly as research has 
demonstrated that individuals routinely feel ambivalent in their food attitudes as well 
as many others (Urland & Ito, 2005). 
A similar subjective interpretation is made with respect to their notion of 
‘truth values’ (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). The reason why the ‘truth’ of an 
evaluative proposition must be viewed as subjective is made clear by Maze (1973).  
He argues that evaluative propositions do not refer to factual properties. For 
example, when one thinks, ‘this chocolate cake tastes good’, they are not referring to 
any actual ‘goodness’ property of the cake. Hence, the truth of this proposition is 
rendered subjective. Given this subjectivity, the truth of an evaluative proposition 
does not logically entail the falsity of its contradiction. In fact, it seems perfectly 
reasonable that I assign truth-values to both the proposition, ‘Chocolate cake is 
good’, as I enjoy its taste, as well as its contradiction, ‘Chocolate cake is bad’, as I 
am not fond of its effect upon my waistline.  
Furthermore, the above example is not intended to suggest that ambivalent 
evaluative propositions can only be accepted as subjectively true if they are 
considered relevant to different dimensions of the object, i.e., taste vs. calorie content 
of a chocolate cake. It seems reasonable to assume, given the subjective nature of the 
consistency assessment, that I may accept two contradictory propositions with 
respect to a single dimension of the attitude object. For example, I may judge that ‘I 
think the Prime Minister of Australia is doing both a good and a bad job with respect 
to economic management’. In this example the attitude object is the Prime Minister 
and the single dimension relevant to my judgement is his/her economic management. 
This judgement may have come about, as I believe his/her approach to budget 
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surpluses was good, as he/she consistently kept the federal budget in surplus, and I 
believe his/her approach to budget surpluses was bad, as his/her chosen level of 
surplus was not sufficient to alleviate the pressure of rising inflation on interest rate 
levels. Whilst the two evaluative propositions are contradictory, the non-evaluative 
propositions underlying them appear perfectly reasonable bases to subjectively 
validate both as true. 
It appears that this aspect of the APE model is influenced by an antiquated 
view that cognitive processes are rational in a sense akin to formal logic. These 
intuitive examples as well as the vast number of published studies, which suggest 
that individuals are commonly conflicted in their evaluations of issues, suggest that 
this assumption of Gawronski and Bodenhausen’s  (2006) model should be 
abandoned. This thesis will provide further evidence by examining individuals’ 
ambivalence specifically with respect to conflicting evaluative propositions. As 
previously discussed, this part of the APE model is attributable to the influence of 
cognitive dissonance theory. Interestingly, Thompson et al. (1995) identified the 
influence of this seminal theory as a major contributor to the ignorance of 
ambivalence in attitude research for much of the 20th Century.  
 
1.4 Why has ambivalence been ignored? 
Cognitive dissonance theory argues that we are intrinsically motivated to resolve 
conflict between evaluative propositions and thus states of evaluative conflict are 
interpreted as transient and of little psychological interest. Due to the extremely 
influential nature of this theory, the antecedents and consequences of cognitive 
consistency were the focus of research and ambivalence was reduced to a form of 
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cognitive error (Thompson et al., 1995). This perspective would have undoubtedly 
influenced our measurement instruments, which would have been designed to assess 
more permanent states. However, the effect of our measurement instruments in 
subverting ambivalence was apparent well before the emergence of cognitive 
dissonance theory. This subversion coincided with the emergence of the method of 
summated ratings as the mainstream approach. The fact that no other ambivalence 
researcher has made the same observation is testament to the strong grip this 
methodology has over attitude research. 
The measurement of attitudes began with Thurstone (1928) with his 
pioneering paper extending the experimental methods of psychophysics to the study 
of attitudes (Cacioppo & Bernston, 1994; Michell, 1990). His method first requires 
the construction of a measurement scale consisting of statements spanning the 
attitude continuum from varying degrees of positivity through what he termed 
‘neutrality’ to varying degrees of negativity. Examination of the sort of statements 
Thurstone (1928) put forth as constituting the ‘neutral’ section of the continuum 
reveals that he considered both ambivalent and indifferent attitudes (Andrich & 
Styles, 1998). Examples of such statements toward the issue of capital punishment 
include; (1) "capital punishment gives a criminal what he deserves", (2) "I think 
capital punishment is necessary but I wish it were not", and (3) "capital punishment 
is one of the most hideous practices of our time." Statement 2, in particular, 
demonstrates Thurstone’s (1928) consideration of ambivalent attitudes in his 
approach as it clearly expresses conflicting evaluations of the issue. 
Likert (1932) developed his method of summated ratings in response to the 
laborious procedures required by Thurstone’s (1928) approach. His technique did not 
require the time-consuming prior step of scaling attitude items as participants were 
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simply given a large collection of clearly negative or clearly positive statements to 
respond to on an arbitrary, graded disagree-agree scale. Respondents’ attitude 
measures are therefore calculated by summing the values of agreement given to each 
statement, with the negative items reverse-scored. Likert (1932) claimed his 
technique to be superior as it was much simpler, more reliable and the results were 
highly correlated with Thurstone’s (1928). Such properties have undoubtedly 
contributed to the widespread appeal of this method to the point where one will 
scarcely find an attitude study that does not implement it in some form. 
However, an unfortunate property of this method is that it is unable to capture 
ambivalent attitudes. For example, an ambivalent item, such as Statement 2 above, 
cannot be included in a Likert-type questionnaire, as it is unclear whether one should 
score it positively or negatively (Andrich & Styles, 1998). Likert (1932) and his 
successors have attempted to overcome this inability to include ‘neutral’ items by 
including a ‘neutral’ middle-category in the response scale. However, repeated 
research has demonstrated that such a middle-category only further complicates 
interpretation of the results, as it does not distinguish between individuals who utilise 
it because they are ambivalent, indifferent or uncertain toward the issue (Andrich, De 
Jong & Sheridan, 1997; Dubois & Burns, 1975; Klopfer & Madden, 1980).  
Kaplan (1972) was the first to acknowledge that for ambivalence to re-
emerge as a major issue in attitude research, reformation of the existing measurement 
approaches was necessary. His solution was to reformulate the semantic differential 
scale, an alternative form of rating scale to Likert’s (1932), so that respondents 
reported their positive and negative feelings toward an object on separate scales. 
These separate positive and negative scores were then combined to give an 
ambivalence ‘measure’. Drawing upon this approach, a number of researchers have 
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developed their own ambivalence measures, e.g., Thompson et al. (1995) and 
Priester & Petty (1996). An overview of the qualities of these approaches will be 
provided, but this must be done in light of an understanding of the true meaning of 
measurement. Whilst at face value this may appear an unusual statement to most 
psychologists, the proceeding section will make it increasingly clear why this is a 
central issue to any thesis concerned with psychological measurement. 
 
1.5 What is measurement? 
Implicit within all major theories of attitude measurement is the assumption that 
attitudes are quantitative (Michell, 1990, 2004a). This assumption is driven by the 
quantitative imperative of academic psychology, which is the view that a scientific 
understanding of one’s subject matter is only provided by measurement (Michell, 
2003). Given that one can only measure quantitative variables, it is important for the 
attitude researcher that attitudes are quantitative. The fact that quantitative structure 
is something that should be discovered by the researcher continues to go unnoticed 
by psychologists despite numerous reminders (Michell, 1990, 1997, 1999, 2001a, 
2004a, 2006, 2009). This is attributable to the field’s distortion of the concept of 
measurement. 
 The definition of measurement in psychology is quite distinct from the 
understanding of other sciences. Psychology’s definition was introduced by Stevens 
(1946) and usually takes the form, ‘the assignment of numerals to objects or events 
according to rules’ (p. 677). Henceforth, the immediate problem of measurement is 
not whether psychological variables are in fact measurable, but rather the 
specification of the rule used and the mathematical properties of the resulting scale. 
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By the latter, he meant the specification of the level of the measurement according to 
his now widespread classification, i.e., nominal, ordinal, interval or ratio level. The 
motivations for Stevens’ redefinition are an intriguing episode in the history of 
psychology and vary from the defence of his own ego to the understanding of 
measurement in the philosophy of mathematics (Michell, 1999).  
In 1932, the British Association for the Advancement of Science came 
together to debate, amongst other things, the status of measurement in psychology. In 
their final report there was relative agreement that psychology had not yet developed 
true measurement scales. A particular focus of their criticism was Stevens’ (1934) 
own ‘Sohn scale of loudness’, which alleged to measure the subjective magnitude of 
an auditory sensation. It is clear from his 1946 paper that Stevens took this rather 
personally and led him to claim that the meaning of measurement was reducible to a 
“semantic issue”, and that we should “ recognize that measurement exists in a variety 
of forms” (p.677). 
These two claims point to the contentious aspects of Stevens’ definition. 
Firstly, to talk of measurement as involving the assignment of numerals really does 
reduce it to a semantic issue. One can assign numerals for a multitude of reasons 
beyond the scope of measurement, e.g., the assignment of numerals to the jerseys of 
different football players. This is because numerals are man-made symbols whose 
meaning is ascribed by us and thus may be arbitrarily utilised. Secondly, defining 
measurement as being possible by the application of a number of unspecified rules 
implies that there are a variety of forms of measurement, which is in stark contrast to 
the traditional view (Michell, 1990, 2007).   
The traditional view stems from antiquity and the work of Euclid and 
explicitly underpinned scientific inquiry up until the 20th century (Michell, 2007). A 
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traditional definition of measurement would generally take the form, “the discovery 
or estimation of the ratio of a magnitude of a quantity to a unit of the same quantity” 
(Michell, 1999, p.222). For example, when I report a piece of string as 7cm long, I 
am saying that when I placed a ruler next to that piece of string I discovered that the 
magnitude of the length of this string was approximately seven times the magnitude 
of my chosen unit, the centimetre. Thus, the measure that I report for the piece of 
string is not a form of numerical assignment. It is the discovery of an objective 
property of the world, the discovery of number, which is the ratio between the 
quantities.  
In contrast to the traditional view, Stevens’ definition is derived from the 
representational interpretation of measurement espoused by Campbell (1920, as cited 
in Michell, 2007) and Krantz, Luce, Suppes and Tversky (1971), which is the 
predominate view in the philosophy of mathematics (Michell, 2007). This view 
rejects any claim that numbers are objective properties of the world. Rather, it argues 
that the measurement of empirical quantities is possible because an isomorphism 
(one-to-one mapping) exists between their structure and a part of the abstract real 
number system. Thus, measurement is not entirely an empirical process of discovery 
as it necessitates the assignment of abstract numbers to empirical quantities. This 
was the starting point for Stevens’ (1946, 1959) argument as numbers can be 
assigned as long as a consistent rule specifying the isomorphic relationship is 
followed. 
However, Bostock (1979, as cited in Michell, 1990) and Michell and Ernst 
(1996, 1997) provide proof that the ratios of values of a continuous quantity are 
identical in structure to the positive real numbers. Consequently, realist philosophers 
like Armstrong (1981), Michell (1990) and Newstead and Franklin (2008) argue that 
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these ratios are the positive real numbers and thus these numbers are properties of 
natural systems. Thus, when we measure we are discovering the numerical 
relationships between values of a quantity, and this is an empirical, not 
representational, exercise (Michell, 1990, 2008a)2.  
The debate regarding the realist versus representational interpretation of 
number continues. However, irrespective of whether the properties and relations of a 
quantity are isomorphic to, or instantiate, the positive real numbers, the numbers 
provided by our measurements refer to empirical properties. Thus, whether the rule 
specifying the isomorphic relationship accurately reflects the structure of the variable 
is an empirical question. The representationalist view does not change the fact that 
measurement is only possible when a variable’s structure permits the calculation of 
ratios between its magnitudes and a common unit. 
Stevens’ (1946) reduction of measurement to rule-based numerical 
assignment is heavily influenced by operationism. This scientific doctrine argues that 
our scientific definitions of natural systems should be grounded in the operations we 
utilise to measure or manipulate them (Michell, 1999). The conceptual problems of 
operationism will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5, but the implication for 
Stevens’ approach is that the numerals allocated as a function of the operational rule 
chosen by the researcher define the properties we are trying to measure. However, 
under both the representational and traditional views, these numerals are a 
consequence of these empirical properties and thus cannot validly define them. 
 Despite Stevens’ best efforts to obscure the fact, there is only one rule of 
measurement and that is the traditional definition. Any other view is at odds with the 
paradigm of measurement in science and is more akin to applied numerics (Barrett, 
                                                
2 A more detailed definition of quantity will be provided in Chapter 3 
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2003; Michell, 2008a). Therefore, attitude researchers cannot continue to mistakenly 
believe that the existence of quantitative structure is a function of methodological 
choice. Rather, if claims of measurement are to be made, the burden is upon us to 
provide evidence that attitudes are quantitative. 
Fortunately, Michell’s (1990, 1994) grafting of Coombs’ (1964) theory of 
unidimensional unfolding to Luce and Tukey’s (1964) conjoint measurement theory 
provides attitude researchers with the means to genuinely test this quantitative 
assumption. There is a scientific imperative to do this, as only then will claims of 
measurement as well as the interpretation of attitude scores be justified. Similarly, 
any claims to measure ambivalence must be made in light of this hypothesis. 
Unfortunately, as will be illustrated in the next section, existing methodologies for 
the assessment of ambivalence perpetuate Stevens’ (1946) distorted view of 
measurement. This thesis will be the first to explicitly address the quantitative 
assumption in the context of assessing ambivalent attitudes.  
 
1.6 The current approach to measuring ambivalence and its limitations 
The most commonly utilised method of assessing ambivalence in the contemporary 
attitude literature involves a reformulated rating scale procedure. This generally 
involves splitting a bi-polar rating scale around the neutral point such that one is left 
with two uni-polar scales, one to assess the positive and the other the negative ratings 
of the attitude object (Kaplan, 1972). As can be seen in Figure 1.1 below, these two 
unipolar scales imply the assumption that the independent positive and negative 
dimensions of an attitude possess an interval/quantitative structure. 
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Figure 1.1. An example of a reformulated rating task representing the positive and 
negative dimensions as independent using two uni-polar, 5-point rating scales. 
 
  
 This approach has been argued to measure what has been termed ‘potential’, 
‘objective’ or ‘operative’ ambivalence. This is because it is a relative feature of the 
positive and negative dimensions and does not require people to consciously reflect 
upon how conflicted their attitude is (Armitage & Arden, 2007; Holbrook & 
Krosnick, 2005; Priester & Petty, 1996). The ambivalence ‘measure’ is calculated by 
combining the positive and negative uni-polar ratings using a pre-determined 
formula and it is this formula that has been subject to the most scrutiny. An extensive 
overview of the different formulas can be found in Priester & Petty (1996). However, 
they will not be reviewed in this thesis as the Similarity-Intensity Model exemplifies 
their general properties (Thompson et al., 1995). 
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Thompson et al.’s (1995) Similarity-Intensity model (SIM) has received the 
most attention as an ambivalence formula. This model stipulates that ambivalence 
manifests in two ways. Firstly, it presents in the similarity between the positive and 
negative ratings. Secondly, it is revealed in the intensity of the respective ratings. 
Thus, the more similar your positive and negative judgements are and the more 
intense they are, the greater your potential ambivalence is. Similarity is assessed by 
calculating the absolute difference between the positive (P) and negative (N) ratings 
and intensity is assessed by averaging the positive and negative ratings. This 
conceptualisation is exemplified in the formula below: 
 
                                      Ambivalence = (P + N) / 2 - |P - N|   
 
Thus, ambivalence is equivalent to the intensity of the components corrected by the 
dissimilarity in their magnitude (Thompson et al., 1995). According to this approach, 
ambivalence increases in a linear manner, whereas other similarly premised models 
depict this increase as either positively or negatively accelerating (Priester & Petty, 
1996).  
A number of criticisms apply to these ambivalence formulas. Firstly, as all of 
these models rely upon a reformulation of the summated ratings approach, they are 
undermined by the problem of how to interpret the numbers obtained by this method. 
For example, if we take higher scores to indicate more positive attitudes and scores 
of ‘4’ and ‘2’ on the above positive rating scale, it is not apparent that a respondent 
who obtains a score of ‘4’ possesses an attitude that is either ‘2’ units greater than, or 
twice as positive as a person scoring ‘2’ (Davies, 2004). This is even further 
complicated if we make a similar assessment based upon the negative rating scale 
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and then combine scores across the two dimensions as the various formulations of 
ambivalence would have us do.  
Similar to the method of summated ratings, this reformulation makes the 
assumption that the positive and negative substrates of attitudes are quantitative and 
provides no means of testing this assumption (Michell, 1994). Rather, it relies upon 
its operational ‘rule’ to determine that, firstly, the positive and negative dimensions 
are independent, and secondly, the two dimensions are quantitatively structured. 
However, as discussed in Section 1.5, the measure cannot be used to define these 
properties.  
To be scientifically credible, the researcher must provide evidence that these 
are properties of attitudes and in turn corroborate how their measure causally reflects 
these properties (Borsboom, 2005). Until this is done, there is no justification for 
interpreting and manipulating the scores in the way that these ambivalence formulas 
would have us do. In fact, even if the ratings do reflect the quantitative differences of 
these dimensions, it is unclear what scores derived from adding or subtracting values 
from two independent dimensions reflect.  
This lack of clarity is further exemplified by the SIM’s collapsing of 
similarity and intensity, which it identifies as two separate constructs, in to a single 
score. By doing this, it obscures the respective relationships between them and 
ambivalence. For example, an individual who gave a positive rating of 5 and a 
negative rating of 3 would end up with the same SIM score as an individual who 
gave 2 for both. According to the SIM, the first person’s positive and negative 
feelings are more intense, and the latter person’s more similar, but they would be 
considered similarly ‘ambivalent’. By combining the two dimensions, Thompson et 
al. (1995) betray their own theoretical rationale.  
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In addition, this approach to measuring ambivalence relies upon the 
unfamiliar and perhaps unnatural process of providing independent ratings of 
positive and negative evaluations. For example, as demonstrated in Figure 1.1 above, 
the task may ask the individual to independently indicate how positive or negative 
their attitude toward the issue is whilst ‘putting aside’ the influence of the other. It 
has not been empirically established that this sort of judgement is possible. Just 
because a researcher can ask a respondent to ignore their negative evaluations whilst 
providing a positive rating does not mean that the respondent can comply with the 
request. In fact, by priming a respondent’s negative regard in the instructions for the 
task, the researcher may increase the likelihood that it affects their positive rating.  
The above issues may explain why validation of these measures has only 
been moderately successful, with inter-correlations between these ambivalence 
scores and subjective reports of ambivalence typically ranging from .15 to .42 
(Newby-Clark et al., 2002; Priester & Petty, 1996;). This has lead researchers to 
conclude that these different measures are actually assessing different constructs, 
with the latter tapping in to what has been termed ‘felt’, ‘subjective’ or ‘meta-
psychological’ ambivalence. This conclusion is equally fraught by the influence of 
operationism, with researchers committing to assumptions regarding the underlying 
variable(s) based, for the most part, on their operationalisations of them. This point 
will be addressed in Chapter 5. 
All of the above criticisms illustrate the shortcomings of the mainstream 
approach to assessing ambivalence. As an alternative, unfolding models have been 
shown to avoid and rectify many of these shortcomings (Andrich, 1996; Michell, 
1994; Roberts, Laughlin & Wedell, 1999). It is the proposal of this thesis that the 
unfolding approach provides a more rigorous tool to measure ambivalent attitudes. 
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This approach allows researchers to both investigate the assumptions they are 
making regarding the structure of attitudes and assess ambivalence using methods 
that are proven reliable and that do not require independent indications of positive 
and negative evaluations.  
 
1.7 Measuring ambivalence by unidimensional unfolding. 
The unfolding approach will only be generally introduced here, as the specific 
models will be overviewed in Chapters 2 and 4.  The unfolding approach is premised 
upon Coombs’ (1950, 1964) notion of the ‘ideal point’ whereby each individual is 
located at a specific point on the relevant attitude dimension and they make their 
judgements regarding the attitude items according to this location. That is, an 
individual will tend to endorse an attitude item if its judged location is sufficiently 
close to their own and vice-versa (Roberts et al., 1999). It is termed the ‘unfolding’ 
model as respondents’ preference orderings (I-scales) of the relevant attitude stimuli 
are said to hinge and fold around their ideal point. The underlying attitude dimension 
(qualitative J-scale) is discovered by undoing this folding, or ‘unfolding’ all 
individual preference orders. See Figure 1.2 below for an illustration of this process. 
.  
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Figure 1.2. An illustration of a respondent’s preference ordering of seven attitude 
statements hinged around their ideal point which is most proximal to statement D. 
 
 
Furthermore, as illustrated in Figure 1.3 below, this ideal-point response 
process, whereby degree of agreement is determined by the proximity of the item to 
the person’s location on the latent dimension, results in a single-peaked response 
function. Thus, in this example, a person’s degree of agreement with each of the 
items, A, B, C and D, is not necessarily determined by whether the valence of the 
item is consistent with the valence of their attitude. Rather it depends on whether the 
item falls close to their location on the latent dimension. Hence, even though items B 
expressed a negative attitude and item C expresses a positive attitude, as the person’s 
location falls between the two, an unfolding model would predict that the person 
would display similar levels of agreement with both.  
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Figure 1.3. The single-peaked function derived from the ideal-point response process 
whereby the degree of agreement with the negative items A and B, and the positive 
items C and D is determined by their proximity to the person’s location on the latent 
attitude dimension. 
 
 
As a result of this hypothesised response process, unlike the method of 
summated ratings, the inclusion of items from the entire span of the attitude 
dimension is encouraged. Roberts et al. (1999) point out that traditional scaling 
techniques only lead to the inclusion of moderately located items that are either 
clearly positive or negative in nature. This is because the response process assumed 
by the method of summated ratings is inconsistent with the response behaviour 
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exhibited on more ‘neutral’ or ‘extreme’ items. The preclusion of the sort of ‘neutral’ 
items that may capture ambivalence is not a feature of unfolding measurement 
models. In fact, such ambivalent items are entirely consistent with the unfolding 
approach and are typically used in applications of it.  
For example, Andrich (1988, p.47) addressed participants’ attitudes toward 
capital punishment using such statements drawn from the original work of Thurstone 
(1928) as, “I don’t believe in capital punishment, but I am not sure it isn’t necessary” 
and, “I think capital punishment is necessary, but I wish it were not”. Roberts et al. 
(1999, p.217) included in their study of individuals’ attitudes toward abortion such 
statements as, “There are some cases where abortion is justified, but there are just as 
many cases where it is not”. Such items clearly express the sorts of mixed 
evaluations that underpin attitudinal ambivalence. 
Thus, the unfolding approach promises the simplified approach of 
incorporating the measurement of ambivalence into a generalised attitude 
measurement procedure. The collection of data is done by commonly accepted 
methods such as the use of rating scales or pair comparisons, neither of which 
require participants to provide positive evaluations whilst ignoring negative 
evaluations and vice-versa.  
In addition, unfolding applications have repeatedly considered other attitude 
parameters aside from one’s location on the evaluative dimensions. These include 
attitude intensity and the latitude of acceptance (Davies, 2004; Luo, Andrich & 
Styles, 1998). Consideration of these parameters appears relevant to the 
abovementioned discussion of the relationship between ambivalent evaluative 
judgements and subjective report of ambivalence  (Thompson et al., 1995). These 
points will be further elaborated in the proceeding chapters. 
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Importantly, unlike the method of summated ratings and its reformulation 
discussed in Section 1.6, the unfolding approach allows for the test of one’s 
assumptions regarding the structure of the attitudes being examined. Specifically, 
whether it is tenable to continue conceptualising attitudes as bipolar and quantitative. 
This question is of immediate concern as ambivalence has been interpreted by a 
number of researchers as opposing the traditional bipolar view of attitudes (Cacioppo 
et al., 1997; Conner & Armitage, 2008, Thompson et al., 2005).  
These researchers have argued that bipolarity entails a reciprocal relationship 
between the polar elements, i.e., the presence of one element entails the absence of 
the other. So, in the case of attitudes, the presence of a positive evaluation judgement 
necessitates the absence of a negative judgement and vice-versa. Clearly, 
ambivalence is inconsistent with such an understanding.  As a result, Cacioppo & 
Bernston (1994) and Cacioppo et al. (1997) propose an alternate bivariate model, 
which splits the positive and negative halves of the bipolar continuum in to two, 
independent dimensions. 
 Based on this argument, it appears that ambivalence is at odds with the 
application of unidimensional unfolding models. Furthermore, although unfolding 
models tolerant of multidimensional data have been developed (see Coombs, 1964; 
Hall, 1970), tests of quantitative structure in unfolding applications have not been 
generalised beyond the unidimensional case. This could pose a serious problem for a 
central aim of this thesis. However, Chapter 2 will present the argument that 
ambivalence is entirely consistent with a bipolar attitude dimension and that the 
conceptualisation of bipolarity provided by Cacioppo and his colleagues (1994, 
1997) is incorrect. The ability to test this structural assumption is testament to the 
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superiority of the unfolding approach and its promise to clarify the consequences of 
ambivalence for attitudes. 
 
1.8 Aims and structure of the thesis 
Therefore, the general aim of this thesis is to investigate the implications of 
ambivalence for the conceptualisation and measurement of attitudes. By utilising the 
unfolding approach, it aims to investigate whether ambivalence is consistent with a 
unidimensional, bipolar understanding of attitudes. Furthermore, it intends to 
examine whether ambivalent attitudes may be located on a quantitative evaluative 
dimension and are thus measurable in the traditional sense. Finally, it aims to utilise 
a measure developed out of this work to more rigorously explore the relationship 
between conflicted evaluative judgements and a number of other attitude parameters, 
particularly subjective reports of ambivalence. To achieve this end, a number of steps 
must be completed and these are reflected in the chapter structure below. 
 Firstly in Chapter 2, an alternative conceptualisation of bipolarity that is 
consistent with ambivalence will be presented. The validity of this alternative model 
will be examined using the unfolding approach with respect to a measure that was 
developed from the bivariate perspective. The results will help illuminate whether, 
even when considering ambivalence, it is valid to continue conceptualising the 
evaluative dimension as bipolar. Additionally, it will determine whether the 
application of a unidimensional unfolding model is appropriate for the subsequent 
chapters. 
 In Chapter 3, social issues that a substantial proportion of the sample feels 
ambivalent toward will be determined. In particular, the specific conflicting 
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evaluations will be examined and utilised to construct the attitude scales for each of 
these issues. This will be done utilising a rigorous method that considers the 
semantic structure of evaluative propositions. This is crucial, as these attitude scales 
must be clearly ordered for tests of quantitative structure.  
  Following the construction of the scales, Chapter 4 will present unfolding 
and conjoint measurement analyses to determine whether the evaluative dimension 
for these issues, including ambivalent evaluations, may be validly treated as 
quantitative. This will not only provide further validation of the conceptualisation 
presented in this Chapter 2, but also has implications for the analyses employed in 
Chapter 5.  
 In Chapter 5, the relationships between evaluative judgements, the intensity 
and latitude of acceptance parameters and subjective judgements of ambivalence for 
these issues will be examined. This analysis will utilise latent variable modelling in 
an attempt to overcome operational biases that have confounded similar research. 
This examination of the latent structure of the evaluative system is expected to 
further validate the arguments regarding the relationship between ambivalence and 
the bipolar conceptualisation of attitudes as well as the use of the unfolding 
approach. 
 Finally, the implications and limitations of the thesis as well as proposals for 
future research will be addressed in Chapter 6.  
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Chapter 2 - Is ambivalence consistent with the bipolar 
conceptualisation and measurement of attitudes? 
 
2.1 Introduction 
As previously discussed in Chapter 1, since the measurement of attitudes began with 
Thurstone (1928), the evaluative continuum has been conceptualised as bipolar in 
structure. Despite the intrinsic appeal of this conceptualisation, a number of 
researchers have called for its rejection in favour of a bivariate approach, arguing 
that bipolar models do not account for ambivalent attitudes.  
The main proponents of a bivariate conceptualisation have been Cacioppo 
and his colleagues (Cacioppo & Bernston, 1994; Cacioppo, Gardner & Berntson, 
1997, 1999). In the presidential address to the Society for Personality and Social 
Psychology, these proponents tolled what they saw as the death knell for the bipolar 
measurement of attitudes, citing a number of studies that they argue demonstrate the 
inadequacy of bipolar models (Cacioppo et al., 1997). In particular, psychometric 
examinations of the relationship between measures of positive and negative 
evaluations do not typically indicate strong inverse relationships. Such a relationship 
is presumed to be an implicit part of the bipolar understanding.  
This chapter will present the argument that this evidence cannot be treated as 
conclusive as it is undermined by the assumption that linear analyses are appropriate 
for bipolar concepts (van Schuur & Kiers, 1993). Secondly, it will present a 
conceptual argument that the assumption that bipolarity entails a reciprocal 
relationship between the polar elements is incorrect, and thus ambivalent attitudes 
  31 
are consistent with a bipolar conceptualisation. Finally, it will attempt to confirm this 
compatibility between ambivalent attitudes and a unidimensional, bipolar continuum 
using a probabilistic unfolding model. This will be done utilising scales developed 
by proponents of the bivariate conceptualisation of attitudes to ensure that the 
conclusions are not confounded by a bipolar bias in the measure.  
 
2.2 Evaluating the evidence against the bipolar measurement of attitudes 
Whilst acknowledging the almost self-evident appeal of the bipolar understanding of 
attitudes, Cacioppo et al. (1997) argue that it can no longer be taken seriously. As 
discussed in Section 1.7, their rejection of bipolarity is premised upon a definition 
whereby the relationship between the positive and negative substrates of an attitude 
is reciprocal, i.e., the presence of positive evaluations entails the absence of negative 
evaluations and vice-versa. In this sense, the bipolar continuum is postulated to range 
from extremely positive evaluations at one pole through a ‘neutral’ zone at the centre 
to extremely negative evaluations at the other pole. As a result of their reciprocal 
definition, Cacioppo et al. take this ‘neutral zone’ to be constituted by the absence of 
any significant positive or negative evaluation, or what is typically termed attitudinal 
indifference. As a result of this understanding, one of their primary criticisms is that 
such a model cannot account for attitudinal ambivalence. This leads them to 
conclude that a two-dimensional representation of attitude space is required to 
capture all possible attitude states.  
In this representation, the relationship between positive and negative 
evaluations can be both reciprocal, as is typically conceived, as well as non-
reciprocal, as is the case with ambivalent attitudes. The psychometric evidence for 
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this representation includes a number of studies where separate, bivariate measures 
of positive and negative evaluations were not found to significantly, negatively 
correlate nor load on to a common factor (Patchen, Hofman & Davidson, 1976; 
Cacioppo et al., 1997). Such linear analyses appear to confirm a bivariate evaluative 
continuum.  
Furthermore, a number of participants in the above studies provided both 
strongly positive and strongly negative evaluations on these measures. Traditional 
bipolar measures, given their assumptions of reciprocity, would not have been able to 
accommodate these ambivalent individuals. Thus, it is argued that bipolar 
measurement scales must be abandoned in favour of bivariate scales. Consequently, 
Cacioppo et al. (1997) designed the Bivariate Evaluations and Ambivalence 
Measures (BEAMs), which include separate sets of items to assess positive, negative 
and ambivalent attitudes using unipolar rating scales. Scores on each of the scales are 
determined by a summated ratings procedure. 
 
2.2.1 An alternative bipolar conceptualisation 
Closer scrutiny of the evidence for the bivariate conceptualisation supports the 
conclusion that attitude measurement needs to move beyond the existing bipolar 
measures. Cacioppo et al. (1997, p. 6) correctly identify that the bipolar continuum 
implicitly accepted by attitude researchers for close to a century is in fact “artificial”. 
This artificial conception of bipolarity has likely been influenced by the method of 
summated ratings, which was discussed in Section 1.4.  
However, it is unclear that the bipolar conceptualisation and measurement of 
attitudes needs to be abandoned altogether. Deeper consideration suggests that the 
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proponents of the bivariate understanding incorrectly assume that bipolarity entails a 
reciprocal relationship between then polar elements. Real bipolar variables possess a 
mixing of their polar elements at their centre. Thus, in the attitude domain, a bipolar 
dimension is able to accommodate ambivalence. This is made clear by considering 
any number of bipolar analogies.  
One such analogy, which was incorrectly invoked by Cacioppo et al. (1997), 
is the balance knob on an audio stereo (see Figure 2.1). When turned to the left pole 
only sound from the left channel is audible, when turned to the right pole only sound 
from the right channel is audible. However, when turned to the centre the result is 
not the absence of either channel, but rather the mixing of the two to give stereo 
sound. A similar relationship is found when considering a mixer tap, which delivers 
hot and cold water in a bipolar fashion. At one pole it delivers hot water, at the other 
pole it delivers cold water, at the centre it delivers a mix of both hot and cold water, 
which is commonly termed warm.  
In fact, it appears that the so-called bipolar continuum critiqued by Cacioppo 
et al. (1997) is implicitly bivariate. Achieving the analogous state to attitudinal 
indifference in the stereo example requires a unipolar balance knob for each channel 
so that no sound is emitting from the speakers. For the mixer-tap example, one 
requires both a hot and a cold tap turned to their off positions so that neither hot, nor 
cold water are flowing. Alternatively, one requires the additional dimension of a 
lever that controls water flow. It appears that the attitudinal state at the centre of the 
evaluative bipolar continuum should be interpreted as a ‘mixing’ of positive and 
negative evaluations, or attitudinal ambivalence. If this is empirically verified, it will 
greatly undermine the assertion that ambivalence entails the end for the bipolar 
conceptualisation of attitudes.  
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Figure 2.1. The bipolar balance knob analogy and the novel understanding of the 
bipolar attitude continuum illustrating the mixing of the polar elements at the centre 
of the continuum. 
 
2.2.2 Linear analyses of bipolar constructs 
In addition, the psychometric evidence for a bivariate understanding is undermined 
by its reliance upon linear analyses of the relationship between positive and negative 
evaluations. A similar debate in the affect literature has repeatedly criticised the use 
of correlational and factor analyses to confirm bivariate models. These criticisms 
have included the bivariate modellers disregard for the obscuring effect of 
measurement error, as well as the attenuating effect of ambiguous response formats 
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on correlational analyses (Green, Goldman & Salovey, 1993; Russell & Carroll, 
1999).  
Of most relevance to the current chapter is the criticism by a number of 
authors that factor and correlational analyses are inappropriate for analysing bipolar 
concepts as they assume that the observed measures are linearly related to the 
underlying latent variable (Coombs & Kao. 1960; Ross & Cliff, 1964; Davison, 
1976; Van Schuur and Kiers, 1994). As introduced in Chapter 1, when a dataset 
conforms to a unidimensional unfolding model this relationship is a single-peaked, 
non-linear function. This is because in unfolding models, individuals’ responses are 
contingent upon the distance between their locations (ideal-points) and the items’ 
locations on the latent dimension. Hence, even if a person and item are located on the 
positive side of the evaluative dimension, that person will only strongly endorse the 
item if their locations are sufficiently close. So in terms of correlational analyses, 
only items that are proximal on the dimension will highly positively correlate. As the 
distance between items increase, their correlation decreases toward zero and then 
increases again in the negative direction.  
In terms of factor analyses, these authors point out that an unfoldable dataset 
will manifest an extra factor. This is problematic as it leads the researcher to 
erroneously conclude that there are two latent variables underpinning the responses. 
Van Schuur and Kiers (1994) suggest that this ‘extra-factor phenomenon’ is the most 
parsimonious explanation of the bivariate solution obtained in studies of the structure 
of emotion. Therefore, if it can be shown that responses to a bivariate attitude 
measure fit a unidimensional unfolding model, then correlational or factor analyses 
of the subscales of the measure can no longer be interpreted as compelling evidence 
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for the bivariate interpretation. This study will utilise the Hyperbolic Cosine Model 
(HCM) for this purpose (Andrich & Luo, 1993).  
This model is being utilised instead of Coombs’ (1964) deterministic model, 
which is to be used in later chapters, as it is a probabilistic measurement model and 
thus more tolerant of unfolding violations. This is an important point for the current 
study as the stimuli to be utilised were not designed for unfolding applications and 
thus it is unlikely that they will adhere to the strict requirements of the deterministic 
model. Despite this tolerance of error, the responses must reasonably fit the 
assumptions of the model. This is crucial as, unlike the method of summated ratings, 
the model is falsifiable and it is therefore meaningful to ask whether attitude 
judgements are consistent with it. The specific details of the model are set out below. 
 
2.3 The Hyperbolic Cosine Model  
Like all unfolding models, the HCM approaches preferential judgement behaviour as 
being governed by an ideal-point response process, albeit in a probabilistic way. It is 
so named as the single-peakedness of the resulting response function is naturally 
captured by the hyperbolic cosine function. Unlike less restrictive non-parametric 
unfolding models, such as Van Schuur’s (1993), this model provides estimates of 
both the item ordering and location. This is important as these item location 
estimates allows for a more specific investigation of the alternative bipolar 
conceptualisation presented in 2.2.1, which hypothesises that ambivalent attitudes are 
located at the centre of the dimension. 
The original HCM model for direct responses hypothesised that there are 
three latent responses that correspond to the manifest, Agree and Disagree responses. 
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These include; (1) Disagree below: because the person considers him/herself below 
the position of the statement, (2) Agree close: as the person considers him/herself 
close to the location of the statement, and (3) Disagree above: because the person 
considers him/herself above the position of the statement. These latent responses are 
illustrated in Figure 2.2 below, which is drawn from Andrich and Luo (1993). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. The category response functions for the three response categories; 
Disagree below (DB), Agree close (AC) and Disagree above (DA) (Andrich & Luo, 
1993). 
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If we take the example where an individual is asked to respond to a statement 
in which both they and the statement are located on the same linear continuum, if the 
individual’s location, denoted by β in Figure 2.2, is very close to the statement 
location, denoted by δ in Figure 2.2, the person will tend to agree with the statement. 
As the distance between the individual’s location and the statement’s location 
increases, in either direction, the probability of an agree response will decrease. This 
is illustrated by the single-peaked (solid) Agree response curve in the Figure. This 
gives rise to the complementary Disagree response. The probability of a disagree 
response will increase as an individual’s location becomes greater than the 
statement’s, or as the location of the individual becomes less than that of the 
statement. This is illustrated by the two (broken) Disagree response functions. The 
fact that the manifest disagree response provides no indication of the direction in 
which the individual’s location is removed from the statements’ location gives rise to 
the ‘unfolding’ process (Andrich & Luo, 1993). This process allows the construction 
of a linear continuum in which direction has meaning from directionless responses 
by unfolding these responses around the individual’s location (their ideal point). 
The HCM for rating or polytomous responses, which will be utilised in this 
chapter, is an extension of the above dichotomous example, albeit somewhat more 
complicated given the extra response categories present in the rating scale (Andrich, 
1996; Luo, 2001). In this model, the category that represents the greatest agreement 
corresponds to a single latent agree close response function. All other ordered 
response categories correspond to two latent disagree response functions, disagree 
below and disagree above. So, as the distance between a person’s location and a 
statement’s location on the attitude continuum increases in either direction, the 
probability that the category of maximum agreement will be selected decreases. The 
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probability that one of the other categories will be selected is contingent upon the 
magnitude of the distance between the person and statement locations.  
For example, in the 4-point rating scale case with the ordered categories, 
‘Strongly Disagree’, ‘Disagree’, ‘Agree’ and ‘Strongly Agree’, the ‘Strongly Agree’ 
category corresponds to a single latent agree response function. The other three 
categories correspond to two latent disagree response functions whose proximity to 
the agree function is dictated by the manifest ordering of the categories. This may 
seem unusual for the ‘Agree’ response category as it is presumably selected to 
indicate a level of agreement with the item, not disagreement. However, in terms of 
the ideal-point response process, the fact that the person did not select the strongly 
agree category for the item indicates that the item is not sufficiently close to their 
own location. Thus, they do possess some level of disagreement with the item, either 
because its location is somewhat above or somewhat below their location, i.e., the 
item represents an attitude that is either somewhat too extreme or not extreme 
enough in comparison to their own. As the magnitude of this difference between the 
item and person locations increases the probability that the strongly disagree 
response category will be selected increases. 
 Parameters are estimated utilising the joint maximum likelihood estimation 
procedure and model fit is determined by a chi-square (X2) fit statistic, which 
examines the statistical significance of the divergence between observed and 
expected values3. Thus, Andrich (1996) and Luo (2001) spell out how the HCM can 
be applied to the sort of rating responses typically gathered in attitude research. This 
chapter will utilise this model to investigate whether a measure presumed to support 
                                                
3 For a thorough mathematical overview of the derivation of the HCM parameters 
see Andrich and Luo (1993), Andrich (1996) and Luo (2001). 
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the bivariate interpretation, in fact, fits a bipolar solution like the one depicted in 
Figure 2.2. 
 
2.4 Aims and Hypotheses 
The primary aim of this chapter is to examine whether ambivalence renders the 
assumption that attitudes possess a bipolar, unidimensional structure untenable. 
Specifically, it aims to demonstrate utilising an unfolding approach that ambivalence 
is consistent with the bipolar conceptualisation and measurement of attitudes. 
Furthermore, it intends to empirically verify the alternative conceptualisation of the 
bipolar evaluative dimension, which depicts ambivalent evaluations as constituting 
its centre.  
 Firstly, it is hypothesised that the linear (correlational and factor) analyses of 
the responses to the BEAMs will be consistent with past findings and interpretations, 
whereby there will be few strong negative correlations between the items of the 
positive and negative subscales and the positive, negative and ambivalent subscales 
will load on to separate factors. However, this will not be assumed to provide support 
for the bivariate interpretation as, secondly, it is hypothesised that the subscales will 
adequately fit the bipolar, unidimensional HCM. Furthermore, it is predicted that the 
items of the ambivalent subscale will be located toward the centre of the evaluative 
dimension.  
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2.5 Method 
2.5.1 Participants 
The study included 121 introductory psychology students from the University of 
Sydney. The sample included 86 females and 35 males. Their ages ranged between 
17 and 27 (M = 19.20, SD = 3.23). All participants received partial course credit in 
return for their participation. 
 
2.5.2 Materials  
This study utilised Cacioppo et al.’s (1997) Bivariate Evaluations and Ambivalence 
Measures (BEAMs) to assess attitudes toward abortion, Aboriginal Australians and 
homosexuality. These issues were selected as previous research has indicated that 
they are consistently subject to ambivalent evaluations (Alvarez and Brehm, 2002; 
Craig, Martinez & Kane, 2005; Katz & Hass, 1988; Katz, Wackenhut & Hass, 1986; 
Meyer, 1977). Furthermore, it seemed reasonable to the researcher that a significant 
number of first-year psychology students may feel ambivalent toward these issues. 
The presentation order of the issues was counterbalanced across participants. 
The BEAMs consists of three subscales designed to assess positive, negative 
and ambivalent evaluations in a unipolar manner, i.e., ranging from the complete 
absence of that form of evaluation to the complete presence of it. Two forms of the 
positive and negative subscales were utilised, form A to assess people’s attitudes 
toward abortion and homosexuality, and form B to assess people’s attitudes toward 
Aboriginal Australians. The forms were split across the attitude issues rather than the 
sample within each issue in order to maximise the respondents for each of the 
unfolding analyses. This was not seen as problematic as both forms have been argued 
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to be statistically equivalent (Cacioppo et al., 1997). The items from each of the 
subscales are set out in Table 2.1 below. The presentation order of each subscale was 
counterbalanced across participants. 
 Unlike the ambivalence measure outlined in Section 1.6, the BEAMs do not 
rely upon any formulaic combination of positive and negative ratings as they include 
a subscale of ambivalent items. This inclusion of these ambivalent items enables the 
investigation of their location relative to the positive and negative items. Thus, the 
use of the BEAMs enables a test of the assumption that ambivalence necessitates a 
bivariate understanding. Furthermore, the scales were developed to minimise a 
bipolar interpretation of the measure, which may potentially confound the 
conclusions drawn from the unfolding analyses. 
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Table 2.1 
Form A and Form B Items of the BEAMs positive, negative and ambivalent 
subscales. 
Positive Negative Ambivalent 
A B A B A/B 
Favourable Desirable Undesirable Unfavourable Muddled 
Appealing Positive Negative Unappealing Jumbled 
Pleasant Likable Unlikable Unpleasant Tense 
Agreeable Happy Unhappy Disagreeable Conflicted 
Approving Supporting Opposing Disapproving Divided 
Rewarding Good Bad Punishing Contradictory 
Delighted Attractive Unattractive Distressed  
Comfortable Satisfying Unsatisfying Uncomfortable   
 
 
 
Specifically, the different forms were developed to curtail participants 
treating the unipolar scales as bipolar scales. For example, if a participant was 
presented with the ‘positive’ item from the positive subscale and the ‘negative’ item 
from the negative subscale, they may tend to interpret the items as constituting a 
bipolar scale together and thus provide opposite responses based upon this 
interpretation. Therefore, instead of being presented with the opposite item, 
participants are presented with a synonym of it, which in this case would be 
‘unappealing’. Cacioppo et al. (1997) argued that this minimised the interpretation of 
bipolarity across items.  
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In addition, the subscales were completed individually and were separated by 
a filler-task. This filler task consisted of a number of different esoteric analogies, 
e.g., “Chick is to Hen as Calf is to…?” (Stankov, 1997). This filler task was 
included, consistent with Cacioppo et al. (1997), to further reduce the likelihood that 
participants interpreted each of the subscales as constituting a larger bipolar scale.  
Participants indicated the extent to which each item reflected their attitude on 
a unipolar scale ranging from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). Note that 
this rating scale is different to the scale utilised to develop the HCM for polytomous 
responses. However, similar to the example provided in Section 2.3, any response 
less than 5 may be taken to indicate that the item was not sufficiently proximal to the 
person’s location on the dimension to warrant extreme agreement with it. Thus, it 
indicated a level of disagreement. In line with the HCM, this may either be because 
the item was located below or above the person’s location. Although this scale was 
unable to differentiate extreme disagreement with the items, this was deemed 
secondary to reducing any demand characteristic of the measure that may be 
interpreted as influencing the bipolar solution. 
The Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients for each of the subscales and 
each of the forms were all acceptable, ranging from .81 to .92.  
 
2.5.3 Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups that ranged in size from 2 to 10 people. All 
questionnaires were administered electronically utilising Quask FormArtist survey 
software (http://www.quask.com)(See Appendix A for an example screenshot of the 
task and instructions). Participants were initially given a general introduction to the 
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purpose of the study as well as the relevant ethical information. They then completed 
all tasks across the three issues. Upon completion, they electronically submitted their 
data and were provided with a thorough debriefing of the study. 
 
2.6 Results 
The data were initially subjected to the traditional linear analyses, including 
correlational and factor analyses, to confirm that it was comparable to Cacioppo et 
al.’s (1997) original findings. As predicted, the overall inspection of the pattern of 
correlations between the positive and negative subscales items revealed no strong 
linear relationship, with correlations ranging from absent to only moderate in 
strength. The average of the positive-negative item correlations was -.32 for the 
abortion issue, -.22 for the Aboriginal Australians issue, and -.31 for the 
homosexuality issue. See Appendix B for the complete set of correlations. 
In addition, as hypothesised, the results of the factor analyses revealed a 
three-factor solution for each of the issues, with the BEAMs positive, negative and 
ambivalent subscales only loading substantially on to single, separate factors. The 
averages of the loadings for each of the issues are presented in Table 2.2 below. See 
Appendix B for the complete set of factor loadings. 
After demonstrating the data’s comparability with past findings, the 
unfolding analyses were performed using Luo’s (2002) RateFOLD2002 Version 2.03 
software. The tests of fit and location parameters of the HCM for each of the issues 
can be seen in Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.2 
Average of the Varimax4 factor loadings across items of the BEAMs positive, 
negative and ambivalent subscales for the abortion, Aboriginal Australians and 
homosexuality issues. 
         Aboriginal  
  
Abortion* 
Australians** 
Homosexuality*** 
Subscale F1 F2 F3 F1 F2 F3 F1 F2 F3 
Negative 0.73 -0.18 0.24 0.67 -0.17 0.27 0.74 -0.21 0.25 
Positive -0.28 0.61 -0.05 -0.14 0.74 -0.04 -0.21 0.73 -0.05 
Ambivalent 0.17 -0.09 0.76 0.31 -0.02 0.62 0.26 -0.02 0.70 
* Eigenvalues were 8.45, 3.02 and 1.79 and the final solution explained 60.26% of the overall 
variance. 
** Eigenvalues were 7.57, 3.73 and 1.72 and the final solution explained 59.18% of the overall 
variance. 
*** Eigenvalues were 8.59, 3.67 and 1.52 and the final solution explained 62.68% of the overall 
variance. 
 
 
                                                
4 An orthogonal rotation was applied and presented here to replicate the procedures 
of Cacioppo et al. (1997). However, given that one would expect some level of 
correlation across the subscales, an oblique rotation would have been more 
appropriate (Russell, 2002). Additional analyses were performed utilising an oblique 
rotation as well as both principal components and maximum likelihood extraction 
methods and the pertinent results were found to be equivalent to the above analysis 
across the three issues. Interestingly, when an oblique rotation was applied, the 
Positive and Negative factors were found to moderately, negatively correlate, 
ranging from -.34 to -.53 across the three issues. 
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Table 2.3 
The Hyperbolic Cosine Model scaling solutions and tests of fit for the Abortion, Aboriginal 
Australians and Homosexuality BEAMs (Form B items in brackets were used for the Aboriginal 
Australians issue) 
  Abortion Aboriginal Aus.   Homosexuality 
Item Location χ2 Location χ2 Location χ2 
Positive       
1) Delighted (Attractive) 2.89 4.34 1.92 14.31 2.80 42.34* 
2) Comfortable (Satisfying) 2.85 13.00 1.85 10.96 2.63 12.70 
3) Pleasant (Likable) 2.80 17.07 2.14 9.66 2.84 27.1* 
4) Rewarding (Good) 2.75 18.47 2.12 15.74 3.20 14.25 
5) Appealing (Positive) 2.68 12.70 1.98 18.01 3.13 34.87* 
6) Approving (Supporting) 2.61 11.74 1.69 15.39 2.81 11.17 
7) Agreeable (Happy) 2.29 25.66 2.33 14.18 2.62 20.99 
8) Favorable (Desirable) 2.19 13.10 2.15 19.70 2.86 26.13 
Ambivalent       
9) Jumbled -0.93 21.92 -0.32 12.05 -1.23 22.18 
10) Conflicted -0.93 27.49* -0.35 26.95* -1.11 18.19 
11) Muddled -0.95 31.71* -0.55 22.57* -1.08 19.12 
12) Divided -1.00 16.34 -0.63 15.34 -1.22 29.67* 
13) Contradictory -1.01 32.25* -1.00 15.57 -1.12 9.88 
14) Tense -1.33 7.00 -1.09 15.11 -1.21 27.27* 
Negative       
15) Unattractive (Distressed) -1.41 14.52 -2.24 4.79 -1.76 22.18 
16) Unsatisfying (Uncomfortable) -1.56 23.20 -1.16 14.30 -1.56 19.21 
17) Undesirable (Unfavourable) -1.73 21.73 -1.50 10.61 -2.00 30.4* 
18) Unhappy (Disagreeable) -1.78 19.47 -1.25 10.40 -1.78 5.59 
19) Opposing (Disapproving) -1.87 8.93 -1.52 6.96 -1.79 13.51 
20) Bad (Punishing) -2.04 9.96 -2.17 4.36 -2.48 10.55 
21) Unlikable (Unpleasant) -2.22 14.36 -1.21 4.90 -2.22 8.89 
22) Negative (Unappealing) -2.26 9.86 -1.19 20.34 -2.35 18.80 
*p<.05 indicating lack of fit to the HCM model. 
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The solutions obtained for the abortion, Aboriginal Australians and 
homosexuality BEAMs were mostly consistent with predictions. Inspection of Table 
2.3 reveals that for each of the issues the items of the positive subscale were located 
at one end of the latent continuum, the negative subscale items at the other, and most 
importantly the ambivalent subscale items were located toward the centre of the 
continuum, although somewhat more to the negative end than expected. The overall 
test of fit revealed that the abortion (χ2351 = 374.80, p = .18) and Aboriginal 
Australians (χ2351 = 302.18, p = .06) BEAMs fit the unidimensional, bipolar HCM. 
Overall, the Homosexuality BEAMs were not found to fit the HCM (χ2351 = 417.19, p 
= .01). However, inspection of Table 3 reveals that 16 of the 22 items were in 
accordance with the HCM. This indicated that the overall misfit might have only 
been attributable to a small number of the items. 
The statement maps for each of the issues, which illustrate the location of the 
BEAMs items and frequency distribution of respondents along the attitude 
continuum, are presented in Figure 2.3 below. Specifically, these maps illustrate how 
the ambivalent subscale items were more proximal to the negative end of the 
continuum than predicted. Of the three issues, the distributions of items for the 
Aboriginal Australians BEAMs were most in accordance with the third hypothesis, 
whereby the ambivalent subscale items were located at the approximate centre of the 
bipolar continuum.  
In addition, the statement maps illustrate how the items of each subscale were 
quite clustered. This clustering was at a moderate location relative to the sample for 
the negative subscale and quite extreme for the positive subscale across the three 
issues. 
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2.7 Discussion 
Overall, the results provide evidence that ambivalent attitudes are consistent with a 
bipolar conceptualisation and that linear analyses cannot be used as evidence for a 
bivariate interpretation. As expected, the linear analyses were found to be consistent 
with past findings. But, as predicted, the abortion and Aboriginal Australians 
BEAMs were found to adequately fit the HCM. The homosexuality BEAMs were 
not consistent with the HCM, however, this overall misfit was largely attributable to 
a small number of the items.  
The scaling solutions, particularly for the Aboriginal Australians BEAMs, 
were consistent with the hypothesis that the ambivalent subscale items would be 
located toward the centre of the evaluative dimension. These solutions provide 
preliminary validation of this chapter’s alternative bipolar conceptualisation. 
In addition to the hypotheses, the dual scaling of both items and persons by 
unfolding analysis provided evidence that, counter to the assumptions of the 
summated ratings approach typically employed, the BEAMs were not invariant 
across issues and that particular items were more or less extreme and in some cases 
inappropriate for particular issues.  This demonstrates the advantages of the 
unfolding approach beyond the ambivalence issue.  
 
2.7.1 A new conceptualisation of bipolar attitudes 
Just as the stereo balance knob and the mixer tap possess a mixing of the polar 
elements at their centre, this chapter provides preliminary evidence that ambivalence 
is at the centre of the bipolar, evaluative dimension. Although such validation has 
been implicit in earlier unfolding research, this study is the first to use a measure 
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developed out of the bivariate approach to demonstrate this. As explained in Section 
2.5.2, the BEAMs were specifically developed to minimise the participants’ 
perceptions of them as bipolar. Thus, the overall bipolar solution obtained for two of 
the three attitude issues may be argued to be relatively free of any confounding effect 
of this potential demand characteristic. However, in contrast with the new bipolar 
conceptualisation, the scaling solutions for the ambivalent subscale located these 
items closer to the negative pole than expected, particularly for the abortion and 
homosexuality issues.  
This finding is consistent with Cacioppo et al. (1997) who explain it as being 
the result of ambivalence’s greater affinity with negative evaluations. More simply, it 
could be the case that some participants perceive the descriptors in the ambivalence 
subscale as more mildly negative than ambivalent. This seems a reasonable 
speculation when one considers the valence of such items as ‘divided’, ‘tense’ or 
‘contradictory’, which were consistently scaled close to the negative items. The 
items of this subscale appear to depict ambivalent or negative feeling states that may 
arise from ambivalent evaluations, rather than the evaluations themselves.  
In addition, the overall misfit for the homosexuality issue may be seen as 
evidence for the bivariate interpretation. However, it appears that a number of the 
BEAMs items may not be appropriate for assessing attitudes toward this issue. 
Specifically, the items that contributed the greatest level of misfit were the 
‘delighted’ and ‘appealing’ items of the positive subscale. The relevance of these 
items appears limited, particularly in the case of the latter, which may be quite 
differently interpreted by heterosexual and homosexual individuals.  
Clearly, to further validate this new bipolar conceptualisation, attitude scales 
that include more carefully constructed ambivalent items that reflect conflicting 
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evaluations are needed. Furthermore, issues that have been empirically shown to be 
subject to considerable levels of ambivalence by the current sample should be 
considered. The establishment of these issues and the construction of such scales will 
be addressed in Chapter 3. 
 It should also be noted that the above discussion of the location of the items 
is intended in a very tentative manner. Any discussion of the relations between the 
items over and above their ordering implies that these differences are quantitative. 
As previously discussed, whether or not attitudes can be considered quantitative is an 
empirical question, and it is a question that the current chapter takes for granted. This 
is because even though this quantitative assumption is central to the HCM, the tests 
of fit employed are not sensitive to it. Hence, data that are demonstrably non-
quantitative are able to fit the model (Kyngdon & Richards, 2007).  
However, unlike most other instances of attitude research, this assumption 
will be tested in Chapter 4. Even if the HCM is artificially imposing quantitative 
relations making the discussion of locations nonsensical, the current chapter at the 
very least demonstrates that the ordinal relations between the items are consistent 
with the alternative conceptualisation of the bipolar ordering. That is, it provides 
support for the fact that attitudes are ordered from extremely positive through to 
extremely negative with ambivalent attitudes ordered between them. In addition to 
this question of quantitivity, there are a number of other criticisms that may be 
levelled at this alternative conceptualisation of bipolar attitudes. 
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2.7.2 Criticisms of the new bipolar conceptualisation 
A potentially debilitating criticism of this new conceptualisation of the bipolar 
attitude continuum is that just as its predecessor discounts ambivalence, this model 
does not allow for the expression of indifferent attitudes. Inspection of the item 
misfit across the three issues reveals that a substantial number of these items are 
from the ambivalence subscale. It seems a reasonable speculation that this is 
attributable to the divergent interpretation of these items by ambivalent versus 
indifferent individuals. 
Whilst at face value the fact that the new bipolar conceptualisation does not 
account for indifference appears to be a severe deficiency, deeper consideration 
suggests otherwise. When the attitude researcher utilises such procedures as those in 
the current study, what they are attempting to do is locate the respondents’ position 
on the evaluative dimension, whether it be understood as bipolar or bivariate. 
Attitudinal indifference is defined as the absence of any form of evaluation or 
significant attitude in the respondent, they simply do not care or may not know about 
the issue (Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2006). Thus, to attempt to locate such individuals on 
the evaluative dimension seems analogous to the absurd situation of attempting to 
weigh something that has no weight. 
 Such a point highlights the argument made by the social judgment theorists 
and attitude strength researchers (Krosnick, Boninger, Chuang, Berent & Carnot, 
1993; Sherif, Sherif & Nebergall, 1965). This is the assertion that individuals’ 
attitudes cannot be represented as a single point on an evaluative dimension. They 
highlight the relevance of a number of other attitude parameters. In particular, what 
has been termed ego involvement or attitude intensity (Cooke & Sheeran, 2004; De 
Liver, Van der Pligt & Wigboldus, 2007; Thompson et al., 1995). It is such a 
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parameter that is far more adept at identifying indifference as it is directly concerned 
with how much an individual cares, or does not care, about a particular issue.  
Furthermore, the relevance of the attitude intensity parameter goes beyond 
just the identification of indifference as it has been found to inform us about such 
factors as individuals’ susceptibility to change and to be predictive of behaviour over 
and above evaluative location (Krosnick et al., 1993). Thus, attitude intensity will be 
investigated in Chapter 5 to address this issue of where indifferent individuals locate 
themselves on the evaluative dimension, as well as its relationship with subjective 
reports of ambivalence. 
Another potential criticism is that this chapter’s psychometric focus leads it 
to disregard a large proportion of the non-measurement based evidence cited in 
Cacioppo et al. (1997) for the bivariate conceptualisation of attitudes. They refer to a 
number of neurophysiological and experimental studies that indicate the 
independence of the positive and negative evaluative processes underpinning 
attitudes. However, the lack of extensive review of such evidence in this chapter is 
not a result of a psychometric bias. Rather there is no dispute regarding the growing 
body of evidence for this independence.  
What the current argument does dispute is that these independent processes 
necessitate bivariate measurement. Green, Salovey and Truax (1999) make the point 
in the affect literature that the experience of positive and negative emotion may 
occur along bipolar lines even if the processes underlying these feelings are 
understood as being physiologically separable systems. Similarly, the experience of 
attitudes may vary along bipolar lines even if the underlying positive and negative 
evaluative processes are independent. Returning to the mixer tap analogy, even 
though the hot and cold water flowing from the tap are caused, to a certain extent, by 
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distinct processes, the endpoint is bipolar. It is the cognitive endpoint of an attitude, 
the evaluative judgement, which is being investigated in this thesis. The findings of 
this chapter provide preliminary evidence that it should equally be treated as varying 
in a bipolar manner.  
 
2.7.3 Moving beyond the method of summated ratings in favour of unfolding 
approaches 
In addition, the current findings present further evidence that Cacioppo et al. (1997) 
should not have been encouraging attitude researchers to move beyond bipolar 
conceptualisations, but rather to move beyond the ubiquitous method of summated 
ratings. The scaling solutions for the positive and negative subscales of the BEAMs 
reveals a pattern typical of a measure developed under the summated ratings 
approach (Roberts et al., 1999). This includes the bunching of similarly valenced 
items around a usually moderate location on the latent continuum. Such a pattern is 
particularly noticeable in the items of the negative subscale.  
This is symptomatic of the method of summated ratings’ reliance upon the 
vast majority of individuals’ attitudes being located at moderate areas of the latent 
dimension to provide accurate estimates of them (Roberts et al., 1999). Whilst this 
may be found to be the case for a majority of individuals and issues, it is unclear why 
this should be assumed from the outset. Furthermore, even if the majority of 
participants may be estimated well for a particular issue by this approach, it is 
unclear why we should accept the poor estimation of the minority whose attitudes are 
located toward the extremes or centre of the dimension when there is a viable 
alternative model that can account for all. 
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In this chapter, preliminary evidence has been provided that unlike the 
method of summated ratings, the unfolding approach can account for ambivalent 
attitudes. This is because it does not require the exclusively positive or exclusively 
negative scoring of the stimuli and thus one can include the sorts of ambivalent items 
prohibited by the summated ratings approach. Similarly, Roberts et al. (1999) 
demonstrated that the unfolding approach can better account for attitudes at the 
extremes of the continuum, because it allows for the inclusion of extreme items. 
Unfolding models do not presume that an individual with an attitude of a certain 
valence will endorse all items of the same valence. Rather, they will only endorse the 
items with locations on the latent continuum sufficiently proximal to their own. 
These endorsed items may be positive, ambivalent or negative depending on the 
relative location of the person. Consequently, the unfolding approach encourages the 
provision of items that address the entire span of the attitude continuum, including 
central, moderate and extreme locations, whilst still permitting the use of the familiar 
rating scale methodology.  
 
2.7.4 Conclusions 
This chapter provides evidence that ambivalence is not at odds with the bipolar, 
unidimensional conceptualisation of attitudes. The ignorance of ambivalence has not 
been an artefact of bipolarity per se, but rather the artefact of treating bipolarity as 
necessitating an exclusively reciprocal relationship between the polar elements.  
 It demonstrated that the linear analyses presumed to support the bivariate 
standpoint are questionable and that under an unfolding approach ambivalent 
attitudes are an implicit part of the bipolar dimension. Thus, it is argued that 
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ambivalence does not require the abandonment of bipolarity, rather attitude 
researchers should move beyond the method of summated ratings in favour of 
unfolding models. These unfolding approaches promise more rigorous measurement 
of all attitudinal dispositions.  
However, given that the findings were not entirely as predicted, such 
conclusions must be bolstered by the continued validation of this conceptualisation 
in future chapters. Furthermore, this discussion highlighted the importance of 
considering other attitude parameters beyond the evaluative dimension. Thus, these 
will also be considered in the proceeding chapters. 
 Crucially, the results of this chapter justify the use of a unidimensional 
unfolding model to investigate ambivalence. As discussed in Section 1.7, this is 
particularly important with respect to the tests of quantitative structure to be 
performed. Such tests additionally require the precise construction of scales so that 
there is unanimous agreement on the ordering of the items along the bipolar 
dimension. Michell’s (1994, 1998) binary tree method, drawing upon his theory of 
the ordered metric determinable, has been shown to successfully develop such 
attitude scales (Davies, 2004; Johnson, 2001; Michell, 1998). The construction and 
validation of these scales will be the focus of Chapters 3 and 4. 
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Chapter 3 - Constructing attitude scales for unidimensional 
unfolding 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 provided evidence that ambivalence is consistent with a bipolar 
understanding of attitudes, albeit a different understanding of bipolarity to the 
conventional view. These results validated the investigation of ambivalent attitudes 
utilising unidimensional unfolding models. However, there were a number of 
limitations of the findings, many of which may be attributed to the measure used. 
Consequently, this chapter will present the construction of attitude scales that 
account for a number of these shortcomings and that may be considered attitude 
measures according to the traditional theory of measurement.  
 Firstly, these scales will be constructed explicitly out of evaluative 
propositions, as these are the constituents of evaluative judgements, which is how the 
attitude construct was defined in Section 1.2. This will include a consideration of the 
relations between evaluative propositions and how these in turn relate to the 
quantitative assumption of attitudes. Secondly, a study will be performed to 
investigate the issues the participants consistently feel ambivalent toward in this 
context. This will also address the propositional underpinnings of this ambivalence. 
Finally, the binary tree method will be utilised to construct the scales for these issues 
that are appropriate for tests of quantitative structure and capture the relevant 
evaluative propositions. 
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3.2 Attitudes as evaluative judgements and the quantitative assumption 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the APE model defines the cognitive element of attitudes 
as evaluative judgements. These judgements are underpinned by evaluative the 
propositions, which are subjected to syllogistic inferences to assess their subjective 
validity. It is this cognitive definition of attitude that is the focus of this thesis. Thus, 
if attitudes in this sense are to be treated as quantitative and therefore measurable, the 
relationships between these evaluative propositions and whether they are able to 
constitute a quantitative structure must be addressed (Michell, 1998).  This requires a 
more rigorous understanding of the notion of quantity. 
 
3.2.1 What is a quantity? 
 A quantity is a continuum of ordered magnitudes that stand in additive relations. 
Taking length as an example, a length of 5cm is greater than a length of 3cm and 
they add to a length of 8cm. Furthermore, length is continuous, as no matter how 
long a length it is always possible, hypothetically speaking, to combine it with 
another magnitude of length to create a larger magnitude until an infinite magnitude 
is reached. For a variable to be a quantity, its set of magnitudes must satisfy the 
following 7 conditions (Hölder, 1901, as cited in Michell, 1999): 
 
1. Any two magnitudes are either the same or different, and if different, there is a 
third magnitude that equals this difference. 
2.  The addition of two discrete magnitudes must compose a magnitude that is 
greater than each. 
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3.  If a magnitude is composed of discrete parts, the order of the composition of these 
parts is irrelevant. 
4.  When a magnitude is composed of three discrete parts, it is always the 
composition of any one with the remaining two. 
5.  There is no smallest magnitude. 
6.  There is no greatest magnitude. 
7.  There are no gaps in the ordered sequence of magnitudes and thus they are 
continuous. 
 
 Therefore, the assumption that an attitude is a quantity entails the assumption 
that the relations between the magnitudes of that attitude are ordered and additive 
and that the set of magnitudes are continuous, akin to the length example provided 
above. The claim that different attitudes are ordered is uncontroversial. For example, 
the evaluative proposition, ‘the Prime Minister is doing a good job’, appears to be 
clearly more favourable than the evaluative proposition, ‘the Prime Minister is doing 
a bad job’. However, the claim that attitudes are additive and continuous is far less 
obvious. Fortunately for the quantitative assumption, Michell (1994, 1998) explains 
how this may be the case using a binary tree method, which will be the focus of the 
next section. 
  
3.3 The binary tree method 
Michell’s (1994) binary tree procedure constructs ordered sets of attitude statements 
that only differ with respect to their evaluative predicates, i.e., all of the statements 
will pertain to the same subject term, but will differ in terms of the level of 
  61 
favourability implied by their predicate term(s). These semantic differences between 
the predicate terms are believed to imply the ordering of the statements. For 
example, if I take the three statements; 1) the Prime Minister of Australia is doing a 
bad job, 2) the Prime Minister of Australia is doing a good, but not an excellent job, 
and, 3) the Prime Minister of Australia is doing an excellent job, then it can be seen 
that each share a subject term, the Prime Minister of Australia, but differ with respect 
to the level of favourability expressed by their predicate terms.   
 The first step in this procedure is to decide upon a kernel concept (e.g., the 
performance of the Prime Minister) and make the initial binary division, or 
bifurcation, into predicates (an expression of an attitude toward the subject) that are; 
(a) fairly general, (b) mutually contrary, and (c) ordered relative to the kernel 
concept (e.g., ‘doing a good job’ and ‘not doing a good job’) (Michell, 1994). This 
creates two new nodes to make further bifurcations from. One may then repeat this 
process from each subsequent node to establish the required number of stimuli as 
long as any predicate in the tree is within the semantic scope of its immediate 
ancestor. This process is illustrated in Figure 3.1 below. 
Michell (1994) refers to the set of predicates resulting from this procedure as 
an ordinal determinable. However, he later argued that the binary tree determines 
more than just ordinal relationships as it also contains distance information (Michell, 
1998). This is based on the principle that the distance between statements is related 
to their level of shared content, which is determined by the number of shared nodes 
in the binary tree.  
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Figure 3.1. Example of binary tree procedure whereby the kernel concept, the 
performance of the Prime Minister (PoPM), is bifurcated to create two new nodes 
containing the predicates, 1) doing a good job (GJ), and 2) not doing a good job 
(~GJ), from which further bifurcations can be made (p, ~p, q and ~q). 
 
 
So, for the example presented in Figure 3.1, if statements A, B, C and D were 
constructed from the tree corresponding to the branches ending with p, ~p, ~q and q, 
the distance between statements A and B would be less than the distance between B 
and C as A and B share two nodes (PoPM and GJ), whereas B and C only share one 
(PoPM). Furthermore, the distance between C and D would be less than the distance 
between B and C for the same reason. 
Michell (1998) refers to this structure as an ordered metric determinable 
(OMD) to reflect the addition of this distance information. Furthermore, he 
postulated that the ordered metric solution obtained from individuals’ preference 
judgements could be predicted from this information. However, Davies (2004) 
provided evidence that this is not the case. Her results suggested that it is the specific 
attitude dimension that determines the solution, as equivalent solutions were found 
PoPM 
GJ 
~GJ 
~p 
~ 
~q 
q 
p 
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across sets of statements about the same issue, which were derived from different 
binary trees.  
 Despite these failings, this approach demonstrates, in principle, that 
evaluative judgements may possess quantitative structure. The predicates of the 
statements are akin to the evaluative propositions that constitute these judgements. 
The semantic relations between these predicates can be formally understood as 
implying order and distance information. This distance information entails an 
ordering upon the inter-statement midpoints and these midpoints are an additive 
function of the values of the statements on the attitude dimension, i.e., if we take the 
values of two statements A and B, the value of their midpoint AB is equal to ½ 
(A+B). Consequently, the structure reduces to a special case of finite additive 
conjoint measurement (Krantz, Luce, Suppes & Tversky, 1971). Furthermore, the 
process of bifurcation could be carried out indefinitely and thus there could be no 
most or least favourable attitude as, in principle, further predicates could always be 
added. Thus, the attitude may be understood as continuous.  
However the conclusion that an attitude is quantitative, ultimately, must come 
down to empirical evidence. This will be the focus of Chapter 4 utilising Coombs’ 
(1964) unidimensional unfolding theory. In more practical terms, the binary tree 
method has provided attitude scales that are remarkably consistent with this model 
(Davies, 2004; Johnson. 2001; Michell, 1994, 1998; Sherman, 1994). Consequently, 
this chapter will now turn to the construction of a number of attitude scales using this 
methodology to apply in the next chapter. The first step in this process is to identify 
the kernel concepts, which in this context must be issues that individuals consistently 
feel ambivalent toward. 
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3.4 The identification of the attitude issues and the ambivalent evaluations 
In addition to identifying three issues that consistently evoke ambivalence, this study 
aims to investigate the sort of conflicting evaluative propositions that underpin this 
ambivalence. This is so that the predicates used in the binary trees are representative 
of individuals’ evaluative judgements.  
 
3.4.1 Method 
Participants 
The participants included 43 first-year psychology students from the University of 
Sydney. This included 31 females and 12 males and the average age was 18.35 (SD = 
.57). All participants received partial course credit in return for their participations. 
Materials 
Participants were asked to indicate their level of ambivalence toward 18 issues, 
which are listed in Table 3.1 below. They were provided with 5 different categorical 
response options, with the 1 to 5 categories intended to capture varying levels of 
evaluative conflict and the 0 category to capture ‘non-attitudes’. These options were: 
0 - I have no attitude or am indifferent toward this issue; 1 - My attitude toward this 
issue is purely positive OR purely negative; 2 - My attitude toward this issue is 
predominantly positive OR predominantly negative; 3 - My attitude toward this issue 
is BOTH a little bit positive AND a little bit negative; 4 - My attitude toward this 
issue is BOTH moderately positive AND moderately negative; 5 - My attitude 
toward this issue is BOTH extremely positive AND extremely negative. 
Furthermore, they were asked to briefly describe why they felt ambivalent toward 
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each of the issues using free text. See Appendix A for screenshots of the tasks and 
the instructions. 
Procedure 
Participants were initially introduced to the purpose of the study and were provided 
with all relevant ethical information. They then completed the questionnaire, which 
was presented electronically using the Quask FormArtist survey software 
(http://www.quask.com). Upon completion they electronically submitted their data 
and were provided with thorough debriefing information. 
 
3.4.2 Results and Discussion 
The results for each of the issues are presented in Table 3.1 below. These issues were 
selected as they presented an extensive cross-section of issues that may be relevant to 
first-year psychology students. In addition, it was suspected that many of them would 
evoke ambivalent responses. The means were calculated by converting the ‘no 
attitude’ option to a score of 1 as it was interpreted as expressing an equivalent lack 
of ambivalence to the ‘purely positive or negative’ option. Furthermore, the 
frequencies for each category are presented, as the mean may be a problematic 
statistic for these categorical data. 
Based on the results, the attitude issues selected were abortion, euthanasia 
and Aboriginal Australians. These issues displayed the highest mean rating of 
ambivalence. Furthermore, they displayed the highest frequencies of responses for 
the 3, 4 and 5 categorical responses, which were the most indicative of conflict in the 
participants’ evaluative responses. This was particularly important for the selection 
of the Aboriginal Australians issue over the existence of god and Iraq war issues. 
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Table 3.1 
Means, standard deviations and frequencies for the categorical indicators of 
ambivalence toward the 18 issues. 
Attitude issue M SD 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Euthanasia 2.65 1.31 10 2 7 11 10 3 
Abortion 2.51 1.40 5 11 5 10 8 4 
Aboriginal Australians 2.37 1.38 7 11 5 9 8 3 
Existence of God 2.33 1.38 7 10 10 4 9 3 
Iraq War 2.26 1.22 9 6 12 8 6 2 
Religion 2.21 1.15 12 4 10 9 8 0 
Road Rage 2.21 1.23 7 9 11 10 3 3 
Animal Testing 2.14 1.10 6 11 9 11 6 0 
Refugees 2.14 1.30 8 13 4 12 3 3 
Police Brutality 2.02 1.16 7 14 7 8 7 0 
Homosexuality 2.00 1.23 14 8 7 8 4 2 
Gay Marriage 1.95 1.09 8 12 10 9 3 1 
Right of Women 1.88 1.28 5 21 5 5 5 2 
Muslim Australians 1.81 1.07 11 13 7 9 2 1 
Environmental Conservation 1.79 1.19 8 19 5 5 5 1 
Political Accountability 1.56 1.01 26 4 6 4 2 1 
Sexual Abuse 1.47 0.93 3 28 8 1 2 1 
Condom Usage 1.47 1.08 7 27 4 1 2 2 
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 The indications of the specific conflicting evaluative propositions for these 
issues were then inspected. See Appendix C for the complete list of conflicting 
evaluations provided by participants for the abortion, euthanasia and Aboriginal 
Australians issues. For the abortion issue, there was a tendency for participants to 
feel ambivalent because they were pro-choice for women, particularly in 
circumstances such as rape or severe financial hardship, but were also pro-life in the 
sense that the unborn child also possesses some ‘right’ to life and this must be 
protected. Examples of the conflicting evaluations toward abortion included: 
 
“I believe that no body should be denied the right to live but at the same time 
feel for teenagers who have been raped and fall pregnant as I also feel sorry 
for teenage parents, as most of the time this is not the best situation for a 
child to be brought up in.” 
 
“I don't believe in abortion, however, in some cases such as rape, or knowing 
that your child will have a disability, abortion should be considered.” 
 
“I believe that every woman should be given the choice to abort if absolutely 
necessary but I feel that it should only be approved where there is no 
alternative and it is a desperate situation.” 
 
This evaluative conflict between ‘pro-life’ and ‘pro-choice’ evaluative propositions 
is consistent with the findings of Craig, Kane and Martinez (2002), who found that 
participants were particularly ‘pro-life’ when abortion was elected simply because 
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the child was not wanted, and particularly ‘pro-choice’ when the pregnancy occurred 
under traumatic circumstances such as rape or extreme financial hardship.  
Participants indicated evaluative conflict toward the euthanasia issue for 
similar reasons. They were ‘pro-choice’, particularly when the individual was 
suffering extreme pain or a terminal illness, but this conflicted with ‘pro-life’ 
evaluations that life is precious and that it could be misused to commit suicide in 
unjustifiable circumstances and even murder. Examples of the conflicting 
evaluations toward euthanasia included: 
 
“Life as precious and killing immoral vs. a life in extreme pain worse than 
death and free choice.” 
 
“My belief in euthanasia conflicts with concerns that this privilege may be 
misused either to murder or aid suicide.” 
  
“My feelings of free will conflict with my beliefs relating to morality.” 
 
The evaluative conflict toward the Aboriginal Australians issues tended to 
arise from the evaluations that Aboriginal Australians have been mistreated and 
deserve equality in our society versus the evaluations that the rights afforded to them 
in the push for equality (e.g., elevated welfare payments) have been abused, may 
promote ‘reverse discrimination’ and ultimately Aboriginal Australians are 
responsible for their equality. Examples of the conflicting evaluations toward 
Aboriginal Australians included: 
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“My belief is that while fair treatment is a responsibility and a right, it is 
earned and should not be expected if certain behaviour doesn't warrant it, that 
being said equality should be assured to all.” 
  
“System doesn’t work, but they abuse the system.” 
 
“My feeling that everyone deserves equal rights is conflicted in this situation 
by a question of what equal rights are. I feel that some aboriginals are now 
being afforded greater or lesser rights as way of compensation.” 
 
These finding are consistent with the work of Katz and Hass (1988), who identified 
‘ambivalent racism’. They argued that in the United States, social forces to reduce 
prejudice have created ambivalence in individuals between ‘egalitarian’ and 
‘individualistic’ motives. This conflict stems from the evaluative belief that all social 
groups should be equal versus the belief that minority groups are responsible for 
their own disadvantage and often abuse the ‘helping-hand’ they are provided with. 
Clearly from the above results, similar beliefs exist for Aboriginals in the Australian 
context. 
Thus, the kernel concepts selected for the binary tree procedures were; 1) 
‘morality of abortion’, 2) ‘morality of euthanasia’ and 3) ‘equality of Aboriginal 
Australians’. An attempt was made to match the predicates of the binary tree to the 
semantic content of the evaluative conflict for each issue described above. In 
addition to the consideration of the issues and specific evaluative proposition, the 
applications of Coombs’ (1964) deterministic unfolding model in Chapter 4 requires 
a minimisation of error. Davies (2004) demonstrated how placing an additional 
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constraint on the binary tree structure successfully minimised the amount of 
erroneous judgements in such an application. 
 
3.5 The binary tree method and reducing error 
Given the deterministic nature of Coombs’ (1964) model, error is a pertinent issue 
as strictly speaking, the presence of any error falsifies the theory. However, a 
number of studies utilising the binary tree method of scale construction have, within 
the scope of what may be termed ‘acceptable error’, satisfied the strict conditions of 
Coombs’ theory (Davies, 2004; Johnson, 2001; Michell, 1994, 1998). This notion of 
‘acceptable error’ is a vague one and typically a rule-of-thumb approach is applied 
whereby if overall there are less than 5% of judgements at odds with prediction of 
the model, then this is seen as confirmation of the model. If the model accounts for 
95% of the preference judgements made, then it seems reasonable to accept the 
model and attempt to provide an account of what has caused the erroneous 
judgements (Michell, 1994). Others have argued that the presence of error 
necessitates the use of probabilistic models, such as the HCM outlined in Chapter 2, 
as these are tolerant and even reliant upon the presence of error in their fit to the data 
(Andrich, 2003).  
 Nonetheless, as Coombs’ (1964) model is to be utilised in the current thesis 
as it allows for the test of the quantitative assumption, any method that can 
potentially reduce the level of error is highly desirable. Recently, Davies (2004) 
specified a further constraint to the predicate structuring of the binary tree method 
that better ensures the unidimensionality of the attitude scale as well as the 
participants’ perception of the ordering of the statements. This constraint requires 
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that each subsequent bifurcation from the origin occur on the same branch such that 
all of the nodes fall along the same path through the binary tree. This process is 
illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Example of binary tree procedure with the scaling constraint whereby the 
kernel concept (KC), is initially bifurcated to create two new nodes containing an 
evaluative predicate (p) and the mutually contrary evaluative predicate (~p) and all 
further bifurcations occur on the same branch. 
 
 
Davies’ (2004) study demonstrated that scales constructed with this 
additional constraint satisfied the necessary and sufficient conditions of Coombs’ 
(1964) model with a lower error rate than scales constructed from a binary tree 
without it (an average of 4% with the constraint versus 5.7% without it). However, 
despite this reduction of error, the addition of the scaling constraint results in 
statements that do not reflect the bipolar dimension discussed in the previous 
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q 
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chapter whereby ambivalent statements are at the centre. For example, a statement 
taken from the centre of her ‘Lesbian Social Distance’ binary tree expresses the 
attitude, ‘I’d speak to a lesbian in passing, mix with one socially, and be good 
friends with a lesbian, but I wouldn’t be physically intimate with a lesbian’. Whilst 
there is some level of mixing of favourable and unfavourable predicates, overall the 
statement reflects a predominantly positive attitude. But, this is not typically the 
case for scales derived from the binary tree method. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Example of a typical binary tree where the bifurcations are made along 
the two branches, and the resulting distribution of favourable (+) and unfavourable  
(-) predicates. 
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For example, in Michell’s (1994) original statements concerning the morality 
of homosexuality, the statement that was found to be located at the centre of the 
attitude dimension took the form, “I have no moral objections to homosexuality and, 
while not wanting to see it encouraged, believe it is a mistake to treat it as a crime”. 
Such a statement clearly expresses an ambivalent attitude as it is neither clearly 
positive, nor clearly negative, but rather the combination of its evaluative predicates 
depicts a mixed attitude. Such statements are typically located toward the middle of 
the binary tree as two branches stem from the kernel concept and bifurcations are 
made along both, not just the one as the scaling constraint requires. An example of 
this typical approach is provided in Figure 3.3 above. The distribution of the 
favourable and unfavourable predicates reflects the structure of the attitude 
dimension proposed in Chapter 2, whereby as you approach the centre of the tree 
there is a greater ‘mixing’ of the favourable and unfavourable predicates. Thus 
statements derived from the centre of the tree will be both favourable and 
unfavourable, i.e., ambivalent. Whereas, statements derived from the combination of 
predicates toward the top and the bottom of the tree will be more clearly favourable 
or unfavourable.  
Thus, even though the scaling constraint has been found to reduce erroneous 
preference judgements, it appears that its limitation of bifurcations to a single 
branch in the binary tree, in turn, limits the majority of the derived statements to 
either the favourable or unfavourable half of the bipolar attitude dimension. This 
means that it cannot be totally adhered to in the current thesis, as statements that 
possess the structure discussed in Chapter 2 and depicted in Figure 3.3 are required.  
Nonetheless, the scaling contraint will be applied to the two branches so that 
there will be no more than two branches in the binary tree. This will ensure that the 
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sets of statements from the top half of the tree and the bottom half of the tree will be 
independently scalable and thus the ordering between them will be clear. Therefore, 
the tree will rely on the semantic strength of the initial bifurcation from the kernel 
concept to ensure the correct perception of the ordering of the statements derived 
from the centre, which will not be constrained in this way. Furthermore, the 
predicates utilised in the top and bottom halves of the binary tree will be reasonably 
semantically matched to ensure a unidimensional interpretation of the attitude 
scales5.  
 
3.6 The binary trees and attitude statements for the abortion, euthanasia and 
Aboriginal Australians issues 
The binary trees and the derived statements for the issues and evaluative predicates 
identified in Section 3.4 are presented in Figures 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 below. Eight 
statements were created for each issue, as this is the minimum required for the test of 
an aspect of Coombs’ (1964) model, which will be elaborated in Chapter 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
5 See Appendix D for the binary trees and derived statements that were entirely 
consistent with these constraints. These statements had to be slightly altered, as 
participants’ perceptions of their ordering were inconsistent. 
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MoA = morality of abortion 
MA = morally acceptable 
UC = universal choice 
AP = always prohibited 
E = encouraged 
SC = serious crime 
A = all circumstances 
M = murder 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Abortion is extremely morally acceptable and should both be available as a choice 
and encouraged in all circumstances 
B. Abortion is very morally acceptable, should be available as a choice in all 
circumstances and should be encouraged in many, but not all, circumstances 
C. Abortion is very morally acceptable and should be available as a choice in all 
circumstances, but shouldn’t be encouraged 
D. Abortion is morally acceptable and should be available as a choice in most 
circumstances, but shouldn’t be encouraged 
E. Abortion is quite morally unacceptable and should be prohibited in most 
circumstances 
F. Abortion is very morally unacceptable and should always be prohibited and treated 
as a minor crime 
G. Abortion is very morally unacceptable and should always be both strongly 
prohibited and treated as a serious crime, but not as a form of murder 
H. Abortion is extremely morally unacceptable and should always be strongly 
prohibited, treated as an extremely serious crime and as a hideous form of murder 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Binary tree and resulting statements for the morality of abortion issue.  
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MoA = morality of euthanasia 
MA = morally acceptable 
UC = universal choice 
AP = always prohibited 
E = encouraged 
SC = serious crime 
A = all circumstances 
M = murder 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Euthanasia is extremely morally acceptable and should both be available as a 
choice and encouraged in all circumstances 
B. Euthanasia is very morally acceptable, should be available as a choice in all 
circumstances and should be encouraged in many, but not all, circumstances 
C. Euthanasia is very morally acceptable and should be available as a choice in all 
circumstances, but shouldn’t be encouraged 
D. Euthanasia is morally acceptable and should be available as a choice in most 
circumstances, but shouldn’t be encouraged 
E. Euthanasia is quite morally unacceptable and should be prohibited in most 
circumstances 
F. Euthanasia is very morally unacceptable and should always be prohibited and 
treated as a minor crime 
G. Euthanasia is very morally unacceptable and should always be both strongly 
prohibited and treated as a serious crime, but not as a form of murder 
H. Euthanasia is extremely morally unacceptable and should always be strongly 
prohibited, treated as an extremely serious crime and as a hideous form of murder 
 
 
Figure 3.5. Binary tree and resulting statements for the morality of euthanasia issue.  
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EoA = equality of Aboriginal 
     Australians 
HE = helped to become more equal 
EA = more economic assistance 
AR = always responsible for disadvantage 
PI = more political influence 
CU = can’t understand their anger 
SL = sacred land to self-govern 
AI = always inferior 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Aboriginal Australians should be helped more than any other group to become more equal and 
thus deserve greater economic assistance, political influence and should be given their sacred land 
to self-govern 
B. Aboriginal Australians should be greatly helped to become more equal and thus deserve greater 
economic assistance, political influence, and should be given free use of their sacred land 
C. Aboriginal Australians should be helped to become more equal and thus deserve greater 
economic assistance, but they receive enough political influence 
D. Aboriginal Australians should be helped to become more equal, but they receive more economic 
assistance than they deserve 
E. Aboriginal Australians should not be helped to become more equal as they are now responsible 
for their own disadvantage in most circumstances, but I can understand their anger 
F. Aboriginal Australians should not be helped to become more equal as they are now always 
responsible for their own disadvantage, but I can understand some of their anger 
G. Aboriginal Australians should definitely not be helped to become more equal as they are now 
always very responsible for their own disadvantage and thus I can’t understand their anger, but I 
don’t believe they are always inferior 
H. Aboriginal Australians should definitely never be helped to become more equal as they are now 
always extremely responsible for their own disadvantage and thus I can’t understand their anger and 
I believe they are always inferior 
 
 
Figure 3.6. Binary tree and resulting statements for the equality of Aboriginal 
Australians issue.  
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As can be seen from the above figures, a degree of license with respect to the 
intended binary tree structure had to be taken for some of the statements. 
Specifically, the pilot studies of Appendix D revealed that respondents were mostly 
inconsistent in their perception of the ordering of the Statements C, D, E and F, 
toward the centre of the binary tree structure. For the Abortion and Euthanasia 
scales, it was found that the ‘shouldn’t be encouraged’ predicate of Statement C was 
semantically more influential than the universal choice bifurcation and so lead some 
participants to interpret it as more negative than Statement D. Consequently, this 
predicate was also applied to Statement D.  
There was also a tendency for the ordering of Statement D and Statement E to 
be confused and so the initial bifurcation was emphasised in Statement E by 
amending it to ‘quite morally unacceptable’ and the following predicate was stated as 
‘prohibited in most circumstances’ rather than ‘not always prohibited’. Similarly, the 
favourability of Statement D was emphasised by stating the second predicate as, 
‘available as a choice in most circumstances’, rather than, ‘not available as a choice 
in all circumstances’. Whilst these alterations somewhat reduce the ambivalent 
nature of these statements, they are deemed necessary for the consistent perception 
of their ordering by participants. Furthermore, this is not detrimental to the 
measurement of ambivalence by these scales, as Coombs’ (1964) model examines 
the preference ordering of all statements. So, ambivalence will be reflected in the 
entire preference order, rather than the agreement with any one statement. 
 For the Aboriginal Australians scale, it was found that as a result of the 
‘understand their anger’ predicate of Statement F, it was consistently judged as more 
positive than Statement E.  As a result, this predicate was appended to Statement E. 
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In addition, the distinction between Statement D and Statement E was emphasised by 
stating the second predicate of Statement E as, ‘responsible in most circumstances’, 
rather than, ‘not always responsible’. Similar to the other two scales, this alteration 
somewhat reduces the ambivalence of this statement, but it is necessary as it clarifies 
the order of the statements. It is predicted that the amendments to all of the scales 
will lead to adequate fit to Coombs’ (1964) unidimensional unfolding model in 
Chapter 4.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that, at least in principle, it is reasonable to search for 
order, additivity and continuity in evaluative judgements. However, as explained in 
Section 1.5, the quantitative assumption is ultimately an empirical question and thus 
must be tested. In aid of this, it demonstrated a rigorous means of constructing 
unidimensional sets of statements that are both consistent with the understanding of 
bipolarity presented in Chapter 2 and may be applied to Coombs (1964) 
unidimensional unfolding model. This application will be the focus of the next 
chapter and is intended to provide further evidence that ambivalence is consistent 
with both bipolar and quantitative structure. 
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Chapter 4 – Validating the bipolar and quantitative 
assumptions using Coombs’ unfolding model 
 
4.1 Introduction 
As previously discussed, unfolding models address a number of the limitations of the 
mainstream attitude methodology. Specifically, they allow for the assessment of 
attitudes across the entire dimension, including ambivalence, and the grafting of 
Coombs’ (1964) unidimensional unfolding theory to axiomatic conjoint 
measurement theory allows for an empirical test of quantitative structure. This 
chapter will take the attitude scales created in Chapter 3 and further validate the 
bipolar and quantitative assumptions by analysing individual’s preference 
judgements using Coombs’ model.  
 
4.2 Coombs’ theory of unidimensional unfolding 
This theory relates to preference orders for the items that constitute an attitude scale 
like those presented in Chapter 3.  Individual’s preference orders, which he termed I 
scales, are collectively analysed to map the items and individuals on to a common 
latent dimension to form what he termed a J scale (denoting the scale’s joint 
accommodation of both individuals responses and stimuli). As generally discussed in 
Chapter 1 with respect to all unfolding models, he theorised that individuals will 
make preference judgements of attitude statements with respect to their ‘ideal point’, 
the perceived location of their attitude on the relevant attitude dimension. More 
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formally, if S refers to a finite set of unidimensional, quantitatively structured stimuli 
and A to a set of people, Coombs’ (1964) theory states that for any individual i in A 
and X and Y in S, where m denotes point of maximal preference or ‘ideal point’: 
 
i prefers X to Y iff ⏐m - X⏐< ⏐m – Y ⏐         
 
That is, an individual will choose statement X rather than statement Y if and only if 
they perceive X to be closer to their ideal point than Y. In this sense, a person’s 
preference for a particular attitude statement involves a distance relationship as their 
judgement regarding which two statements they agree with more is dependent upon 
the relative distance between the two statements and the individual’s ideal point 
(Bossuyt, 1990). A full set of judgements for each individual provides information 
regarding the distance between their ideal point and all of the statements (I scale). 
The information within a full set of I scales allows the establishment of the statement 
locations on the latent attitude dimension (J scale). If Coombs’ (1964) model is 
empirically confirmed, this resulting J scale is an ordered metric measurement scale 
(Michell, 1994).  As discussed in Section 3.3, because the stimuli midpoints of an 
ordered metric scale are additive, it reduces to a special case of finite additive 
conjoint measurement (Krantz, Luce, Suppes & Tversky, 1971). The confirmation of 
Coombs’ model depends upon the corroboration of the following assumptions. 
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4.3 Assumptions of Coombs’ unidimensional unfolding theory 
Coombs’ (1964) theory specifies five boundary conditions; 1) unidimensionality, 2) 
quantitivity, 3) single-peaked preference functions, 4) symmetry and monotonicity of 
the preference functions, and 5) Intersubjective congruence. These are explained 
below:  
 
4.3.1 Unidimensionality 
This condition stipulates that preference judgements must be made relevant to a 
single stimulus variable. Thus, the set of attitude statements utilised must be 
unidimensional in nature. If the statements do not possess this attribute, then 
preferential judgements of them are unlikely to be made with respect to a single 
stimulus variable and thus such judgements are not likely to unidimensionally 
unfold. For example, with the abortion scale presented in Figure 3.4, all preference 
judgements must be made with respect to a single factor, i.e., the morality of the act. 
 
4.3.2 Quantitivity 
This condition requires that the attribute is quantitative. This is because of Coombs 
(1964) reliance upon distance in explaining respondents’ preference judgements. If 
unidimensional preference space is Euclidean, as his notion of preferential distance 
asserts, then magnitudes within this space must adhere to the axioms of quantity put 
forth by Hölder (1901, as cited in Michell & Ernst, 1996, 1997). So, in the case of 
the abortion scale, it is not enough for the statements to be perceived as ordered on 
the underlying attitude dimension. Individuals must also perceive distance between 
  83 
statements such that some are consistently closer than others on the underlying 
dimension. 
 
4.3.3 Single-peaked preference functions 
This condition specifies that each person must only have one point of maximum 
preference with respect to the relevant issue (their ideal point). Thus, this condition 
stipulates that each individual only has one attitude toward the issue. 
 
4.3.4 Symmetry and monotonicity 
Given a single point of maximum preference, it follows that other points will be less 
preferred. Coombs’ (1964) theory stipulates that the extent to which an individual 
prefers any stimulus decreases as the distance between it and their ideal point 
increases and that this decrease is equivalent on either side of the ideal point. Thus, 
the further a statement is from the ideal point on either side of the dimension, the less 
it is preferred. This condition insists that not only is an individual’s preference 
function single peaked, but also that it is monotonic decreasing and symmetric about 
this peak  
 
4.3.5 Intersubjective congruence 
This condition requires that all individuals must agree upon the location of the 
stimuli on the relevant dimension. This is essential for the establishment of the J 
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scale as without it the ordered-metric layout of the stimuli along the attitude 
dimension will be discrepant across participants.  
 
4.4 Necessary and sufficient conditions for unidimensional unfolding 
Michell (1990) and Doignon and Falmagne (1991, as cited in Michell, 1994) 
independently identified three necessary and sufficient conditions to establish that 
the above assumptions are met. These are; 1) the folding condition, 2) the single path 
condition, and 3) the cancellation condition.  
 
4.4.1 The folding condition 
For a set of n stimuli on a J scale, any of the n! distinct orderings are possible 
individual preference orderings. Coombs’ (1964) theory predicts that no more than 
2n-1 of these will occur. Thus, for eight Statements, the theory predicts that only 128 
(28-1) individual preference orderings will occur (Michell, 1990). This is because the 
individual preference order (I scale) must reflect the qualitative J scale (i.e., for 
eight statements, ABCDEFGH) folded around their ideal point. So, if an 
individual’s ideal point is statement C, then a valid preference order according to 
Coombs’ theory would be CBDAEFGH as this ordering may be unfolded around the 
ideal point ‘C’ to recover the qualitative ‘J scale’. Whereas an invalid order would 
be CBDAEFHG as the inversion of the ‘GH’ pair does not permit this unfolding 
(refer to Figure 4.1).  
 
  85 
 
Figure 4.1. Boomerang diagrams demonstrating the recovering of the qualitative J 
scale (in red) from I Scale 1, but not from I Scale 2. 
 
 
Satisfaction of the unfolding condition establishes the existence of ordinal 
unidimensionality. However, it does not establish agreement upon the midpoint 
order between the stimuli. For example, the preference orders CBDAEFGH and 
BCDEAFGH both satisfy the folding condition.  
However, if an individual (Ia) provides the CBDAEFGH preference order 
they prefer statement A to statement E and thus it follows that;  
 
Ia < midpoint (AE) 
Furthermore, as they prefer statement C to statement B it follows that;  
midpoint (BC) < Ia 
Therefore,  
midpoint (BC) < midpoint (AE) 
If an individual (Ib) provides the BCDEAFGH preference order, then it follows by 
the same logic that;  
midpoint (AE) < midpoint (BC) 
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Both cannot be true if the attribute is quantitative, as opposed to just ordinal, and 
hence a further condition is required to ensure the agreement upon the midpoint 
ordering (Davies, 2004). This is provided by the single-path condition.   
 
4.4.2 The single-path condition 
This condition ensures the satisfaction of the ‘Intersubjective congruence’ boundary 
condition of Coombs’ (1964) theory as it stipulates that all I scales must fall along a 
single path through the proximity graph. This graph arranges all of the I scales that 
are valid foldings of the qualitative J scale into paths. Two I scales fall on the same 
path if their ordering of the midpoints are connected (for every x and y that are not 
equal in an ordered set, either x is greater than y or y is greater than x), transitive (for 
every x, y and z in an ordered set, if x is greater than y and y is greater than z, then x 
must be greater than z) and asymmetric (for every x and y in an ordered set, if x is 
greater than y, y cannot be greater than x)(Michell, 1990). If all I scales fall along a 
single descending path through the proximity graph, this equates to collective 
agreement upon the location of the statements on the dimension, and provides a 
distinct ordering of the inter-stimulus midpoints.  
The proximity of I scales on a single descending path are derived from the 
number of pair inversions they differ by. For example, the preference order 
CBDAEFGH is more like BCDAEFGH than CDBEAFGH as the latter differs by the 
inversion of the BD and AE pairs, whereas the former only differs by the inversion 
of the BC pair. See Figure 4.2 for an example of a proximity graph for 6 stimuli. 
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Figure 4.2. Proximity graph representing the proximities of the set of all foldings 
around J = ABCDEF with the single-path marked by red arrows.  
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The single path condition results from a simple ordering of the inter-stimulus 
midpoints. Generally, for n stimuli there are 1/2n(n-1) inter-stimulus midpoints and 
thus 1/2n(n-1) +1 inter-stimulus intervals (Coombs, 1964). Thus, for six stimuli there 
are [1/2 x 6(6-1) =] 15 inter-stimulus midpoints and hence [1/2 x 6(6-1) +1 =] 16 
inter-stimulus intervals. The ordering of the midpoints dictated by the single path 
depicted in Figure 4.2 is set out in Figure 4.3 below. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3. The position of the six stimuli along the attitude dimension 
demonstrating the order upon inter-stimulus midpoints and inter-stimulus intervals.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 demonstrates that given a set of six stimuli, only 16 of the 32 
preference orderings consistent with the qualitative J scale are in turn consistent with 
the same ordered metric J scale. However, even though satisfaction of the single path 
condition ensures that a unique ordering of the inter-stimulus midpoints has been 
determined, not all of the orders can be realised unidimensionally as some entail 
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contradictions (Michell, 1994). Thus, a set of preference orders unfolds 
unidimensionally only when the order upon inter-stimulus midpoints established by 
the single path condition, in turn, satisfies the hierarchy of cancellation conditions 
stipulated by Scott (1964). 
 
4.4.3 The cancellation condition 
The testing of the hierarchy of cancellation conditions is the extension of Luce and 
Tukey’s (1964) conjoint measurement theory to the theory of unidimensional 
unfolding. Conjoint measurement theory allows for the testing of additive structure 
amidst the observable ordinal relations of a variable. Satisfaction of the cancellation 
conditions supports, but does not prove, the existence of additive structure. The first 
level of the hierarchy, single cancellation, is satisfied by the folding and single path 
conditions of Coombs’ theory (Michell, 1994). In addition, tests of double 
cancellation and triple cancellation of this hierarchy have been empirically explicated 
(Kyngdon & Richards, 2007; Michell, 1988). The test of double cancellation requires 
at least six stimuli in the attitude scale and the test of triple cancellation requires at 
least eight stimuli in the attitude scale. The satisfaction of this condition is essential 
to establishing the quantitative J scale as it ensures that there are no contradictions 
entailed by the midpoint ordering and thus that an additive representation of the 
ordering is possible (Michell, 1994).  
The tests of double cancellation are illustrated in Figure 4.4 below. To satisfy 
double cancellation the ordering of the midpoint comparison represented by the 
middle line in each of the matrices must not oppose the order on both the outer pairs. 
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So the direction of the arrow of the middle line must not oppose the direction of both 
the outer lines. 
 
 
 C D E F  C D E F  C D E F 
A     A     A     
B     B     B     
C     C     C     
D     D     D     
 
 C D E F  C D E F      
A     A          
B     B          
C     C          
D     D          
 
Figure 4.4. Tests of double cancellation for 6 items where J = ABCDEF. 
 
 
Thus, the establishment of congruence between individual preference orders 
and the qualitative J scale (folding condition) as well as the congruence in perception 
of the inter-stimulus midpoints (single-path condition) and satisfaction of tests of 
additivity (cancellation condition) collectively allow for the construction of a 
quantitative J scale. If Coombs’ (1964) theory is true, this is a measurement scale in 
the traditional sense. 
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4.5 Validating the attitude scales using Coombs’ unidimensional unfolding 
theory 
The above discussion of the strict requirements of Coombs’ (1964) model further 
illuminates why such a large degree of precision and stimulus control was required in 
the scale construction of Chapter 3. The assumptions of the model require that these 
statements are strictly ordered and that this ordering is easily discernable by 
participants. Furthermore, they require that participants’ preference judgements of 
the statements are valid foldings of this ordering and collectively indicate a 
consistent ordering of the inter-statement midpoints to provide an ordered-metric 
solution. 
Therefore, this chapter aims to empirically investigate the fit of the abortion, 
euthanasia and Aboriginal Australians scales to Coombs’ (1964) model by a twofold 
procedure. Firstly, Study 1 will assess participants’ perceptions of the ordering of the 
statements of each scale. It is expected that, within the scope of reasonable error, 
these perceptions will be consistent with the ordering specified by the binary tree 
procedure. Reasonable error is defined as less than 5% of judgements being at odds 
with this order. Furthermore, participants will be asked to rate their perception of the 
favourability and unfavourability of the statements of the three attitude scales. This is 
particularly to ensure that they perceive the ambivalent statements as similarly 
favourable and unfavourable.  
 Secondly, Study 2 will establish the location of the statements for each of the 
scales by assessing participants’ preference judgements. It is hypothesised that, given 
the confirmation of the ordering of the statements in Study 1, these preference 
judgements will confirm, within the scope of reasonable error, the necessary and 
sufficient conditions of Coombs’ (1964) model. This will permit the construction of 
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ordered metric solutions. In this case, reasonable error is defined as less than 5% of 
judgements being at odds with the model. Additionally, in line with the 
conceptualisation presented in Chapter 2, it is predicted that these ordered metric 
solutions will locate the ambivalent statements of each of the attitude scales close to 
the centre of the dimension. 
 
4.6 Study 1: Testing the perception of the ordering of the statements 
4.6.1 Method 
Participants 
All participants (n=30) were first-year Psychology students at the University of 
Sydney who received partial course credit. There were 22 females and 8 males and 
the mean age was 21.02 (SD = 6.05). 28 of the 30 participants indicated English was 
their first language and all indicated English was their best language. The Mean 
rating of their ability to understand English was 4.83 out of 5 (SD = .46). A strong 
grasp of English was important for the participants, as correct perception of the 
ordering of the statements requires a strong grasp of the semantic intricacies of the 
binary tree structure (Michell, 1994). 
 
Materials 
The main materials were the attitude scales overviewed in Section 3.6. The 
questionnaires were presented via computer using the Quask Formartist survey 
software (http://www.quask.com). Participants indicated their perception of the 
ordering of the statements via pair comparison judgements. Pair comparisons were 
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utilised as Michell (1998) demonstrated that this method was more sensitive than 
rank ordering or rating methodologies to the ordered structure of statements. The pair 
comparisons were counterbalanced using the optimum orders of Ross (1939). 
In addition, participants indicated their perception of the favourability and 
unfavourability of each of the statements through two 5-point rating scales, ranging 
from “1 – not at all favourable” to “5 – extremely favourable”, and, “1 – not at all 
unfavourable” to “5 – extremely unfavourable”. 
  
Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups ranging from 2 to 8 individuals in size. At the 
beginning of the testing session, participants were given a general introduction to the 
purpose of the study as well as the relevant ethical information. In addition, they 
were instructed to carefully follow all instructions provided and to ask for 
clarification from the experimenter if they were unsure about either of the tasks. 
Participants then completed the three tasks via computer. Upon completion they were 
provided with a thorough debriefing of the study. 
 
4.7 Results and Discussion 
4.7.1 Pair comparison task 
There were two types of errors possible in individuals’ ordering judgements in this 
task, intransitive judgement and ordering errors. An intransitive judgement error 
occurred when an ordering judgement was inconsistent with the other ordering 
judgements, e.g. the participant judged Statement A more favourable than Statement 
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B and Statement B more favourable than Statement C, but inconsistently judged 
Statement C more favourable than Statement A. An ordering error occurred when the 
individual’s set of ordering judgements did not provide the solution ABCDEFGH. 
For the morality of abortion issue, 20 out of 30 (67%) individuals indicated a 
perception of the ordering consistent with the predicted statement ordering. There 
were 13 intransitive judgement errors and 11 ordering errors. Thus, overall, 24 of the 
840 (2.86%) pair comparisons made across all participants were inconsistent with the 
predicted ordering of the statements.  
For the morality of euthanasia issue, 20 out of 30 (67%) individuals indicated 
a perception of the ordering consistent with the predicted statement ordering. There 
were 9 intransitive judgement errors and 5 ordering errors. So, 14 of the 840 (1.67%) 
pair comparisons made across all participants were inconsistent with the predicted 
ordering of the statements.  
For the equality Aboriginal Australians issue, 16 out of 30 (53%) individuals 
indicated a perception of the ordering consistent with the predicted statement 
ordering. There were 14 intransitive judgement errors and 14 ordering errors. 
Consequently, 28 of the 840 (3.33%) pair comparisons made across all participants 
were inconsistent with the predicted ordering of the statements. 
 Overall, the ordering errors tended to be associated with the statements drawn 
from the middle of the binary tree structure. Fourteen (47%) of the folding errors 
were for the CD and DE statement pairings across the three issues. This is 
unsurprising given the findings of Hovland and Sherif (1952), Michell (1973) and 
Davies (2004), which provided evidence that items located toward the middle of the 
attitude dimension are not as clearly defined for participants and so display more 
movement and displacement around the dimension. Despite this, the low nature of 
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the overall error rate for these statements across the three issues appeared to make 
them suitable for use in Study 2.  
 
4.7.2 Ratings task 
The mean ratings of favourability and unfavourability of each of the statements for 
each of the issues are presented in Figure 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 below. As illustrated in 
these figures, the distribution of favourability and unfavourability across the 
statements for the three issues was reasonably in line with expectations. For the 
abortion issue, Statements A, B, F, G and H were perceived as predominantly 
favourable or unfavourable. Statements C, D and to a lesser extent E were rated 
similarly favourable and unfavourable, indicating their ambivalent nature. For the 
euthanasia issue, Statements A, B, C, F, G and H were perceived as predominantly 
favourable or unfavourable. Statements D and E were rated similarly favourable and 
unfavourable, indicating their ambivalent nature. The distinction in the ratings given 
to the abortion and euthanasia sets of statements is curious given that their binary 
tree structure and semantic content are identical. It appears that the attitude issue 
affects perceptions of the statements over and above their strict semantic structuring.  
For the Aboriginal Australians issue, Statements A, B, E, F, G and H were 
rated as predominantly favourable or unfavourable. In contrast, statements C and D 
were rated similarly favourable and unfavourable, indicating participants’ 
perceptions of them as ambivalent in nature. 
Overall, the ratings of favourability and unfavourability were consistent with 
the predicted ordering of the statements and reinforce the findings of the pair 
comparisons task. Furthermore, the small standard errors of each of the mean ratings 
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indicate that there was minimal variability in the ratings provided, and so these 
perceptions of the ordering as well as the favourable and unfavourable nature of the 
statements were reasonably consistent across participants. These findings reinforced 
the conclusion that these statements were suitable for a test of Coombs’ (1964) 
theory to investigate their locations. 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Mean ratings of favourability (Fav) and unfavourability (Unfav) of each 
of the statements for the morality of abortion issue. 
 
Figure 4.6. Mean ratings of favourability (Fav) and unfavourability (Unfav) of each 
of the statements for the morality of euthanasia issue. 
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Figure 4.7. Mean ratings of favourability (Fav) and unfavourability (Unfav) of each 
of the statements for the equality of Aboriginal Australians issue. 
 
From these ratings analyses as well as the argument of Chapter 2, it is 
expected that statements C, D and E of the abortion issue, statements D and E of the 
euthanasia issue and statements C and D of the Aboriginal Australians issue will be 
located close to the centre of the attitude dimension. 
 
 
4.8 Study 2: Establishing the ordered-metric structure and location of the 
statements via preference judgements 
4.8.1 Method 
Participants 
All participants (n=50) were first-year Psychology students at the University of 
Sydney who received partial course credit. There were 33 females and 17 males and 
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the mean age was 20.28 (SD = 2.59). 42 of the 50 participants indicated English was 
their first language and 49 indicated English was their best language. The Mean 
rating of their ability to understand English was 4.74 out of 5 (SD = .66).  
 
Materials 
The main materials were the attitude scales from Study 1, presented in Section 3.6. 
The questionnaires were presented via computer using the Quask Formartist survey 
software (http://www.quask.com). Participants indicated their preferences for the 
attitude statements via pair comparison judgements. The pair comparisons were 
counterbalanced using the optimum orders of Ross (1939).  
 
Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups ranging from 2 to 8 individuals in size. 
Participants were given a general introduction to the purpose of the study as well as 
the relevant ethical information at the beginning of the session. It was stressed to 
them that they must follow the instructions carefully and to ask the experimenter if 
any clarification of the task was required. Participants then completed the two tasks 
via computer. Upon completion they were provided with a thorough debriefing of the 
study. 
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4.9 Results and Discussion 
4.9.1 Pair comparison task 
In this study, there were three types of error possible in individual’s preference 
judgements; intransitive judgement, folding, single-path and cancellation condition 
errors. An intransitive judgement error occurred when a preference judgements was 
inconsistent with other preference judgements, e.g., the participant judged Statement 
B closer to their own attitude than Statement C, and Statement C closer to their 
attitude than Statement D, but judged Statement D closer to their attitude than 
Statement B. In that case the intransitive judgement has occurred for the BD 
statement pairing. A folding error occurred when the preference order was not a valid 
folding of the J scale ABCDEFGH, e.g., CBDFEGH. In that example, the folding 
error has occurred for the EF statement pairing. A single-path error occurred when 
the valid preference order did not fall on the single-path through the proximity graph 
and thus their perception of the inter-statement midpoint ordering differed to the 
majority. This error was attributed to the judgment of the statement pair that had to 
be corrected to fit the preference order with the single-path solution. 
 As illustrated in Table 4.1 below, there were unacceptable levels of 
intransitive and folding errors in the preference judgements across the three issues. 
Thus, the preference orders were not tested with respect to the single-path and 
cancellation conditions. 
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Table 4.1 
Intransitive judgement (Int.) and folding (F.) errors for each of the statement pairs 
for the abortion (AN), euthanasia (EU) and Aboriginal Australians (AA) issues. 
  AN EU AA 
Statement Pairs Int. F. Int. F. Int. F. 
AB 2 3 3 2 2 5 
AC 3 2 1 2 1 4 
AD 1 2 1 1 2 3 
AE 2 0 4 0 2 0 
AF 1 0 0 0 9 0 
AG 3 0 1 0 1 0 
AH 1 0 5 0 2 0 
BC 1 5 1 5 2 7 
BD 2 3 1 4 1 5 
BE 1 1 1 1 2 1 
BF 2 0 3 0 7 0 
BG 2 0 1 0 5 2 
BH 1 0 0 0 0 0 
CD 1 11 4 9 1 10 
CE 3 3 2 3 8 3 
CF 0 3 0 1 1 3 
CG 0 0 2 0 3 2 
CH 1 0 0 0 1 0 
DE 9 12 4 14 1 8 
DF 2 4 3 2 6 3 
DG 2 1 1 1 4 1 
DH 2 0 4 0 1 0 
EF 0 3 2 3 2 5 
EG 4 0 1 1 2 1 
EH 1 0 1 0 0 0 
FG 3 7 4 5 2 3 
FH 1 3 1 1 0 0 
GH 1 1 1 4 0 0 
Total 52 64 52 59 68 66 
  
  101 
For the abortion issue, there were a total of 52 (3.71%) intransitive 
judgements and 64 (4.57%) folding errors, resulting in an overall error rate of 8.28%. 
The DE statement pair was involved in 17% of the intransitive judgements. The 
remaining 83% were reasonably spread across the other statement pairs. The folding 
errors were far more localised with the BC (8%), CD (17%), DE (19%) and FG 
(11%) statement pairs involved in 55% of them. 
 For the euthanasia issue, there were a total of 52 (3.71%) intransitive 
judgements and 59 (4.21%) folding errors, resulting in an overall error rate of 7.92%. 
The AE (8%), AH (10%), CD (8%), DE (8%), DH (8%) and FG (8%) statement 
pairs were involved in 50% of the intransitive judgements, with the other half 
reasonably spread across the other statement pairs. Again the folding errors were 
more localised, with the BC (8%), CD (15%), DE (24%) and FG (8%) statement 
pairs involved with 55% of them.  
For the Aboriginal Australians issue, there were 68 (4.86%) intransitive 
judgements and 66 (4.71%) folding errors, resulting in an overall error rate of 9.57%. 
The AF (13%), BF (10%), BG (7%), CE (12%), DF (9%) and DG (6%) statement 
pairs were involved in 57% of the intransitive judgements, with the remaining 43% 
fairly spread across the other statements pairs. The AB (8%), BC (11%), BD (8%), 
CD (15%), DE (12%) and EF (7%) statement pairs were involved in 61% of the 
folding errors. 
Clearly the ordering of the statements is variable across task contexts and 
individuals. This inconsistency in the findings of the studies may be attributable to 
the differences in the response behaviour mechanisms of the tasks.  
In Study 1, participants’ judgements were only influenced by their perception 
of the favourability and hence location of the statements on the attitude dimension. 
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As previously discussed, the fluidity of these perceptions of statements located 
toward the middle of the dimension is a possible explanation for the erroneous 
judgements in that study. In Study 2, participants’ judgements were not only 
influenced by their perceptions of the item location, but also, if Coombs’ (1964) 
theory of response behaviour is correct, contingent upon the location of their own 
attitude, i.e., their ideal point.  
With respect to the first point, there is support that some individuals’ 
perceptions of the locations of the middle statements were not fixed. The CD 
statement pair was involved in 17.19% of the folding errors for the abortion issue, 
15.25% of the folding errors for the euthanasia issue and 15.15% of the folding 
errors for the Aboriginal Australians issue. 
In addition, with reference to the influence of the ideal point on erroneous 
pair comparison judgements, De Soete, Carroll and De Sarbo (1986) demonstrated 
that some individuals may not possess a fixed location on the dimension and thus 
their ideal point may ‘wander’. If this wandering takes place across the individual 
pair comparison judgements, then these individuals will make a large number of 
intransitive judgements and folding errors.  
This postulation is supported by the finding that 50% of the erroneous 
judgements were made by 12 (24%) participants for the abortion issue, 14 (28%) 
participants for the euthanasia issue, and 10 (20%) participants for the Aboriginal 
Australians issue. Clearly, most participants’ preference judgements were consistent 
with the predicted ordering. These individuals may not have perceived the location 
of the items as fixed or may not have had any fixed ideal point on the attitude 
dimension. 
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Furthermore, the spread of intransitive judgements across a large number of 
statement pairs indicates that the errors may be attributable to the cognitive load 
placed on participants by this task, as well as moments of inattention and procedural 
errors in responding. Clearly to achieve the aims of this chapter, new statements need 
to be formulated that address the above explanations of the unacceptable levels of 
error. 
 
4.10 Study 3: The formulation of new attitude scales and the determination of 
the item locations. 
The results of Study 2 outlined a number of issues necessitating the revision of the 
attitude scales. Firstly, the reasonably non-systematic distribution of the intransitive 
judgements across the statement pairs gave an indication that the cognitive load of 
the task may have been too great for some participants (Davies, 2004; Torgerson, 
1958). With 8 statements there are 28 pair comparisons to be made and participants 
can find this amount too taxing and laborious. Torgerson (1958) suggests two 
solutions to alleviate the laborious nature of pair comparisons. Firstly, the researcher 
can reduce the number of items to be compared. Secondly, the researcher can reduce 
the number of pair comparisons by only comparing items that are in the immediate 
vicinity of one another on the ordered dimension, e.g., in Study 2 above, Statement A 
would only be compared with Statements B and C as the ordering is presumed to be 
clear enough to ensure that participants would not make mistakes in comparing 
Statement A to the other statements. The latter option seemed too presumptuous as 
the results of Study 2 indicated that errors were not just localised to statements 
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presumed in the immediate vicinity of one another. Therefore, it was decided to 
reduce the amount of statements for each of the issues from 8 to 6. 
 This reduction in the number of statements is deemed acceptable for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, 6 statements still permit a test of the cancellation 
condition of Coombs’ (1964) theory and hence allow for a crucial test of quantitative 
structure. In addition, the use of 6 statements only requires 15 pair comparisons to be 
made and so significantly reduces the cognitive load of the task. This cognitive load 
is further reduced by the reduction of the complexity of the predicate structure, 
whereby statements will include the combination of a maximum of 3 predicates of 
the binary tree, rather than 4, as required by 8 statements. Similarly, 15 pair 
comparisons reduce the time required for the completion of the task, which may lead 
to more sustained attention throughout its duration. 
 The findings of Study 2 also demonstrated that the ‘wandering’ locations of 
the statements, particularly toward the centre of the dimension, might have 
contributed to the unacceptable level of erroneous judgements. The revised 
statements address this issue in a number of ways with a goal to more clearly 
delineate their ordering. Firstly, with the exception of Statement C, items derived 
from the middle of the binary tree structure will be worded so that they are 
moderately favourable or unfavourable rather than ambivalent. This is because the 
locations of ‘neutral’ items have been found to be the most likely to move around 
(Davies, 2004; Michell, 1973). Given the importance of accurately assessing 
individuals with ambivalent attitudes, Statement C will remain ambivalent in nature. 
Furthermore, the binary tree structure outlined in Figure 3.4, whereby there 
are only 2 branches stemming from the initial bifurcation from the kernel concept, 
will be more strictly adhered to. The deviations from this structure in the statements 
  105 
utilised in the previous two studies were indicative of troublesome predicates. The 
reduction in the required amount of predicates for 6 statements allows the removal or 
alteration of these troublesome predicates. The revised 6 statement scales for each of 
the issues are illustrated in Figures 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 below. 
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MoA = morality of abortion 
MA = morally acceptable 
UC = universal choice 
AP = always prohibited 
AE = always encouraged 
AM = always murder 
 
 
A. Abortion is extremely morally acceptable and should be available as a choice and 
encouraged in all circumstances 
B. Abortion is very morally acceptable and should be available as a choice in all 
circumstances and sometimes encouraged 
C. Abortion is morally acceptable and should be available as a choice in some 
circumstances 
D. Abortion is immoral and should be prohibited in most circumstances  
E. Abortion is very immoral and should always be prohibited and treated as a 
criminal offence in most circumstances 
F. Abortion is extremely immoral and should always be strongly prohibited and 
treated as a despicable form of murder in all circumstances 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8. Binary tree and resulting statements for the morality of abortion issue.  
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MA 
~MA 
~UC 
~ 
~AP 
AP 
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MoE = morality of euthanasia 
MA = morally acceptable 
UC = universal choice 
AP = always prohibited 
AE = always encouraged 
AM = always murder 
 
 
A. Euthanasia is extremely morally acceptable and should be available as a choice 
and encouraged in all circumstances 
B. Euthanasia is very morally acceptable and should be available as a choice in all 
circumstances and sometimes encouraged 
C. Euthanasia is morally acceptable and should be available as a choice in some 
circumstances 
D. Euthanasia is immoral and should be prohibited in most circumstances  
E. Euthanasia is very immoral and should always be prohibited and treated as a 
criminal offence in most circumstances 
F. Euthanasia is extremely immoral and should always be strongly prohibited and 
treated as a despicable form of murder in all circumstances 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9. Binary tree and resulting statements for the morality of euthanasia issue.  
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EoA = equality of Aboriginal 
 Australians 
HE = helped to become more equal 
EA = more economic assistance 
AR = always responsible for disadvantage 
SL = ownership of sacred lands 
I = inferior 
 
A. Aboriginal Australians should be given the utmost help to become more equal and 
thus deserve far greater economic assistance and ownership of their sacred lands  
B. Aboriginal Australians should be significantly helped to become more equal and 
thus deserve greater economic assistance and free use of their sacred lands 
C. Aboriginal Australians should generally be helped to become more equal, but 
some receive more economic assistance than they deserve  
D. Aboriginal Australians should not be helped to become more equal as they are 
responsible for their own disadvantage in most circumstances 
E. Aboriginal Australians should definitely not be helped to become more equal as 
they are always responsible for their own disadvantage 
F. Aboriginal Australians should definitely never be helped to become more equal as 
they are always responsible for their own disadvantage and they are inferior 
 
Figure 4.10. Binary tree and resulting statements for the equality of Aboriginal 
Australians issue.  
EoA 
HE 
~HE 
~EA 
~ 
~AR 
AR 
EA 
~SL 
SL 
I 
~I 
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Statement E 
Statement F 
 F 
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Again, with the exception of the kernel concept, the semantic content of the 
abortion and euthanasia statements is identical. Firstly, the initial bifurcation is 
emphasised by changing ‘morally unacceptable’ to ‘immoral’ as according to 
semantic intuition the latter is more clearly negative. Also, the ordering of the 
statements is introduced into the initial bifurcation by adding the adverb ‘extremely’ 
to Statements A and F, and adding the adverb ‘very’ to Statements B and E. The 
troublesome ‘should be encouraged’ predicate is changed to ‘should always be 
encouraged’ so that the mutually contrary predicate is ‘should not always be 
encouraged’. To ensure the correct perception of the ordering of Statements B and C, 
this predicate is expressed as ‘sometimes encouraged’, emphasising the moderately 
favourable nature of the former. The ‘treated as a form of murder’ predicate is 
changed to ‘always treated as a form of murder’ and a degree of license is taken in 
expressing its contrary predicate as ‘treated as a criminal offence in most 
circumstances’ to emphasise Statement E as moderately unfavourable in nature, and 
more unfavourable than Statement D. Similarly, the ‘not always prohibited’ predicate 
of Statement D is expressed as ‘prohibited in most circumstances’ to emphasise its 
moderately unfavourable nature and to more clearly order it with respect to 
Statement C. 
For the Aboriginal Australians statements, the ordering is introduced into the 
initial bifurcation by emphasising the level of help to be given according to their 
order in Statements A, B and C, and by emphasising how adamant each is that help 
should not be given according to the proposed order in Statements D, E and F. The 
troublesome ‘can understand their anger’ predicate is completely removed. Statement 
D’s moderately unfavourable nature is emphasised by expressing ‘not always 
responsible for their own disadvantage’ as ‘responsible for their own disadvantage in 
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most circumstances’. The ordering of Statement E relative to Statement D is 
emphasised by excluding the ‘not inferior’ predicate from its final expression. 
In this study, the pair comparison task will involve preference judgements, as 
these are necessary for confirming Coombs’ (1964) model and in turn establishing 
the location of the statements. The alterations to the statements described above are 
predicted to result in a clearer ordering of the statements, which should result in 
substantially fewer folding errors than the previous study. Additionally, the shorter 
and less laborious pair comparison task is predicted to result in considerably fewer 
intransitive judgements than Study 2. Finally, the locations of the statements for each 
of the issues are expected to be fairly spread along the attitude dimension, with 
Statement C located proximal to the centre. 
 
4.10.1 Method 
Participants 
All participants (n=50) were first-year Psychology students at the University of 
Sydney who received partial course credit. There were 30 females and 20 males and 
the mean age was 19.52 (SD = 3.47). 33 of the 50 participants indicated English was 
their first language and 46 indicated English was their best language. The Mean 
rating of their ability to understand English was 4.74 out of 5 (SD = .49).  
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Materials 
The main materials were the attitude scales presented in Section 4.6. The 
questionnaires were presented via computer using the Quask Formartist survey 
software (http://www.quask.com). Participants indicated their preferences of the 
attitude scale statements via pair comparison judgements. The pair comparisons were 
counterbalanced using the optimum orders of Ross (1939).  
 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to the pair comparison task of Study 2. 
 
4.11 Results and Discussion 
As predicted, the revised statements manifested far fewer erroneous preference 
judgements even with the inclusion of single-path errors. The frequencies of the 
intransitive judgement, folding and single-path errors across the 15 statement pairs 
for each of the issues are presented in Table 4.2 below. Overall, for the abortion 
issue, 26 (3.47%) out of 750 judgements were inconsistent with Coombs’ (1964) 
model. For the euthanasia issue, 24 (3.2%) judgements were erroneous. For the 
Aboriginal Australians issue, 22 (2.93%) judgements were erroneous. This is an 
average error rate of 3.2% across the three issues, which is a remarkable finding for a 
psychological theory considering that only one intransitive, folding or single-path 
error committed by each individual would have constituted an error rate of 6.67%. 
Such results are typical for statements constructed using this rigorous method and 
testify to the importance of stimulus control (Davies, 2004; Michell, 1994, 1998). 
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Table 4.2 
Frequencies of intransitive judgement (Int.), folding (F.) and single-path (SP) errors 
for each of the statement pairs for the abortion (AN), euthanasia (EU) and 
Aboriginal Australians (AA) issues. 
 AN EU AA 
Statement 
Pairs Int. F. SP Int. F. SP Int. F. SP 
AB 0 2 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 
AC 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
AD 1 0 2 3 0 0 1 0 0 
AE 1 0 1 2 0 2 0 0 2 
AF 2 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 3 
BC 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 2 1 
BD 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BE 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
BF 4 0 1 5 0 1 1 0 0 
CD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CF 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DE 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 1 
DF 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
EF 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 13 7 6 14 1 9 6 9 7 
 
  
For the abortion issue, 13 (1.73%) judgements were intransitive, constituting 
50% of the overall error rate. The BF statement pair demonstrated the highest 
prevalence of intransitive judgements. Seven (0.93%) judgements were folding 
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errors, constituting 27% of the overall error rate. Five of these errors involved the EF 
statement pair. Finally, there were 6 (0.8%) single-path errors, constituting 23% of 
the overall error rate. There was no clear localization of these errors. 
 For the euthanasia issue, 14 (1.87%) judgements were intransitive, 
composing 58% of the overall error rate. Again, the highest prevalence was for the 
BF statement pair. A single (0.13%) judgement was in violation of the folding 
condition, making up 4% of the overall error rate. Nine (2.67%) judgements were in 
violation of the single-path condition, constituting 38% of the overall error rate. The 
single-path errors were most prevalent with the AF and BC statement pairs. 
 For the Aboriginal Australians issue, 6 (0.8%) judgements were intransitive, 
constituting 27% of the overall error rate. There was no clear localization of these 
errors. A total of 9 (2.67%) judgements were in violation of the folding condition, 
making up 41% of the overall error rate. These were most prevalent for the DE 
statement pair. Seven (0.93%) judgements were single-path errors, composing 32% 
of the overall error rate. Three of these errors involved the AF pair. 
These acceptable error rates allowed the establishment of the midpoint 
orderings. These are presented in Figures 4.11, 4.12 and 4.13 below. These figures 
also demonstrate the frequency of each preference order across the three issues. The 
3 sets of midpoint orderings were then submitted to a test of double cancellation, 
presented in Figures 4.14, 4.15 and 4.16 below. All three issues’ midpoint orderings 
satisfied the double cancellation condition as the middle arrow never opposed the 
direction of both of the outside arrows and hence there were no contradictions 
entailed by them. This permitted an ordered metric solution using the Goode-Phillips 
algorithm from which the statement locations were obtained (Phillips, 1971). These 
solutions are presented at the bottom of Figures 4.11, 4.12 and 4.13. 
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ABCDEF (1) 
         AB 
BACDEF (2) 
         AC 
BCADEF (8) 
         BC 
  CBADEF (13) 
         AD 
  CBDAEF (10) 
         BD 
CDBAEF (4) 
         AE 
CDBEAF (2) 
         AF 
CDBEFA (3) 
         BE 
CDEBFA (1) 
         BF 
CDEFBA (0) 
        CD 
DCEFBA (1) 
        CE 
DECFBA (0) 
        CF 
DEFCBA (2) 
        DE 
EDFCBA (1) 
        DF 
EFDCBA (1) 
       EF 
FEDCBA (1) 
 
 
                                              
  0            3                                     11                    16                       21     23 
 A            B                                     C                      D                       E       F 
 
 
Figure 4.11. The single-path through the proximity graph for the abortion issue with 
black arrows marking the dominant path and green arrows marking the arbitrary 
path, the frequency of the preference orders and the ordered-metric solution obtained 
from the midpoint ordering. 
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ABCDEF (0) 
         AB 
BACDEF (1) 
         AC 
BCADEF (2) 
         BC 
  CBADEF (12) 
         AD 
  CBDAEF (11) 
         BD 
CDBAEF (5) 
         AE 
CDBEAF (4) 
         BE 
CDEBAF (1) 
         AF 
CDEBFA (0) 
         BF 
CDEFBA (3) 
        CD 
DCEFBA (5) 
        CE 
DECFBA (1) 
        CF 
DEFCBA (3) 
        DE 
EDFCBA (0) 
        DF 
EFDCBA (0) 
       EF 
FEDCBA (2) 
 
 
                                              
  0  1                                                          13                     18           21     23 
 A  B                                                          C                      D            E       F 
 
 
Figure 4.12. The single-path through the proximity graph for the euthanasia issue 
with black arrows marking the dominant path and green arrows marking the arbitrary 
path, the frequency of the preference orders and the ordered-metric solution obtained 
from the midpoint ordering. 
  AB     AC       BC    ADBD        AE     BEAFBF        CD       CE      CF       DE       DF       EF 
  116 
 
ABCDEF (6) 
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BACDEF (10) 
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BCADEF (4) 
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  CBADEF (19) 
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  CBDAEF (1) 
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CBDEAF (1) 
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CDBEAF (4) 
         BE 
CDEBAF (1) 
         CD 
DCEBAF (1) 
         AF 
DCEBFA (3) 
        CE 
DECBFA (2) 
        BF 
DECFBA (0) 
        CF 
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  0               6                 13                                       28     31                          42 
  A              B                 C                                        D      E                            F 
 
Figure 4.13. The single-path through the proximity graph for the Aboriginal 
Australians issue with black arrows marking the dominant path and green arrows 
marking the arbitrary path, the frequency of the preference orders and the ordered-
metric solution obtained from the midpoint ordering. 
        AB             AC      BC             AD  AE BD BE   CDAFCE  BF      CF        DE                    DF   EF 
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 C D E F  C D E F  C D E F 
A     A     A     
B     B     B     
C     C     C     
D     D     D     
 
 C D E F  C D E F      
A     A          
B     B          
C     C          
D     D          
 
Figure 4.14. Tests of double cancellation for the morality of abortion issue. 
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Figure 4.15. Tests of double cancellation for the morality of euthanasia issue. 
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 C D E F  C D E F  C D E F 
A     A     A     
B     B     B     
C     C     C     
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 C D E F  C D E F      
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Figure 4.16. Tests of double cancellation for the equality of Aboriginal Australians 
issue. 
  
 
As can be seen from the above findings, in line with predictions, there was a 
sharp reduction in erroneous judgements across the three issues. The average 
intransitive judgement rate fell from 4.38% to 1.47%.  It seems a reasonable 
explanation that the reduction of the number of items and in turn the number of pair 
comparisons reduced the cognitive load placed on the participants and the shorter 
task time allowed for more sustained attention. Of this 1.47%, 30% involved the BF 
statement pair. All of the individuals who made this intransitive judgement indicated 
their ideal point as most proximal to Statement C’s location, indicating their location 
proximal to the centre of the attitude dimension. This location situates them close to 
the BF midpoint and so their ideal point would only have to slightly ‘wander’ to lead 
to this intransitive judgement. The finding that the BF statement pair for the 
Aboriginal Australians issue was only misjudged once and the BF midpoint is 
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considerably closer to the unfavourable end of its dimension reinforces this 
interpretation. Nonetheless, such a low intransitive judgement rate is quite 
remarkable support for Coombs’ (1964) model and is also attributable to the much 
clearer ordering of the statements, which was also demonstrated by the low folding 
error rate.   
The average folding error rate fell from 4.5% in Study 2 to 1.24% in Study 3. 
Surprisingly, these errors were predominantly committed with respect to statement 
pairs in the moderate to extreme locations of the dimension, as the locations of such 
items are normally more fixed for individuals. These errors may be alleviated in the 
future by further emphasising the semantic ordering of these pairs of statements. 
However, the overall level of error is not perceived as high enough to warrant further 
revision to the scales in this thesis. 
The ordered metric solutions and the resulting statement locations were also 
reasonably consistent with predictions, particularly for the abortion and euthanasia 
issues. For the three issues, the statements were reasonably spread across the 
dimension, with the exception of the moderately favourable part of the dimension for 
the euthanasia issue. It appears that for this issue, Statement B is interpreted as more 
extremely favourable than expected. This may follow from the fact that the semantic 
weight of the predicate  ‘sometimes encouraged’ leads to the interpretation of the 
statement as extremely favourable as participants believe the encouragement of 
euthanasia under any circumstances represents an extremely favourable attitude. 
Euthanasia is a sensitive issue and the prospect that individuals could be encouraged 
to seek a medically assisted death may offend people’s beliefs that it is a deeply 
personal decision and alert their fears that such a practice may be abused as a form of 
murder. 
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Crucially, for the abortion and euthanasia issues, Statement C was found to 
be located very close to the centre of the dimension. Given the intended ambivalent 
nature of this statement, this provides further support for the discussion of last 
chapter that the attitude dimension varies in a unidimensional, bipolar manner with 
ambivalent attitudes located toward the centre.  
This relationship was not as clear for the Aboriginal Australians issue where 
Statement C was located at more moderately favourable position on the dimension. 
However, this finding must be interpreted with caution, as the ordered metric 
solution for this issue is the most questionable given the highly arbitrary nature of the 
single-path fit. Five of the 15 steps along the single path were defined arbitrarily as 
there were no preference orders at that position of the proximity graph. Furthermore, 
a number of the other steps were contingent upon the preference orders of a very 
small proportion of the participants as approximately 60% of responses were 
consistent with only two preference orders, BACDEF and CBADEF. Thus, a more 
reliable solution requires a wider spread of preference orders, which will ideally be 
achieved in the next chapter with a larger sample size.  
It may also be the case that the semantic weight of the ‘some receive greater 
economic assistance than they deserve’ predicate of Statement C may not be as 
unfavourable as predicted. This is a commonly held belief regarding Aboriginal 
Australians, as illustrated in Section 3.4, and so it may not be interpreted as a 
‘realistic’ evaluation rather than a particularly unfavourable one. In addition, 
individuals may feel favourable toward helping Aboriginal Australians to become 
more equal despite the fact that they feel that some abuse this help. Thus, they 
consider their attitude moderately favourable despite that belief, and hence such a 
statement would express a moderately favourable attitude.  
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Nonetheless, individuals who feel their attitude is more ambivalent than this 
statement may indicate this mixed nature of the attitude through their entire 
preference order, not just their indication of the statement closest to their ideal point. 
For example, an ambivalent attitude may provide a preference order of CDBEAF, 
which is located at the centre of the dimension. Whereas a moderately positive 
individual may provide the preference order CBADEF. Hence, the information 
present in the complete preference orders is far richer than just the most preferred 
statement. 
 
4.12 General discussion 
As can be seen from the progression of the studies in this chapter as well as the pilots 
presented in Appendix D, the construction of clearly ordered statements appropriate 
for a test of Coombs’ (164) deterministic theory is a laborious process. This is the 
even the case with the stimulus control provided by the binary tree procedure. Thus, 
it is unsurprising that most attitude researchers take a somewhat haphazard approach 
to scale construction and rely upon a tautological model such as the method of 
summated ratings, or utilise a probabilistic model, such as the HCM employed in 
Chapter 2. 
 
4.12.1 The paradox of error in psychometric models 
One of the largest shortcomings of the probabilistic approach is that by integrating 
error into the models, systematic accounts of the causes of error in psychometric 
studies have mostly been precluded (Michell, 1994). The progression from Study 2 
to Study 3 was done on the basis of such an account, and the success of Study 3 
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provides evidence that the errors were systematic. Specifically, the significant 
reduction in intransitive judgements across the two studies provided evidence that 
the amount of cognitive effort required by the larger amount of pair comparisons and 
semantic complexity of the statements led to inconsistent preference judgements. 
Furthermore, the accentuation of the ordering of, and removal of troublesome 
predicates from the statements of Study 3 led to significantly fewer folding errors. 
Thus, providing evidence that these factors would have influenced the unacceptable 
level of these errors in Study 2. If the typical psychometric approach had been taken, 
these sorts of errors may have been dismissed as artifacts of chance.  
In defense of the probabilistic approach, Andrich (2003) makes the 
observation that probabilistic models increase the precision of measurement. The 
rationale of his argument is that fit to deterministic models, such as Guttman’s 
(1944), are typically achieved by measures where the items are well spread on the 
underlying dimensions. This was demonstrated in the present chapter to a certain 
extent, as its deterministic approach led to the reduction of the number of statements, 
which in turn led to a reduction in the number of possible preference orders. Thus, 
the ability of the measure to differentiate between different, but close attitudes was 
reduced. The Aboriginal Australians scale, whereby 60% of the participants provided 
only two preference orders, provided an extreme example of this.  
The precision of the measurement could perhaps be improved by increasing 
the amount of items, particularly located around the area of the dimension where 
participants were clustered.  The response patterns could then be analysed using a 
probabilistic model that would be more tolerant of the resulting ordering violations. 
These would manifest from the subtler semantic ordering of the statements, which 
creates ambiguity. However, the notion that the integration of error in to the model 
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increases the precision of measurement is what Michell (2008a) refers to as a 
paradox in psychometric theory. 
 Typically, scientific models, such as those found in physics, increase the 
precision of their measurements by reducing the contaminating effect of error. If 
errors were completely removed the measurement would be, by definition, perfect. 
On the other hand in psychology, Andrich (2003) argues that the removal of error 
decreases the precision of measurement. It should be noted, as Andrich points out, 
that quantum physics provides an example whereby similar probabilistic models are 
utilised in the natural sciences. However, the use of such models in quantum physics 
is not a result of observations consistently being at odds with the proposed 
mechanisms of the system. Rather, they are used because the nature of the system is 
understood as inherently probabilistic6.  
One is free to speculate that psychological phenomena are equally 
probabilistic, but this should be done in light of the fact that the collection of 
particles at the atomic level, let alone the human level, appears ‘large’ enough to be 
explained by the deterministic laws of classical physics (Rae, 2005). Furthermore, 
such a speculation should be accompanied by a theory of how the probabilistic 
features of the model correspond to the probabilistic aspects of the relevant 
psychological process. The fact that no such theory is ever provided is symptomatic 
of the lack of rigorous cognitive theory of such phenomena as social attitudes 
(Michell, 2008b). 
 Equally troubling is the fact that the assumptions regarding error normally 
provide the basis to the quantitative assumption of the model (Michell, 2004a, 
                                                
6 This is also a point of contention as some interpretations of quantum physics, such 
as Bohm’s (1952), argue that quantum phenomena are not probabilistic in nature.  
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2008a). That is, we presume quantitative structure on the basis of the thing we know 
the least about.  This is particularly concerning as tests of fit of such models have 
been shown to be insensitive to violations of the quantitative assumption (Kyngdon 
& Richards, 2007). If psychological measurement is going to progress from its 
dubious operationalist basis, tests of quantitivity, such as those presented in this 
chapter in a deterministic context, need to be integrated into these models. 
Karabatsos (2001), Humphry (2005) and Kyngdon and Richards (2007) have begun 
the work toward this end.  
Nonetheless, Andrich (2003) makes a valid point that the fit of deterministic 
models often leads to ‘crude’ measures in psychology. However, a satisfactory 
solution does not appear to be provided by probabilistic models. Rather, greater 
precision in measurement must be developed out of greater precision in our 
understanding of the constructs and how they causally relate to our measures of 
them. For example, if it is ultimately revealed that attitudes are purely ordinally 
structured, violations of the single-path condition of Coombs (1964) model should 
not be considered erroneous at all, as the participants are accurately indicating that 
there is no strict ordering of the inter-statement midpoints. If the best we can do is 
order individual’s attitudes, then this should not be considered imprecise, as our 
instruments will accurately reflect the construct. In that case, our time would be 
better invested in understanding what determines this ordering so that this could be 
integrated in to the construction of the instrument to bring about more precise 
orderings. 
Given the multitude of extraneous factors that affect questionnaire responses, 
it seems inevitable that violations of model assumptions will always be found. This 
chapter attempts to provide systematic explanations of the causes of such violations 
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throughout the studies. Whilst these explanations may not be accurate, they at least 
escape the psychometric habit of obscuring them under the cloak of error and may 
provide future avenues for improvement. Furthermore, without this consideration of 
the causes of error, the statements in this chapter could not have progressed to a form 
where they are judged in a manner almost entirely consistent with Coombs’ (1964) 
model. This, in turn, provided genuine evidence that ambivalent attitudes fit within a 
unidimensional, bipolar and quantitative dimension. 
 
4.12.2 Conclusion 
This chapter’s confirmation of the bipolar and quantitative assumptions affirms the 
possibility of true quantitative attitude measurement, including the assessment of 
ambivalent individuals. This finding is crucial for the statistical analyses to be used 
in Chapter 5. Furthermore, this approach conceptualized ambivalence as a property 
of evaluative judgements, located at the centre of the evaluative dimension. The 
measures validated in this chapter reflect this conceptualisation. Thus, there is an 
opportunity to examine the relationship between these measures and subjective 
reports of ambivalence to provide further validation of them. Furthermore, the 
greater rigour of the measures and the insights provided by the unfolding approach 
provide the opportunity to further investigate the relationship between ambivalence 
and latent attitude parameters free from the influence of operationalist biases. These 
issues will be the focus of Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5 - The Conceptualisation of Attitudinal 
Ambivalence 
 
5.1 Introduction 
So far, this thesis has investigated the implications of ambivalence for the 
conceptualisation and measurement of attitudes generally. This work has been 
psychometrically focussed and has provided evidence that ambivalence is consistent 
with both the bipolar and quantitative assumptions and guided the construction of 
measures of a number of attitudes. These measures have been validated as reflecting 
these structural assumptions. Furthermore, they represent ambivalence as mixed 
evaluative judgements located at the centre of the evaluative dimension. This chapter 
will attempt to provide further validation of these measures and conceptualisation by 
examining their relationship with subjective reports of ambivalence. This will shift 
the focus to a critical consideration of the conceptualisation of ambivalence in the 
literature and its relationship with a number of attitude parameters. This 
conceptualisation of ambivalence is intrinsically linked to the psychometric issues 
raised in earlier chapters, as it has been driven by the measurement approaches. This 
is unsurprising given the aforementioned operationalist bias that pervades attitude 
research. 
This operationalist approach has led ambivalence researchers to identify two 
forms of ambivalence, which were introduced in Chapter 1. These have been referred 
to in the literature as objective and subjective, potential and felt, direct and indirect, 
or meta-psychological and operative (Fazio & Olson, 2003; Holbrook, & Krosnick, 
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2005; Newby-Clark et al., 2002). They stem from the distinction between the direct 
assessment of ambivalence, whereby individuals are directly asked how ambivalent 
their attitude toward the issue is, and indirect assessment, whereby individuals are 
asked to independently indicate how positive and how negative they feel toward the 
issue. Evidence for the independence of these constructs has mostly been provided 
by the lack of inter-correlation between these distinct measurement approaches 
(Holbrook & Krosnick, 2005; Priester & Petty, 1996; Thompson et al., 1995). 
However, this evidence is undermined by the influence of operationism. This 
influence has led these researchers to forget what they are referring to when they 
investigate ambivalence. 
It will be argued in this chapter that the above conceptualisation is at odds 
with the most basic understanding of ambivalence as a property of an attitude, not a 
standalone construct. The previous chapters demonstrated how ambivalence fits 
within the general bipolar conceptualisation and measurement of attitudes using an 
unfolding approach. In line with this understanding, the conceptualisation of 
ambivalence and the relationship between different measures of it will be 
investigated in terms of a number of attitude parameters.  
The importance of the attitude intensity parameter was discussed in Chapter 
2, particularly with respect to differentiating ambivalence from indifference. 
Additionally, this chapter will explore the relevance of the latitude of acceptance 
parameter, which has been addressed in a number of other attitude contexts and 
appears relevant to an understanding of ambivalence. These parameters will be 
elucidated in terms of the response function of the unfolding models. However, 
before presenting the details of these parameters and the proposed model, this 
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chapter will review and critique the dominant conceptualisation of ambivalence in 
the attitude literature. 
 
5.2 Operationism and the conceptualisation of ambivalence 
5.2.1 Operationism and Psychology 
Bridgman (1927) introduced operationism as a philosophy of science. He argued that 
physical concepts should not be defined in terms of their properties, but rather in 
terms of the operations used to measure and manipulate them. So, the physical 
concepts such as length, mass, weight etc. are not understood as objective properties 
in space-time, but rather in terms of the operations we perform on them. He saw this 
as a way of eradicating what he labelled as abstract, metaphysical concepts from 
science, which had led to the crisis in physics as a result of Einstein’s relativistic 
revolution (Grace, 2001). Bridgman’s proposal was bolstered by its enthusiastic 
acceptance by the Logical Positivists, who were a major force in the philosophy of 
science at the time and shared a common goal of eradicating ‘metaphysics’ from 
scientific theories (Bickhard, 2001).  
 Within a decade, the philosophy of science community, including the logical 
positivists, abandoned operationism as a viable theory. One of the most debilitating 
criticisms was almost immediately provided by Russell (1928, cited in Green, 2001) 
and reiterated by Suppe (1977). This criticism points out that an absurd consequence 
of operationism is that it leads to a multiplication of theoretical terms. Taking length 
for example, operationism leads to the conclusion that a length measured by a ruler is 
entirely distinct from a length measured by triangulation, and is entirely distinct from 
a length measured by any other operation. That is, these ‘lengths’ are distinct in the 
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way that length differs from mass. They are literally different concepts. Furthermore, 
Michell (1999) highlights the logical error of operationism as it seeks to confound 
the thing being measured with how it is measured. The fact that something may be 
identified using a certain operation does not logically entail that it cannot exist 
without being identified by that operation. Despite these fundamental flaws, 
operationism continues to influence psychology, albeit in a diluted fashion. 
 Operationism was ushered into psychology by Stevens (1935) amongst 
others. As previously discussed in Chapter 1, Stevens utilised it as a justification for 
his revised definition of measurement (Michell, 1999). Other psychologists rapidly 
adopted it as it provided justification for the fledgling experimental practices of the 
dominant behaviourist school at the time (Grace, 2001; Michell, 1999). In addition, it 
would later justify the use of classical test theory, which had a profound effect upon 
psychological testing, especially in the realm of mental abilities (Borsboom, 2005).  
It appears that some psychologists took the tenets of operationism literally, 
such as Boring (1923, p. 187) who famously wrote, “Intelligence is what the tests 
test”. Curiously, this predates Bridgman’s (1927) formalisation of operationism, 
demonstrating the readiness to adopt this principle. However, such a literal 
adaptation of operationism is rendered untenable by the above criticisms. It is 
fallacious to confound what is being measured with how it is being measured. 
Despite this, evidence of its effect may be identified throughout the attitude literature 
and particularly in the dominant understanding of ambivalence. 
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5.2.2 Operationism and the two forms of ambivalence 
As introduced in Chapter 1, researchers have typically approached the assessment of 
ambivalence in one of two ways. Firstly, researchers have assessed what they term 
felt/subjective/direct/meta-psychological ambivalence, which involves directly 
asking individuals how conflicted/ambivalent/mixed they feel toward an attitude 
issue. Secondly, they have assessed what they term 
potential/objective/indirect/operative ambivalence by asking respondents to 
independently rate how positive and how negative they feel toward an issue and 
these two ratings are combined into an ambivalence score using a pre-determined 
formula, such as the Similarity-Intensity Model (SIM), which was reviewed in 
Section 1.6. 
 Upon calculating this score, researchers have typically assessed its validity by 
comparing it with a subjective measure as the criterion. More often than not, this 
involves correlating the two scores and the correlation is typically only small to 
moderate in size (Holbrook & Krosnick, 2005; Priester & Petty, 1996; Thompson et 
al., 1995). Conclusions are then drawn regarding the nature of these ‘ambivalences’ 
as independent constructs.  
However, such a conclusion is not valid given the nature of the analysis 
employed. Firstly, it does not account for the attenuating effect of error on such inter-
correlations. Secondly, it appears to be influenced by a literal operationalist 
mentality, whereby measures are taken to be equivalent to the underlying constructs. 
Holbrook and Krosnick (2005) were the first to extend upon this approach utilising a 
latent variable model. 
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5.2.3 Operationism and the two ambivalences as latent variables 
Despite the pervasive effect of operationism upon psychology, a number of statistical 
analytical approaches have been developed that account for the imperfect nature of 
measures as indicators of latent psychological variables. The most widely utilised of 
these has been the factor analytic procedure introduced by Spearman (1904). More 
recently, the statistical technique of structural equation modelling, which combines 
path analysis, factor analysis and simultaneous equation modelling, has received 
increasingly widespread attention within the social sciences (Hoyle, 1995; Jöreskog, 
1973; Kaplan, 2000)7. Despite the widespread usage of these approaches in other 
areas of Psychology, ambivalence researchers have predominantly ignored them. 
Holbrook and Krosnick (2005) were the first to extend upon the 
abovementioned correlational approach by examining the relationship between the 
two hypothesised ambivalences using confirmatory factor analysis. They defined the 
two approaches as assessing meta-psychological and operative ambivalence and 
argued that these are distinct, but related constructs. Their analyses provided a two-
factor solution across a number of issues, supporting their assertion that these are 
independent latent variables. The distinction between these latent variables will be 
discussed in greater detail in Section 5.3. 
 Whilst improving upon the correlational approaches that preceded it, 
Holbrook and Krosnick’s (2005) analyses may still be criticised as being undermined 
by operationism. Specifically, because the operative scores that underpin their 
operative ambivalence variable are framed in terms of the assessment of 
                                                
7 Although latent variable approaches are positively reviewed in this context as they 
lend themselves to realist interpretations of psychological variables, they also make a 
number of assumptions that are not routinely checked (MacCallum & Austin, 2000). 
These assumptions will be overviewed in Section 5.6.4. 
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ambivalence, the underlying construct is conceptualised as ambivalence. This may be 
perpetuated by their use of the Gradual Threshold Model (Priester & Petty, 1996) 
and the Negative Acceleration Model (Scott, 1966) as the operative scores in their 
analyses.  
 Both of these models take as their premise that ambivalence is a feature of the 
positive and negative ratings provided on the unipolar scales illustrated in Figure 1.1. 
Thus, there is no attempt to conceptualise ambivalence with respect to the underlying 
construct(s) that causally influence these ratings. Rather, the focus is upon the nature 
of the relationship between the ratings provided and the extent of the conflict 
between them. Clearly, this literature needs to move away from these operationalist 
underpinnings and extend the understanding of ambivalence to the latent attitude 
level. 
Curiously, despite addressing the SIM in their literature review, Holbrook 
and Krosnick (2005) do not include it in their analyses. This is detrimental as the 
SIM is the only ambivalence formula that is explicitly derived from a theoretical 
consideration, however limited, of the attitude parameters that potentially underpin 
the positive and negative ratings. What the SIM makes explicit, at least in its 
derivation, is that ambivalence is not a stand-alone construct. Rather, it is a property 
of an attitude (Thompson et al., 1995).  What Holbrook and Krosnick (2005) and the 
ambivalence literature in general have failed to acknowledge is that as ambivalence 
is a property of an attitude, it should be investigated in terms of general attitude 
parameters as the latent constructs. Consideration of the components of the SIM 
provides a starting place for a conceptual understanding of ambivalence in terms of 
the underlying attitude parameters. 
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5.3 Ambivalence as a property of latent attitude parameters 
5.3.1 The SIM, similarity and ambivalence 
As previously discussed, the SIM identifies ‘similarity’ and ‘intensity’ as the attitude 
components most relevant to ambivalence. Despite being titled in operative terms, it 
can be elucidated from Thompson et al.’s (1995) discussion that the similarity 
component refers to the person’s location on the evaluative dimension. This is the 
most common parameter addressed in attitude research.  
Specifically, it pertains to the polarity of the location of the individual’s 
attitude on the evaluative dimension.  As Thompson et al. (1995, p. 367) state, “as 
the difference in magnitude between the two components increases (i.e., the 
similarity in the magnitude between the two components decreases), the attitude 
becomes more polarised in the direction of the stronger component.” Therefore, 
rather than referring to the similarity between the ratings of positivity and negativity, 
in latent variable terms, similarity is understood as a non-polarised (i.e., proximal to 
the centre) location on the evaluative dimension. This understanding is akin to the 
conceptualisation of the bipolar evaluative dimension and the place of ambivalence 
in it that was elaborated and investigated in the previous chapters.  
 
5.3.2 The SIM, intensity and ambivalence 
Thompson et al.’s (1995) inclusion of the intensity component in the SIM model 
acknowledges the calls of a number of attitude researchers to pay more attention to 
what they term ‘attitude strength’ parameters (Krosnick et al., 1993; Petty & 
Krosnick, 1995). Components of attitude strength have been found to influence an 
attitude’s persistence over time, resistance to change, and influence on thought and 
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action over and above a person’s location on the evaluative dimension (Visser, Bizer 
& Krosnick, 2006). The strength parameters include attitude intensity, certainty, 
importance, accessibility, knowledge and the latitudes of acceptance, rejection and 
non-commitment, amongst others. It appears that it is these strength parameters that 
pertain to the intensity component of the SIM model.  
However, Thompson et al. (1995) are never explicit about what they take this 
parameter to be in terms of a latent construct. Rather, they refer to it in operative 
terms as the extremity of the ratings provided. To further complicate matters, there is 
an ongoing debate within the attitude strength literature as to whether it should be 
considered a unitary construct, or rather composed of many interrelated constructs 
(Krosnick et al., 1993, Visser et al., 2006). But, it will be inferred from the title given 
to this aspect of Thompson et al.’s (1995) model that they were referring to the 
attitude intensity parameter.  
Krosnick et al. (1993, p. 1132) define attitude intensity as, “the strength of 
the emotional reactions provoked by the attitude object in the individual.” Items that 
assess attitude intensity typically ask individuals to indicate how strongly or intense 
they feel toward an issue (Krosnick et al., 1993; Visser et al., 2006). This is crucial, 
as when discussing the details of an ambivalence formula that influenced the SIM, 
Thompson et al. (1995, p. 368) state, “in order to reward…intensity even more (or to 
penalize indifference)”. Thus, they allude to their understanding of an intense 
attitude as being the counterpart to indifference. A person who is indifferent toward 
an issue does not care about it. There is no intensity or strength to his or her feelings 
regarding the issue. 
Some researchers have treated attitude extremity and intensity as 
interchangeable (McDill, 1959; Tannenbaum, 1956). This is of interest because it 
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suggests that the similarity and intensity components of the SIM may in fact be 
underpinned by a single variable, i.e., location on the evaluative dimension. That is, 
as an attitude polarises in either direction the positivity and negativity become less 
similar and the intensity increases. However, Davies (2004) found that attitude 
extremity and intensity were only lowly correlated, and that variation in intensity 
was present across the entire evaluative dimension, including moderate and extreme 
locations. Thus, extremity and intensity, although related, appear to constitute 
different elements of an attitude. 
Furthermore, Davies (2004) investigated the hypothesis that attitude intensity, 
understood as the level of caring toward an issue, is associated with the extremity of 
responses on rating scales toward the issue, the operative understanding of intensity 
put forth by Thompson et al. (1995). Her findings indicated a strong, positive 
correlation between the two. Thus, it seems reasonable to investigate the attitude 
intensity parameter as the variable underpinning this aspect of the SIM.  
Interestingly, the parameters identified in the SIM are inherent within the 
interpretation of the single-peaked preference function argued to underpin rating 
scale responses by Michell (2001b) and later elaborated by Davies (2004). This 
preference function not only captures the similarity and intensity components of the 
SIM, understood in latent variable terms, but also adds the latitude of acceptance 
parameter.  
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5.3.3 The single-peaked preference function and ambivalence 
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                 Evaluative dimension 
 
Figure 5.1. Single-peaked preference function illustrating the conceptualisation of 
the evaluation, intensity and latitude of acceptance parameters.  
 
 
Davies (2004), extending upon the ideas of Michell (2001b), postulated that rating 
scale responses are determined by the parameters of a person’s single-peaked 
preference function (see Figure 5.1 above for an illustration of this preference 
function). She highlights three components of the preference function. Firstly, the 
person’s location on the evaluative dimension, or their ideal point in Coombs’ (1964) 
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terms. This is typically the only parameter considered in attitude research and in the 
interpretation of rating responses, including research applying unfolding analysis. 
Secondly, the height of their preference function, which indicates how strongly or 
intensely their attitude is felt. Thirdly, the slope of the preference function, which is 
determined by their level of agreement with other attitude positions. This is 
commonly referred to as the individual’s latitude of acceptance. Consequently, two 
individuals may share a common ideal point on the evaluative dimension, but their 
attitudes may still differ in terms of either their intensity or the number of other 
attitude positions they also agree with. 
Thus, when rating an item, a person will agree with it if it is sufficiently 
proximal to their ideal-point, i.e., it is within the bounds of their latitude of 
acceptance. Furthermore, for the item deemed closest to their ideal point, the 
extremity of this agreement will be determined by the intensity of their attitude. So, 
in terms of translating the SIM to this context, an ambivalent individual’s ideal-point 
will be located toward the centre of the evaluative dimension and their preference 
function will be sufficiently high to indicate that they are not indifferent toward the 
issue, i.e., their attitude is sufficiently intense. Interestingly, the one parameter in 
Davies’ (2004) conceptualisation that is not addressed by the SIM is the latitude of 
acceptance. At face value, this parameter seems relevant to the manifestation of 
ambivalence in attitude structure. 
 
5.3.4 The latitude of acceptance parameter and ambivalence 
The latitude of acceptance parameter was first investigated in a Social-Judgment 
theory context, whereby it was defined as the extent of the positions acceptable to an 
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individual in addition to their most acceptable position (Hovland, Harvey & Sherif, 
1957; Sherif & Hovland, 1961; Sherif, Sherif & Nebergall, 1965). They found that 
individuals tended to not just agree with one particular item. Rather, they indicated 
varying levels of agreement with a number of items across a certain area of the 
evaluative dimension.  
This parameter has been mostly ignored in the mainstream attitude literature, 
which may be attributable to the field’s predisposition to treat attitudes as a single 
point on a single evaluative dimension (Krosnick et al., 1993). However, this 
parameter has been given more thorough consideration within the unfolding context, 
which does not always display the same predisposition (Andrich & Luo, 1993; 
Andrich, 1996; Coombs, 1964; Davies, 2004; Johnson, 2007; Luo, 1998; Luo, 
Andrich & Styles, 1998). For example, in Coombs’ (1964) unidimensional unfolding 
theory, he argues that an individual will agree with an item if the distance between 
their ideal point and the location of the item is less than or equal to the person’s 
latitude of acceptance (this notion is illustrated in Figure 5.1 above). Thus, in both 
the social-judgment theorists’ and Coombs’ approaches, the latitude of acceptance is 
understood as a person parameter. 
Recently, this parameter has been considered in research utilising the 
Hyperbolic Cosine Model (Andrich & Luo, 1993; Andrich, 1996; Luo, 1998; Luo, 
Andrich & Styles, 1998). This approach has predominantly understood the latitude of 
acceptance as an item parameter, whereby if an individual’s ideal point falls within 
the latitude of acceptance region surrounding an item, the probability of an agree 
response to it is greater than the probability of a disagree response. Thus, the greater 
the latitude of acceptance region of an item, the less discriminatory it is. However, 
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Luo, Andrich & Styles (1998) did offer a version of the generalised HCM whereby 
the latitude of acceptance is also understood as a person parameter. 
This question of whether the latitude of acceptance should be understood as a 
person or item parameter is an important one for the current study as it wishes to 
examine this attitude parameter as a latent variable and thus adopts an understanding 
akin to the traditional view. That is, it is being examined as the tendency of a person 
to agree with attitudinal positions that may be different and even contrary to their 
own and thus is a person parameter. However, this item/person parameter distinction 
with respect to the latitude of acceptance seems rather moot given that items are 
designed as analogues of attitudes. If an attitude possesses a latitude of acceptance, 
then its analogous item should also possess such a latitude. Thus, this parameter 
should be given more consideration when attempting to understand individuals’ 
attitudes or constructing attitude items. 
In addition, there has been controversy regarding the degree of distinction 
between the latitude of acceptance parameter and the extremity and intensity 
parameters and whether it should be understood as an independent component. 
Firstly, when initially considered, the latitude of acceptance parameter was 
understood as being inversely related to the extremity of one’s attitude, i.e., the 
further polarised your attitude, the smaller your latitude of acceptance (Diab, 1965; 
Sherif & Hovland, 1961). However, McCroskey (1968) demonstrated that these two 
parameters were only lowly correlated and that there was a wide range of latitudes 
observed in ‘neutral’ subjects. This is crucial as it provides evidence that there is 
variability in this parameter across individuals located toward the centre of the 
evaluative dimension and thus it appears independent of attitude extremity.  
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Secondly, Sherif and Hovland (1961) suggested that latitudes of acceptance 
are inversely related to attitude intensity. That is, individuals who care more about an 
issue will have smaller latitudes of acceptance than those who care less. Whilst this 
trend is consistent in aggregated data across a number of studies, Sherif (1960) found 
that there is variability in latitudes of acceptance across individuals of similar 
intensities. Thus, although the latitude of acceptance is likely highly related to the 
extremity and intensity parameters, given the above findings, it seems reasonable to 
investigate it as an independent parameter. 
 
5.4 Relationships between these latent attitude parameters and meta-
psychological ambivalence 
As previously discussed, Holbrook and Krosnick (2005) found that the distinction 
between the operative and subjective forms of ambivalences in the literature was 
attributable to the fact that researchers were assessing two different latent variables 
by their different ambivalence measures. The first pertains to the level of conflict in 
an individual’s positive and negative judgements of an issue. This is what I have 
explained in latent variable terms as a property of an attitude. The second pertains to 
the subjective experience of ambivalence, which they describe as a meta-
psychological judgement.  
They term it this as when you ask someone how conflicted/ambivalent 
/mixed they feel about a particular issue, you are not attempting to assess their 
attitude. Rather, you are assessing a subjective judgement of that attitude. This is 
akin to the difference between assessing a person’s weight by putting them on a 
weighing scale versus asking for their judgement regarding how much they weigh. It 
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could be the case that the two coincide. However, it seems more likely that the latter 
would be determined not only by their actual weight, but also by other extraneous 
factors such as their body self-image, comparisons to their peers, influence by the 
media etc. 
Typically in attitude assessment we are attempting to directly assess an 
attitude, understood in this context as an evaluative judgement regarding some 
object/issue. When we ask an individual to assess how ambivalent their attitude is we 
are asking for a judgement of the evaluative judgement, or in Holbrook and 
Krosnick’s (2005) terms, a meta-psychological judgement. Just as in the above 
example whereby one’s judgement of a physical state may be influenced by 
extraneous factors to that state, it is plausible that one’s judgement of a psychological 
state may be similarly affected.  
In fact, Newby-Clark et al. (2002) demonstrated that meta-psychological 
ambivalence could be independently affected by an individual’s preference for 
cognitive consistency. Furthermore, Priester and Petty (2001) showed that it could be 
partially explained by attitude discrepancy with a liked other. Thus, it appears 
reasonable to assume that meta-psychological judgements of ambivalence, which 
will be referred to as meta-psychological ambivalence, are distinct from the 
ambivalence inherent in the parameters of an attitude. 
However, despite these extraneous influences, past research studies utilising 
the Similarity-Intensity Model appear to suggest a significant determining 
relationship between the attitude parameters and meta-psychological ambivalence 
(Mucchi-Faina, Costarelli & Romili, 2002; Priester & Petty, 1996; Thompson et al., 
1995). Of these, location on the evaluative dimension appears the most fundamental. 
The past chapters of this thesis have demonstrated that proximity to the centre of this 
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dimension is indicative of a mixed evaluative judgement. It seems unlikely that an 
individual would experience meta-psychological ambivalence if the attitude being 
evaluated did not possess this quality. 
The attitude intensity and the latitude of acceptance parameters have received 
no empirical attention with respect to meta-psychological ambivalence. However, 
given the consistent finding that more extreme attitudes on the evaluative dimension 
tend to be more intense, and that extremity is negatively correlated with 
ambivalence, it appears reasonable to assume that overall intensity will have a 
negative relationship with meta-psychological ambivalence (Maio, Bell & Esses, 
1996). In contrast, for individuals located toward the centre of the evaluative 
dimension, Thompson et al. (1995) suggest that greater intensity will lead to greater 
feelings of ambivalence.  
With respect to the latitude of acceptance, given that ambivalent individuals 
are more likely to find both positive and negative attitudes agreeable, it seems 
reasonable to predict that larger latitudes will lead to greater feelings of ambivalence. 
This is particularly the case for individuals located toward the centre of the 
evaluative dimension. This is an important point, as if an individual possesses a large 
latitude of acceptance toward some issue, but is located toward the extremities of the 
dimension, then their stance might be more accurately understood as acquiescent 
rather than ambivalent. 
 
5.5 Aims and hypotheses 
Given the above overview, the study presented in this chapter firstly aims to 
further investigate the relationships between the evaluation, intensity and latitude of 
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acceptance attitude parameters. It is hypothesised that higher levels of intensity will 
be associated with more extreme positions on the evaluative dimension. Furthermore, 
it is hypothesised that locations on the evaluative dimension proximal to the centre 
will be associated with greater latitudes of acceptance. Finally, it is predicted that 
higher levels of intensity will be associated with smaller latitudes of acceptance. 
More importantly, the study presented in this chapter intends to more 
rigorously examine the structural relationship between ambivalence as a property of 
these attitude parameters and as a meta-psychological judgement. In doing this, it 
will be the first to attempt to study this relationship free from operationalist biases. 
This will involve the adoption of a structural equation modelling (SEM) framework, 
which will be elaborated in Section 5.6.4. By using multiple indicators, this analytic 
method attempts to investigate the relationships between the latent variables of 
interest, rather than our measures of them. 
It will initially parallel Holbrook and Krosnick’s (2005) analysis by fitting 
one and two-factor models to the data (see Figures 5.2 and 5.3 below). It is expected 
that, in line with the results of Holbrook and Krosnick, the two-factor model will 
possess a superior fit, highlighting the distinction between ambivalence as a property 
of an attitude and as a meta-psychological judgement. Furthermore, given that the 
evaluation, intensity and latitude of acceptance parameters are conceptually 
understood as independent constructs, a further model will be assessed containing 
independent latent variables for each (see Figure 5.4 below). It is expected that this 
model will display the best overall fit. 
Furthermore, the three attitude parameters and their interactions will be 
investigated as predictors of meta-psychological ambivalence. It is hypothesised that 
the evaluation parameter will show the greatest predictive relationship, whereby 
  144 
values proximal to the centre of the evaluative dimension will be associated with 
greater meta-psychological ambivalence. As this parameter will be predominantly 
indicated by the measures developed and validated in Chapters 3 and 4, it is expected 
that these results will further validate these measures by providing evidence that they 
are systematically related to meta-psychological ambivalence. In addition, a small 
but significant negative relationship between intensity and meta-psychological 
ambivalence and a small but significant positive relationship between the latitude of 
acceptance and meta-psychological ambivalence are predicted. 
Finally, two interactions are predicted including, 1) evaluation × intensity, 
whereby the relationship between proximity to the centre of the evaluative dimension 
and meta-psychological ambivalence will be greater for individuals with more 
intense attitudes, and, 2) evaluation × latitude of acceptance, whereby the 
relationship between proximity to the centre of the evaluative dimension and meta-
psychological ambivalence will be greater for individuals with larger latitudes of 
acceptance. 
 
5.6 Method 
5.6.1 Participants 
All participants (n=200) were first-year Psychology students at the University of 
Sydney who received partial course credit in return for their participation. There 
were 125 females and 75 males and the mean age was 19.99 (SD = 4.42). 137 of the 
200 participants (68.5%) indicated English was their first language and 183 (91.5%) 
indicated English was their best language. The Mean rating of their ability to 
understand English was 4.63 out of 5 (SD = .59).  
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5.6.2 Materials 
The main materials were the 6-item morality of abortion, morality of euthanasia, and 
equality of Aboriginal Australians attitude scales developed in Chapter 4. Similar to 
Chapter 4, participants indicated their preference orders for each of the 3 issues via 
pair comparison judgements. In addition, ratings of agreement with the statements 
were obtained on a 9-point bipolar rating scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to 
‘strongly agree’ with ‘neither agree nor disagree’ at the centre. The pair comparisons 
were counterbalanced using the optimum orders of Ross (1939) and the order of the 
statements was counterbalanced across participants for the rating task. 
 Similar to the bivariate rating task outlined in Section 1.6, participants were 
also required to provide separate ratings of how positive and how negative their 
attitude was toward the issue on a 9-point rating scale anchored at one end by, ‘not at 
all positive/negative’, and at the other end by, ‘extremely positive/negative’. These 
two ratings were provided at different times, separated by a number of tasks.  
In addition, participants reported their levels of attitude intensity on a single 
item using a 9-point, unipolar rating scale anchored at one end by the statement, ‘I 
am completely indifferent toward this issue’, and at the other end by the statement, ‘I 
care more about this issue than any other’. These anchoring descriptors were based 
upon the attitude intensity scale presented in Appendix E. Similarly, meta-
psychological ambivalence was assessed using 3 items on a 9-point, unipolar rating 
scale. These items asked participants how ‘mixed’, ‘indecisive’ and ‘conflicted’ their 
attitudes were toward the issue and options on the rating scale ranged from ‘not at 
all’ to ‘extremely’. This approach is consistent with Holbrook and Krosnick (2005) 
  146 
and a number of other ambivalence researchers and thus increases comparability 
with the current findings. 
This study did not utilise the scales presented in Appendix E for the attitude 
intensity and meta-psychological ambivalence parameters for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, Davies (2004) provided evidence that ratings are a valid form of 
measurement when used to assess demonstrably quantitative variables. The results of 
Appendix E provided evidence that these parameters are quantitatively structured. 
Furthermore, as participants were already required to respond to a large number of 
different questions across three issues, it was deemed ideal to simplify these 
measures.  
Latitude of acceptance was assessed utilising a task adopted from the work of 
the Social-Judgment theorists (Sherif et al., 1965). Participants were provided with a 
randomised list of the items and were initially required to indicate the item they 
agreed with the most. They were then required to indicate if they agreed with any 
other items. See Appendix A for sample screenshots and instructions for each of the 
tasks. 
 
5.6.3 Measures 
As will be discussed in Section 5.6.3, three indicators were required for each variable 
of interest. Given that the types of measures (e.g. ratings) can introduce systematic 
biases and these can be perpetuated when very similar indicators are utilised, the 
study will attempt to use scores derived from different methods (Green et al., 1993). 
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Mixed Evaluation  
For the evaluation parameter, scores were obtained by analysing the preference 
orders from the pair comparison and rating tasks according to Coombs’ (1964) 
model. The findings regarding the assumptions of Coombs’ model and the scaling 
solutions are presented in Section 5.7.1 below. The scoring of the item-rating task 
was almost identical to the scoring of the pair comparisons overviewed in the 
previous chapter. Firstly, each individual’s preference order was extracted from his 
or her rating of each item. This complete set of preference orders was then used to 
scale the items.  
The main difference in scoring the ratings was that they included preference 
orders with ties, i.e., an individual may provide the same rating of agreement for 
more than one item. Michell (1998) provides an extensive overview of how to deal 
with this and the procedure is best explained via an example. If an individual 
provides the preference order B(ACD)EF, with the brackets indicating that they 
provided equivalent ratings of items A, C and D, then their response does not 
differentiate between the BACDEF, BCADEF and BCDAEF preference orders. As a 
result, they are provided with the score that is the midpoint of the part of the scale 
covered by these three preference orders. This scoring is explained in greater detail 
in Appendix F. 
Importantly, the scores extracted from both the pair comparison and item-
rating tasks were inverted such that higher scores indicated greater proximity to the 
centre of the evaluative dimension. Thus, higher scores were indicative of a mixed 
evaluation. This was done as the analyses described in the section below will be 
investigating linear relationships between the attitude parameters and meta-
psychological ambivalence and proximity to the centre of the evaluative dimension is 
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hypothesised to predict greater meta-psychological ambivalence. The pair-
comparison derived score will be referred to as the ME CoombsPC measure and the 
item-rating derived score will be referred to as the ME CoombsRt measure. 
The third score was derived from the bivariate ratings utilising the similarity 
formula from Thompson et al.’s (1995) similarity-intensity model. As discussed in 
Section 5.3.1, this score is understood to assess the person’s location on the 
evaluative dimension and particularly their proximity to its centre. Despite the fact 
that Chapter 1 was critical of this approach to assessing ambivalence, it was included 
in the study as it allowed for the comparison of scores derived from this 
methodology with scores obtained from an unfolding approach. This will be referred 
to as the ME SIM measure. 
 
Attitude Intensity 
The first indicator of the intensity parameter was the subjective rating of 
indifference described in the previous section. This will be referred to as the Int Sub 
measure. The second indicator was influenced by the above discussion of the work 
by Thompson et al. (1995) and Davies (2004), whereby the extremity of the rating 
provided was taken to be indicative of the intensity of the attitude. Specifically, in 
the item-rating task, the intensity score was derived from the rating given to the item 
most agreed with. This will be referred to as the Int Rate measure. The final intensity 
indicator was taken from the intensity component of the SIM formula to combine the 
positive and negative, bivariate ratings. This will be referred to as the Int SIM 
measure. 
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Latitude of Acceptance 
The first indicator of the latitude of acceptance parameter was taken from the 
abovementioned Social-Judgment methodology. Scores were derived from the area 
covered by the item(s) agreed with the on the scaling solution of the pair comparison 
task. This will be referred to as the LoA SJ measure. The second indicator was 
influenced by the aforementioned work of Davies (2004) and was similarly scored to 
the Social-Judgment method. However, the items agreed with were determined by 
the ratings provided on the item-rating task. Scores were then allocated according to 
the area covered by the item(s) agreed with the on the scaling solution of the rating 
task. This will be referred to as the LoA Rate measure. The final indicator was taken 
from the mean of the ratings provided on the item-rating task. This seemed a sensible 
indicator as the greater the number of items given a high rating of agreement, the 
higher the mean score. This will be referred to as the LoA Mean Rate measure. 
 
Meta-psychological ambivalence 
The three indicators of meta-psychological ambivalence were provided by the 
‘mixed’, ‘conflict’ and ‘indecision’ rating tasks described in the previous section. 
These will be referred to as the MPA Mixed, MPA Conflict and MPA indecision 
measures. 
 
5.6.4 Analyses 
Structural equation modelling (SEM) was selected as the analytic procedure as it is 
premised upon the acknowledgment that our measures are fallible indicators of the 
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psychological constructs by making the distinction between observed and latent 
variables (Kline, 1998). It investigates the relationships between latent variables by 
analysing the patterns of covariation between multiple observed indicators, which 
allows for an account of measurement error. This is in contrast to the operationalist 
analyses typically utilised to investigate ambivalence.  
Moreover, SEM is advantageous as it is tolerant of correlated predictors and 
it allows for the confirmatory analysis of theoretical models as a whole, rather than 
just specific parameters. This test can be of a single model or between competing 
theoretical models and allows for more robust interpretations as the researcher has 
evidence regarding the correct specification of the model (Kline, 1998). 
However, SEM does make a number of assumptions that should be addressed 
for its correct application. Primary to this thesis is the assumption that the latent 
psychological variables and in turn their observed indicators possess a quantitative 
structure. This assumption is rarely if ever tested and reasons for this may be traced 
to the previously discussed Pythagorean mindset in psychology, whereby everything 
in nature is considered to be quantitative at their core (Michell, 1999). Some 
researchers have provided solutions for dealing with ordinal or categorical observed 
variables including bootstrapping procedures and Bayesian analysis (Byrne, 2001; 
Lee, 2007). However, although these procedures may improve the robustness of the 
resulting statistics, they are still premised on the assumption that the underlying 
variables are quantitatively structured (Lee, 2007).  
Other key assumptions include that the distribution of the individual variables 
in the model as well as the multivariate distribution of the variables should be 
normal, that the sample size is appropriately large to provide robust statistics, and 
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that the relationships between the variables should approximate linearity (Kline, 
1998). 
Procedurally, SEM involves two steps (McDonald & Ho, 2002). Firstly, the 
data is subjected to a confirmatory factor analysis, which tests what is termed the 
‘measurement model’. This addresses the assumption that the indicators measure the 
corresponding latent variable. The researcher only moves on to fitting what is termed 
the ‘structural model’ once the measurement model has been validated. The 
structural model involves testing specific relationships between the latent variables, 
which are often causal in nature. Although it should be noted that the procedure is 
not specifically sensitive to the question of causality, and thus such conclusions 
should be driven by theoretical insight and judgement (Byrne, 2001). 
The specific alternative measurement models for this chapter are set out in 
Figures 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 below. In each Figure, the latent variables are represented in 
circles, including the error terms, and the observed indicators are represented in 
rectangles. Single-headed arrows indicate a causal relationship between the variables 
in the direction specified by the arrow. Double-headed arrows indicate covariation 
between the variables. 
The first model captures the assumption that a single latent variable 
underpins the measures of the mixed evaluation, intensity and latitude of acceptance 
parameters as well as the measure of meta-psychological ambivalence (one-factor 
model). The second model is more akin to the work of Holbrook and Krosnick 
(2005) and represents the measures of the three attitude parameters as underpinned 
by a common latent variable and the meta-psychological ambivalence measure 
determined by a separate factor (two-factor model). The third model is consistent 
with the hypotheses of this chapter and the notion that ambivalence is a property of 
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the independent parameters of an attitude and not a latent psychological construct 
unto itself. Figure 5.4 represents the measures of each of the attitude parameters and 
meta-psychological ambivalence as being determined by their own independent 
factors (four-factor model). Superior fit of the four-factor model will demonstrate 
that the hypotheses were premised upon a correct understanding of the latent 
structure of the attitude parameters and meta-psychological ambivalence. 
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Figure 5.2. One-factor measurement model of the mixed evaluation, intensity and 
latitude of acceptance parameters and meta-psychological ambivalence. 
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Figure 5.3. Two-factor measurement model of the mixed evaluation, intensity and 
latitude of acceptance parameters and meta-psychological (MP) ambivalence. 
 
  155 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4. Four-factor measurement model of the mixed evaluation, intensity and 
latitude of acceptance parameters and meta-psychological (MP) ambivalence. 
   
 
 
 
 
  156 
The structural model to be evaluated is depicted in Figure 5.5 below. This 
model represents the hypothesised linear relationships, whereby the meta-
psychological ambivalence latent variable is predicted by the mixed evaluation, 
intensity and latitude of acceptance parameters as well as their interactions. The 
inclusion of interaction terms in a SEM framework has been a problematic issue as 
they are multiplicative effects of the main variables and thus non-linear (Kenny & 
Judd, 1984; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). 
 Kenny and Judd (1984) introduced a procedure to test these interaction 
effects by creating a new interaction latent variable whose observed indicators are 
the cross-products of the main latent variables. In this procedure the full set of cross-
products are utilised, but Jöreskog and Yang (1996) and Jaccard and Wan (1996) 
demonstrated that, for simplicity, only one cross-product between each main latent 
variable should be utilised. These are typically the indicators that have the highest 
factor loadings for each latent variable. 
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Figure 5.5. Structural model with the mixed evaluation (ME), intensity (Int) and 
latitude of acceptance (LoA) attitude parameters as well as their interactions as 
predictors of meta-psychological (MP) ambivalence. 
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5.6.5 Procedure 
Participants were tested in a group setting ranging from 2 to 8 individuals in size. At 
the beginning of the testing session, participants were given a general introduction to 
the purpose of the study as well as the relevant ethical information. In addition, they 
were instructed to carefully follow all instructions provided and to ask for 
clarification from the experimenter if they were unsure about any of the tasks. For 
each attitude issue, participants were required to respond to a number of tasks that 
were administered via computer using the Quask Formartist survey software 
(http://www.quask.com).  
The pair-comparison task was always administered first as it required the 
most concentration. The order of all other tasks was counter-balanced across 
participants. Additionally, the order of the attitude issues was counter-balanced 
across participants. Upon completion, the participants were provided with thorough 
debriefing information.  
 
5.7 Results 
5.7.1 Testing the assumptions of Coombs’ unidimensional unfolding model 
The pair comparison and item-rating judgements were examined to ensure that they 
satisfied the conditions of Coombs’ (1964) model in this larger sample. The 
frequencies of the intransitive judgement, folding and single-path errors for the pair 
comparison task across the three issues are presented in Table 5.1 below. 
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Table 5.1 
Frequencies of intransitive judgement (Int.), folding (F.) and single-path (SP) errors 
for each of the statement pairs for the abortion (AN), euthanasia (EU) and 
Aboriginal Australians (AA) issues. 
 AN EU AA 
Statement 
Pairs Int. F. SP Int. F. SP Int. F. SP 
AB 3 10 0 4 9 0 3 10 0 
AC 1 1 0 2 0 0 8 1 0 
AD 2 0 3 10 0 0 1 0 2 
AE 2 0 9 11 0 6 4 0 4 
AF 3 0 4 3 0 13 4 0 4 
BC 2 0 3 0 0 3 5 4 2 
BD 4 0 0 2 0 9 2 3 0 
BE 2 0 1 6 0 0 4 0 0 
BF 8 0 5 8 0 4 1 2 1 
CD 0 0 2 2 0 4 3 3 2 
CE 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 
CF 3 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 
DE 0 5 0 1 2 0 1 9 1 
DF 5 0 0 3 0 0 1 3 0 
EF 1 15 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
Total 36 33 30 54 13 39 37 36 18 
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For the abortion issue, 36 (1.2%) judgements were intransitive. Thirty-three 
(1.1%) judgements were folding errors. Finally, there were 30 (1%) single-path 
errors. This was an overall error rate of 3.3%.  
For the euthanasia issue, 54 (1.8%) judgements were intransitive. Thirteen 
(0.4%) judgements were in violation of the folding condition. Thirty-nine (1.3%) 
judgements were in violation of the single-path condition. This was an overall error 
rate of 3.5%.  
 For the Aboriginal Australians issue, 37 (1.2%) judgements were intransitive. 
A total of 36 (1.2%) judgements were in violation of the folding condition. Eighteen 
(0.6%) judgements were single-path errors. This was an overall error rate of 3%. 
These total error rates for each of the issues were considered sufficiently small to 
conclude that the data were consistent with the assumptions of Coombs’ (1964) 
model. 
These findings permitted the construction of the ordered metric solutions, 
which are presented in Figures 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8 below. These are equivalent to the 
findings of Study 3 in Chapter 4. However, based on the current findings, only the 
Aboriginal Australians issue’s path contained arbitrary elements where some 
preference orders were not provided by any of the respondents. The frequencies of 
each preference order across the three issues are also presented in the Figures. As the 
midpoint orderings were identical to Chapter 4, the tests of the double cancellation 
condition were identical and thus satisfied. This provided evidence that these attitude 
dimensions possess additive structure.  
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Figure 5.6. The single-path through the proximity graph for the abortion issue, the 
frequencies of the preference orders and the ordered-metric solution obtained from 
the midpoint ordering. 
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Figure 5.7. The single-path through the proximity graph for the euthanasia issue, the 
frequencies of the preference orders and the ordered-metric solution obtained from 
the midpoint ordering. 
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Figure 5.8. The single-path through the proximity graph for the Aboriginal 
Australians issue with black arrows marking the dominant path and green arrows 
marking the arbitrary path, the frequencies of the preference orders and the ordered-
metric solution obtained from the midpoint ordering. 
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Secondly, the item-rating judgements were examined. For the Abortion issue 
there were 26 (2.2%) unfolding errors and 11 (0.9%) single path errors. For the 
Euthanasia issue there were 52 (4.3%) unfolding errors and 10 (0.8%) single path 
errors. For the Aboriginal Australians issue there were 45 (3.75%) unfolding errors 
and 12 (1%) single path errors. This resulted in total error rates of 3.1%, 5.1% and 
4.75% across the three issues. These higher error rates for the rating judgements over 
the pair comparison judgements for the euthanasia and Aboriginal Australians issues 
are consistent with previous research (Davies, 2004; Michell, 1998).  
Typically, ratings are a less reliable means of collecting preference data, 
despite their greater convenience. This point is pronounced by the fact that it is not 
possible to provide an intransitive rating response and this should be considered 
when comparing the error rates of the two tasks. Nonetheless, the levels of error were 
considered small enough to conclude that the rating data were also consistent with 
the assumptions of the unidimensional unfolding model. See Appendix F for the 
complete rating judgements analyses. 
 Interestingly, the single-path solutions for the rating judgements were 
equivalent to those derived from the pair comparison judgements, which are 
presented in Figures 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8. Thus, the tests of double cancellation and 
ordered metric solutions were identical. Overall, these findings justified the 
calculation of the ME CoombsPC and ME CoombsRt measures described in Section 
5.6.3, and in turn, their inclusion in the SEM analyses. 
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5.7.2 Testing the SEM assumptions 
Before performing the SEM analyses, the data assumptions of this procedure were 
investigated. Firstly, a sample size of 200 was obtained which is generally accepted 
as the minimum sufficient for validly testing models (Kline, 1998). Furthermore, as 
discussed in the previous section, the scaling solutions for each of the attitude scales 
were identical to Chapter 4. Importantly, these solutions provided evidence that the 
latent variables being examined were quantitatively structured, consistent with the 
interval scaling assumption of SEM. The findings of Appendix E provided evidence 
that both the intensity parameter and meta-psychological ambivalence are 
quantitatively structured. Furthermore, as the latitude of acceptance parameter was 
conceptualised as an interval of the evaluative dimension, the findings of the 
previous section were taken to be indicative that this parameter is quantitative for the 
three issues. This is the first example in an attitude measurement context of this SEM 
assumption being systematically addressed. 
The measures were examined for their compliance with the multivariate 
normality assumption of the maximum likelihood estimation method of SEM by 
inspecting whether the univariate distributions were normal (Kline, 1998). The 
results of this analysis across the three issues are presented in Table 5.2. In 
accordance with Kline (1998), values of the ratio of the skew index and its standard 
error greater than ±3 and values of the ratio of the kurtosis index and its standard 
error greater than ±10 were taken to indicate problematic levels of non-normality. 
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For both the abortion and euthanasia issues, the skew ratio of the ME CoombsPC 
and the Int Rate measures were problematic. For the abortion issue, the skew levels of the 
LoA Rate and MPA Indecision measures were borderline, but were deemed acceptable 
due to minimal kurtosis levels. 
For the Aboriginal Australians issue, the skew ratio of the ME CoombsRt measure 
and the kurtosis ratio for the Int SIM measure were problematic. The skew level of the Int 
Rate measure was borderline, but again was deemed acceptable due to a minimal kurtosis 
level. 
Transformations were performed on these problematic measures in order to correct 
their non-normality (Kline, 1998). Log-transformations adequately corrected the skew of 
the ME CoombsPC measure of both the abortion and euthanasia issues, the ME CoombsRt 
measure of the Aboriginal Australians issue and the Int Rate measure of the euthanasia 
issue to acceptable levels. This also corrected the Kurtosis of the Int SIM measure of the 
Aboriginal Australians issue to an acceptable level. However, no transformation was 
found which adequately corrected the Int Rate measure of the abortion issue and thus this 
measure was excluded from the SEM analysis for this issue. 
 
5.7.3 Reliability analyses, descriptive statistics and correlations of the measures across 
the three attitude issues. 
Cronbach’s alphas were calculated for the sets of measures for each of the attitude 
parameters across the three issues. The alphas for the mixed evaluation parameter (.75-
.79) and meta-psychological ambivalence parameter (.87-.90) were acceptably high. This 
was not the case for the alphas for the intensity parameter (.14-.43) and the latitude of 
acceptance parameter (.41-.54).  
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Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 present the means and standard deviations for each of the 
measures as well as their inter-correlations across the abortion, euthanasia and Aboriginal 
Australians issues. These patterns of correlations were initially inspected to ascertain 
whether the measures of the same parameter were significantly, positively correlated as 
expected and to gain a preliminary understanding of the inter-relationships between the 
parameters. 
As can be seen in these tables, the patterns of correlations are very similar across 
the three issues and thus the relationships between the measures will be addressed in 
general. The correlations between the mixed evaluation measures were all satisfactorily 
high, ranging between .42 and .77. Similarly, the correlations between the meta-
psychological ambivalence items were highly significant, ranging between .64 and .79. 
The latitude of acceptance measures only displayed low to moderate correlations with one 
another, ranging between .19 and .67, but all relationships were significantly positive. The 
low and in some cases non-significant correlations between the attitude intensity measures 
were concerning. 
The correlations between the measures of the different parameters were generally 
low. Only the mixed evaluation and meta-psychological ambivalence consistently 
demonstrated moderate, significant correlations, ranging between .22 and .68 across the 
three issues. 
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 Overall, the patterns of relationships from the reliability and correlational 
analyses were consistent with the prediction that the measures of the same attitude 
parameter would interrelate greater than measures of different parameters. However, 
this trend was far less so for the intensity and latitude of acceptance parameters and 
their results question whether the different measures are reliably assessing a 
unidimensional construct. But, as previously addressed, these commonly used 
statistics are confounded and potentially attenuated by measurement error and in 
order to more rigorously investigate these intra and inter-relationships, the data 
structure was investigated utilising SEM. 
 
5.8 The relationships between the attitude parameters and meta-psychological 
ambivalence utilising structural equation modelling 
As previously discussed in Section 5.5.3, McDonald and Ho (2002) recommend that 
a two-stage reporting approach should be adopted, whereby the measurement model 
is first subjected to a confirmatory factor analysis before fitting the structural model. 
In accordance with this, the measures of the different attitude parameters were 
subjected to the one-factor, two-factors and four-factors models specified in Section 
5.5.4.  
The covariance structures were analysed utilising the AMOS Version 7 
(Arbuckle, 2006) statistical software utilising the maximum likelihood estimation 
method. As aforementioned, this method has been found to provide robust estimates 
even under sub-optimal conditions (Hoyle & Planter, 1995; Kline, 1998). 
Furthermore, as recommended by McDonald and Ho (2002) the fit statistics utilised 
were the model chi square (χ2), the Root mean square error of comparison including 
  173 
confidence intervals (RMSEA) and the comparative fit index (CFI). The χ2 statistic 
indicates acceptable fit when it is not statistically significant. In addition, acceptable 
fit is typically indicated when the χ2 value is less than three times the degrees of 
freedom (Kline, 1998). However, Schumacker and Lomax (2004) argue that ratios up 
to 5 to 1 indicate acceptable fit. Conventionally, a RMSEA value less than .08 
indicates acceptable fit with scores less than .05 indicating good fit (Kline, 1998). 
Similarly, a CFI value greater than .9 is typically taken to indicate acceptable fit and 
values greater than .95 indicate good fit. 
 
5.8.1 Parameter estimates and comparative fit of the one, two and four-factor 
measurement models 
The parameter estimates and fit statistics for each of the measurement models across 
the three issues are presented in Tables 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8. As can be seen, the one-
factor model was a poor fit of the data across the three issues. The χ2/df ratios were 
9.23, 6.64 and 8.13 for the abortion, euthanasia and Aboriginal Australians issues 
respectively. Similarly, the close fit tests for the RMSEA statistic were significant 
across the three issues, thus indicating that their values could be confidently 
considered greater than .08. 
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The two-factor model also poorly fit the data with χ2/df ratios of 8.58, 4.97 
and 6.60. Again, the close fit tests for the RMSEA statistics were all significant. 
However, a chi-square difference test (∆χ2) demonstrated that the two-factor model 
was a better fit than the one-factor model across all three issues [abortion ∆χ2 (1) = 
37.06, p< .001; euthanasia ∆χ2 (1) = 95.42, p< .001; Aboriginal Australians ∆χ2 (1) 
= 89.67, p< .001]. 
There were a number of problems fitting the four-factor model. The LoA rate 
measure was excluded from the analysis for the abortion issue as it provided a 
nonsensical negative error variance. Furthermore, no solution was obtainable for the 
euthanasia issue and thus it was excluded from the analysis. 
 The four-factor model for the two remaining issues represented a better fit 
than the two-factor model [abortion ∆χ2 (5) = 37.06, p< .001; Aboriginal Australians 
∆χ2 (5) = 160.19, p< .001]. Despite this, the four-factor model was a poor fit of the 
model with χ2/df ratios of 5.29 and 3.94 and both of the close fit tests for the 
RMSEA statistic significant. 
Thus, comparatively, the four-factor model represented the best fit of the 
data, at least for the abortion and Aboriginal Australians issues, but overall did not 
adequately fit the data. This was particularly the case for the euthanasia issue as no 
admissible solution was obtained. These troubling results led to the re-specification 
of the models and parameters addressed. This post-hoc process of re-specifying 
models to obtain better fit is commonplace in SEM analyses and departs from its 
confirmatory underpinnings (Hoyle & Planter, 1995; Kline, 1998). Thus, the 
following analyses are performed under the knowledge that they may be capturing 
idiosyncratic features of the sample and any conclusions drawn require validation by 
future investigations.  
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Rather than haphazardly adding/deleting paths from the model, it was 
decided that the intensity and latitude of acceptance parameters would be deleted. 
This was because the previous analyses, including the reliability alphas, correlations 
and SEM parameters, appeared to indicate that the measures of these variables were 
predominantly unrelated and thus most likely not assessing a common, 
unidimensional construct8.  
 
5.8.2 Post-hoc SEM analysis of the relationship between the mixed evaluation 
parameter and meta-psychological ambivalence 
Firstly, confirmatory factor analyses were performed to empirically test the 
assumption that the mixed evaluation parameter and meta-psychological 
ambivalence should be treated as independent constructs. The post-hoc one-factor 
and two-factor models are represented in Figures 5.9 and 5.10. 
 The parameter estimates and fit indices for the competing models across the 
three attitude issues are presented in Tables 5.9 and 5.10. As can be seen, the one-
factor model poorly fit the data for all three issues. The χ2/df ratios were 11.78, 
14.15 and 17.03 for the abortion, euthanasia and Aboriginal Australians issues. 
Similarly, the close fit tests for the RMSEA statistic were significant across the three 
issues. 
 
                                                
8 As this was particularly the case for the intensity variable, the following analyses 
were also attempted including the LoA parameter. Solutions were not permissible for 
the abortion and euthanasia issues. The one and two-factor solutions for the 
Aboriginal Australians issue fit significantly worse than the analyses presented in 
Section 5.8.1 [∆χ2 (16) = 233.02, p< .01; ∆χ2 (16) = 27.48, p< .05].  
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Figure 5.9. Post-hoc one-factor model of the mixed evaluation and meta-
psychological ambivalence measures 
 
 
Figure 5.10. Post-hoc two-factor model of the mixed evaluation and meta-
psychological ambivalence measures 
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Chi-square difference tests indicated that the two-factor model fit the data 
significantly better over the three issues [for abortion ∆χ2 (1) = 41.94, p< .001; for 
euthanasia ∆χ2 (1) = 74.68, p< .001; for Aboriginal Australians ∆χ2 (1) = 73.12, p< 
.001]. However, this model still represented a poor fit of the data with χ2/df ratios of 
8.01, 6.58 and 10.02 and all of the close fit tests for the RMSEA statistic significant. 
This led to further post-hoc modifications of the two-factor model. 
Specifically, from the patterns of covariation across the three issues, it 
appeared that the ME SIM measure was loading upon both the mixed evaluation and 
meta-psychological ambivalence latent variables. This seemed sensible as this 
measure was extracted from the similarity between the independent ratings of 
positive and negative regard toward the issue. It does not seem unlikely that at least 
some participants would have identified this methodology as addressing how ‘mixed’ 
their attitude was, and thus the score is not only assessing the valence of their 
attitude, but also their reflection upon how ambivalent their attitude was. Thus, the 
model was modified with an additional path from the meta-psychological 
ambivalence variable to the ME SIM measure. This is represented in Figure 5.11. 
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Figure 5.11. Revised post-hoc two factor model of the mixed evaluation and meta-
psychological ambivalence measures including a path from the meta-psychological 
ambivalence variable to the ME SIM measure 
 
 
5.8.3 Revised post-hoc two-factor model addressing the relationship between the 
mixed evaluation attitude parameter and meta-psychological ambivalence 
Chi-square difference tests indicated that this revised two-factor model represented a 
better fit of the data across the three issues [for abortion ∆χ2 (1) = 40.6, p< .001; for 
euthanasia ∆χ2 (1) = 74.68, p< .001; for Aboriginal Australians ∆χ2 (1) = 73.12, p< 
.001]. The parameter estimates of this model are presented in Table 5.11. 
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Most importantly, from the fit indices this model appeared to adequately fit 
the data. Despite the fact that the all of the χ2 fit statistics were significant, the χ2/df 
ratios were in the acceptable range across the three issues [abortion = 3.36; 
euthanasia = 3.15; Aboriginal Australians = 2.90]. Additionally, the CFI statistics 
indicated good fit of the model across the three issues (> .95). The troubling results 
were for the RMSEA statistics, which were all greater than .08. However, their 
confidence intervals all fell within the acceptable range. Thus, although future 
studies would undoubtedly attempt to improve this fit, it appeared reasonable to 
conclude that the fit was acceptable and that meaningful inspection of the model 
estimates could take place. 
As shown in Table 5.11, the regressions weights between the latent and 
manifest variables were all significant (when possible to be estimated). Interestingly, 
the ME SIM measure was significantly predicted by both the mixed evaluation and 
meta-psychological ambivalence variables, confirming the speculation of Section 
5.8.2. As predicted, the correlation between the mixed evaluation and meta-
psychological ambivalence variables was found to be statistically significant across 
all three issues [for abortion r = .49, p< .01; for euthanasia r = .53, p< .01; for 
Aboriginal Australians r = .47, p< .001].  
Finally, a post-hoc regression analysis was performed to examine the 
prediction of meta-psychological ambivalence by the attitude parameters and their 
interactions. As outlined in Section 5.6.4, SEM analysis was intended for this 
investigation. However, the failure to fit the measurement model with the three 
independent attitude parameters precluded this. Thus, these results are presented as a 
very preliminary analysis to explore the utility of future investigations in to the 
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relationship between the attitude intensity and latitude of acceptance parameters, as 
well as their interactions with the evaluation parameter, and meta-psychological 
ambivalence. 
 
5.8.4 Exploring the structural relationship between the mixed evaluation, intensity 
and latitude of acceptance parameters and meta-psychological ambivalence 
utilising a post-hoc hierarchical regression 
Single measures from each latent variable were selected for entry in to the 
hierarchical regression. The CoombsPC measure was entered for the mixed 
evaluation parameter as it has been found in this thesis and in previous studies to be a 
very reliable measure of the evaluative dimension (Davies, 2004; Johnson, 1998; 
Michell, 1998;). The Int Sub measure was entered for intensity, as it is the most 
conventionally used measure of this parameter. Similarly, the LoA SJ measure was 
entered for the latitude of acceptance parameter, as it was the closest to the original 
methodology of the social-judgment theorists who pioneered this parameter (Sherif 
et al., 1965). Given the high correlations between the meta-psychological 
ambivalence items, these were compiled into a mean score for this parameter. The 
interaction terms were calculated by multiplying the mean-centred predictors. This 
mean centring was performed to reduce multicollinearity (NB. final Tolerance values 
were all acceptable ranging from .76 to 1). 
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In the regression, the ME Coombs PC measure was entered as the first step, 
followed by the Int Sub and LoA SJ and then the interaction terms. The results of the 
regression for each of the issues are presented in Tables 5.12, 5.13 and 5.14. The 
overall models were statistically significant for each of the issues [For abortion, R2 = 
.15, F (5, 194) = 7.07, p < .01; For Aboriginal Australians, R2 = .24, F (5, 194) = 
12.51, p < .01; For euthanasia, R2 = .24, F (5, 194) = 12.45, p < .01]. 
 
 
Table 5.12 
Final step in the hierarchical regression analysis of predictors of meta-psychological 
(MP) ambivalence for the abortion issue. 
MP Ambivalence b SE β p 
ME CoombsPC 0.37 0.07 .34 .00 
Int Sub 0.03 0.08 .03 .66 
LoA SJ -0.01 0.06 -.01 .89 
ME x Int 0.07 0.03 .17 .01 
ME x LoA 0.04 0.02 .14 .04 
 
 
For the abortion issue, the ME CoombsPC measure and both of the attitude 
parameter interaction terms were significant predictors of MP Ambivalence [t (194) 
= 5.04, p< .01; t (194) = 2.51, p< .05; t (194) = 2.08, p< .05]. Adding the intensity 
and LoA parameters to the model did not lead to a significant increase in explained 
variance, R2 change = .00, p = .93. In contrast, adding the interaction terms to the 
regression did lead to a significant increase in variance explained, R2 change = .04, p 
< .05. 
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Table 5.13  
Final step in the hierarchical regression analysis of predictors of meta-psychological 
(MP) ambivalence for the euthanasia issue. 
MP Ambivalence b SE β p 
ME CoombsPC 0.47 0.06 .48 .00 
Int Sub -0.16 0.07 -.14 .03 
LoA SJ 0.03 0.05 .04 .58 
ME x Int 0.02 0.03 .05 .44 
ME x LoA 0.01 0.02 .04 .51 
 
 
For the euthanasia issue, the ME CoombsPC and Int Sub measures were 
significant predictors of MP Ambivalence [t (194) = 7.31, p< .01; t (194) = -2.18, p< 
.05. Adding the intensity and LoA parameters to the model did not lead to a 
significant increase in explained variance, R2 change = .02, p = .10. Similarly, adding 
the interaction terms to the regression did lead to a significant increase in variance 
explained, R2 change = .00, p< .62. 
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Table 5.14  
Final step in the hierarchical regression analysis of predictors of meta-psychological 
(MP) ambivalence for the Aboriginal Australians issue. 
MP Ambivalence b SE β p 
ME CoombsPC 0.16 0.03 .40 .00 
Int Sub -0.26 0.07 -.26 .00 
LoA SJ 0.01 0.03 .03 .70 
ME x Int 0.03 0.01 .21 .00 
ME x LoA 0.00 0.00 -.08 .29 
 
 
For the Aboriginal Australians issue, the ME CoombsPC and Int Sub 
measures and mixed evaluation-intensity interaction term were significant predictors 
of MP Ambivalence [t (194) = 6.16, p< .01; t (194) = -3.61, p< .01; t (194) = 2.96, 
p< .01]. Adding the intensity and LoA parameters to the model did not lead to a 
significant increase in explained variance, R2 change = .03, p = .05. In contrast, 
adding the interaction terms to the regression did lead to a significant increase in 
variance explained, R2 change = .04, p< .01. 
 Overall, the mixed evaluation parameter, measured by applying Coombs’ 
(1964) model to the pair comparison judgements, was the most significant predictor 
of meta-psychological ambivalence for all issues. This was unsurprising given the 
hypotheses of the chapter as well as the observed relationship between these two 
variables in Section 5.8.3. The attitude intensity parameter, measured by a subjective 
rating, was a significant predictor for the euthanasia and Aboriginal Australians 
issues. The mixed evaluation-intensity interaction term was a significant predictor 
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for the abortion and Aboriginal Australians issues. The mixed-evaluation-latitude of 
acceptance interaction term was significant for the abortion issue.  
The mixed results for all parameters except mixed evaluation allude to the 
measurement issues enlightened by the above SEM analyses. However, it appears 
from these preliminary results that these parameters, and particularly their 
interactions, are worth pursuing in future examinations of the relationships between 
the structural components of an attitude and the experience of ambivalence. 
 
5.9 Discussion  
5.9.1 Implications for our understanding of the relationships between the attitude 
parameters and ambivalence 
The results provide little insight in to the first set of hypotheses regarding the 
relationships between the attitude parameters. As no satisfactory solution was 
achieved for the intensity and latitude of acceptance variables little can be said about 
their relationship with the evaluation parameter and one another. The patterns of 
correlations between the measures of these parameters are somewhat consistent with 
the predictions.  
Across the three issues, there was some indication of a significant, inverse 
relationship between levels of intensity and proximity to the centre of the evaluative 
dimension. However, despite statistical significance, this relationship was only low 
to moderate in size and provided preliminary evidence that individuals who indicate 
that they do not care about the issue do not necessarily locate themselves at the 
centre of the evaluative dimensions when forced to do so. This is relevant to the 
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discussion of indifference in Chapter 2, which will be addressed later in this 
discussion. 
Results regarding the relationship between proximity to the centre of the 
evaluative dimension and the latitude of acceptance parameter were inconsistent, 
ranging between moderately negative to moderately positive. Overall, the results for 
the relationship between the intensity and latitude of acceptance parameters did not 
demonstrate any systematic correlation. However, all of these results should be 
interpreted with extreme caution given the problems highlighted by the SEM 
analyses. Obviously the relationship between these parameters requires further 
investigation before firmer conclusions can be drawn. 
Despite overall model misfit, the SEM analyses provided preliminary 
evidence, consistent with Holbrook and Krosnick (2005), that meta-psychological 
judgements of ambivalence are independent from the structural parameters of the 
attitude being judged, and that these parameters are in turn independent, as the four-
factor model displayed the best fit. However, given that the hypothesised model did 
not adequately capture the structure of the data, future studies must achieve model fit 
before firmer conclusions can be drawn. 
The post-hoc SEM analyses provided more reliable insight in to the 
relationship between the evaluation parameter and meta-psychological ambivalence 
as independent, but related constructs. However, these results must still be 
interpreted with caution as post-hoc respecification of the model can lead to low 
model replicability as a revised model may be capturing idiosyncratic qualities of 
one’s specific sample (MacCallum, Roznowski & Necowitz, 1992). Hoyle and 
Panter (1995) suggest that in the case of post-hoc modifications, cross-validation 
studies should be carried out to test the generalisability of the findings. This study 
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managed to validate the final model across three different attitude issues and thus 
displays some promise. However, this was limited to a single sample on a single 
occasion and thus further validation across different samples must be carried out 
before it can be conclusively accepted.  
Nonetheless, there was a consistent relationship across the three issues 
between the evaluation variable and the meta-psychological ambivalence variable, 
with common variance ranging between 20% and 25%. This finding demonstrated 
that there was a systematic relationship between attitudes at the centre of the 
evaluative dimension and subjective judgements of ambivalence. This provides 
additional validation of the conceptualisation of bipolarity, and the place of 
ambivalence within it, presented in the earlier chapters. Furthermore, the fact that 
this relationship was only found to be moderate in size is unsurprising, as a number 
of other factors may influence meta-psychological ambivalence.  
These include the influences of preference for cognitive consistency as well 
as consistency with the attitudes of liked others (Newby-Clark et al., 2002; Priester 
& Petty, 2001). Additionally, Priester and Petty (2001) highlight that mixed affective 
responses as well as conflict between cognitive and affective responses influence 
experiences of meta-psychological ambivalence. This chapter only examined 
ambivalence in cognitive terms.  
Even when considering only evaluative conflict, it may be the case that some 
individuals’ ambivalence was not captured by the semantic content or structure of the 
statements, despite the efforts of Chapter 3. This alludes to a potential confound in 
the statements between ambivalence and specificity, which will be elaborated in 
Chapter 6. Furthermore, the issue of the semantic content of the statements seems 
particularly pertinent for the Aboriginal Australians issue, where 75% of the sample 
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provided only four different preference orders. It appears that the statements drawn 
from the bottom half of the binary tree expressed a level of unfavourability that was 
unacceptable to the participants, and thus indications of negative evaluations were 
limited. Therefore, the predicates of the unfavourable statements will need to be 
altered to allow for the expression of both positive and negative evaluations. This 
result should also be interpreted in light of the fact that there is a much stronger 
social norm to appear to evaluate Aboriginal Australians positively than there is for 
the other issues. 
Also, from the discussion in Section 5.3, it seemed reasonable that the 
attitude intensity and latitude of acceptance parameters may independently and 
interactively influence meta-psychological ambivalence. The post-hoc regression 
analyses provided some preliminary insight in to this hypothesis. As expected from 
the SEM findings, proximity to the centre of the evaluative dimension was found to 
be significantly predictive of meta-psychological ambivalence across the three issues 
and accounted for the majority of the variance explained by the models. This 
provides preliminary validation that the measures developed in Chapter 4 are able to 
capture ambivalent attitudes and further promotes the unfolding approach. 
The findings for the intensity parameter were less consistent, but it was found 
to be a significant predictor for the euthanasia and Aboriginal Australians issues. 
This suggested that as the intensity of the attitude increased for these issues, the level 
of meta-psychological ambivalence decreased. The latitude of acceptance parameter 
was not found to be a significant predictor for any of the issues. The results for the 
interaction variables were also inconsistent with the evaluation-intensity interaction 
significant for the abortion and Aboriginal Australians issues and the evaluation-
latitude of acceptance interaction only significant for the abortion issue.  
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The results for the evaluation-intensity interaction were particularly important 
as Chapter 2 highlighted the importance of attitude intensity for differentiating 
between ambivalent and indifferent attitudes. As discussed earlier, the present 
findings suggested that individuals who indicated indifference toward the issues on 
the intensity measures did not necessarily locate themselves at the centre of the 
evaluative dimension. Furthermore, the findings of the interaction analyses indicated 
that, for the abortion and Aboriginal Australians issues at least, subjective 
judgements of ambivalence were predicted by centrally located attitudes that were 
also reasonably intense. However, both of these conclusions are intended quite 
cautiously, as they are drawn from indicators of the intensity variable that the present 
analyses indicate may not be reliable or valid. Future research on this issue is crucial, 
as the distinction between indifference and ambivalence goes to the heart of the 
validity of the bipolar conceptualisation proposed in Chapter 2. 
Additionally, future studies should be mindful of the fact that the intended 
structural model and the eventual post-hoc regression analyses performed suggested 
a unidirectional causal relationship between the attitude parameters and meta-
psychological ambivalence. However, it seems reasonable to speculate that this 
relationship might be reciprocal or even in the opposite direction, as argued by 
Holbrook and Krosnick (2005). Thus, the nature and direction of this causal 
relationship requires further experimental examination. 
Overall, the conclusions from this chapter regarding the hypothesised 
relationships between the attitude parameters as well as meta-psychological 
ambivalence are at times quite limited and at others quite preliminary. This for the 
most part was attributable to the measurement problems of the observed indicators of 
the variables. 
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5.9.2 Problems with measurement and scoring 
Despite the limiting effect of these measurement problems upon the conclusions that 
can be drawn, these results should not simply be interpreted as a failure. Rather, they 
are an endorsement of the procedures that allow researchers to check the 
measurement assumptions that are routinely and often blindly made in social 
research. This chapter highlights that such problems go beyond the question of 
quantitivity, which has been the focus of this thesis, to the question of validity in 
general. Put simply, do our measures assess what we believe them to, including the 
issues of whether the variable exists, and if so, whether it is unidimensional and 
quantitatively structured (Borsboom, 2005). 
 If the typical operationalist approach was followed in this study, erroneous 
conclusions could have been drawn. The problem is, in attempting to be more 
rigorous one runs the risk of being left with more questions than answers, as was the 
case in this study. However, this should not be seen as an impediment to research, 
but rather a challenge. Given that we are so often dealing with latent constructs in 
psychology, our conclusions regarding the inter-relationships between these 
constructs are contingent upon the validity of our measures. This validity must be 
established before substantive conclusions can be drawn.  
This chapter’s removal of the operational bias from the conceptualisation of 
ambivalence is a first step toward establishing this validity. This is highlighted by the 
results for the ME SIM and Int SIM measures, which were drawn from the 
Similarity-Intensity Model (Thompson et al., 1995). As previously discussed, this is 
one of the most widely utilised models in ambivalence research. The current findings 
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suggest that this model may not tap the latent constructs it is hypothesised to, 
particularly with respect to location on the evaluative dimension. This is a 
fundamental point as a number of researchers have relied upon this empirical model 
to draw conceptual conclusions regarding the relationship between the forms of 
ambivalence. The current study suggests that these conclusions may be confounded, 
as the method stemming from this model appears to assess both ambivalence as a 
property of an attitude and a meta-psychological judgement. Therefore, the 
correlations reported for the relationship between this measure and measures of 
meta-psychological ambivalence may have been artificially inflated.  
With respect to the measurement problems of this study, as explained in the 
method, the evaluative parameter was rescaled so that ‘middle-scores’ were given the 
highest value. This restricted the range of values as individuals located toward either 
extreme were given similar scores, which may have had an attenuating effect upon 
observed relationships. Furthermore, it perhaps mistakenly assumed that as one 
moves in either direction away from the centre of the evaluative dimension, the 
resulting relationship with meta-psychological ambivalence would be equivalent. 
Cacioppo et al. (1997) suggest that feelings of ambivalence will subside more rapidly 
as you approach the positive extremity of the evaluative dimension. Thus, future 
studies may benefit by utilising non-linear modelling procedures, which would not 
necessitate scoring evaluation in this way. These may include models that only make 
ordinal assumptions, which will be addressed in Chapter 6. 
 The measurement issues were particularly pronounced for the intensity and 
latitude of acceptance parameters. Firstly, the primary indicator of intensity was a 
subjective rating adapted from the scale presented in Appendix E. This was 
inconsistent with the discussion regarding assessing ambivalence as a property of an 
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attitude and as a meta-psychological judgement. The item is not assessing the 
intensity parameter as such, but rather the individual’s judgement of it. Such a 
judgement may be directly influenced by the parameter, but may also be determined 
by extraneous influences. One such influence may be a demand characteristic of the 
task, whereby a respondent may feel as if they should care about the issue because 
someone is taking the time to ask for their opinion regarding it, and thus inflate their 
response. 
 A similar confound appears to have affected the intensity measure drawn 
from the rating judgements. The results for this measure demonstrated that 
participants tended to provide an extreme rating of agreement for at least one of the 
statements, even if they indicated that they did not particularly care about the issue 
on the subjective measure. Furthermore, as previously discussed, this agreement was 
not necessarily for the statements located toward the centre of the evaluative 
dimension. This is inconsistent with the findings of Davies (2004), who provided 
evidence that the extremity of the rating of agreement for the statement closest to the 
person’s ideal point was related to the intensity of their attitude. Future research must 
address this inconsistent finding, as it is fundamental to be able to assess the intensity 
parameter without relying upon subjective judgements of it. This examination may 
be better served by including the scale validated in Appendix E, which was excluded 
from the current analyses for mostly pragmatic reasons, rather than its rating scale 
adaptation. 
 Overall, the patterns of correlation and the results of the SEM analyses 
indicated that the measures of the intensity and latitude of acceptance parameters 
were not tapping their respective constructs in a unidimensional way, if at all. The 
question of how to validly assess these attitude parameters is an important research 
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question unto itself. This is both with respect to their relationship with ambivalence 
as well as attitude theory in general, which has for too long focused solely upon the 
evaluative dimension (Krosnick et al., 1993; Visser et al., 2006). This chapter was 
somewhat guilty of haphazardly assessing these parameters and thus future research 
needs to correct this applying the same rigour displayed in earlier chapters.  
 The low correlations between the measures of common latent variables may 
also be attributable to this study’s attempt to draw upon quite different 
methodologies for the indicators. This was done in order to alleviate the systematic 
error that can be introduced by utilising common methods within and across 
indicators. Future studies may consider implementing a Multitrait-Multimethod 
approach to control for such measurement bias whilst allowing common methods 
(Marsh & Grayson, 1995). This approach would further encourage a more systematic 
account of the sorts of error that may confound our statistical models, like the one 
advocated in Chapter 4 for our psychometric models. 
  
5.9.3 Future directions and conclusions 
Borsboom (2003) highlights an additional problem in the current study that should be 
addressed in future research. He argues that between-subjects models, such as the 
ones utilised in this chapter, do not substantiate valid conclusions at the individual 
level. This is fundamental, as the conceptualisations of the attitude parameters and 
meta-psychological are as intra-individual constructs. Without the modelling of 
within subject data, it will remain unclear whether the relationships between the 
attitude parameters and meta-psychological ambivalence are a by-product of 
aggregated data, or whether they genuinely explain relationships at an individual 
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level. This is a point that also pertains to the tests of quantitative structure presented 
in the previous chapter, which will be elaborated in Chapter 6. 
Additionally, an improved understanding of ambivalence is important for our 
conceptualisation of the attitude-behaviour relationship. Andrich and Styles (1998) 
demonstrated utilising an unfolding methodology that attitude and behaviour 
statements may be scaled on a common dimension, with the behaviour items 
consistently located at more extreme locations. They argue that the non-significant 
relationship often found between attitudes and behaviour may be attributable to the 
behaviour statements utilised. This is obviously relevant to assessing ambivalent 
individuals who tend to be located toward the centre of the evaluative dimension. 
Thus, understanding the relationship between their attitudes and behaviour entails the 
provision of behaviour statements that are more moderate in nature. Furthermore, it 
may be the case that behaviour is not only predicted by location on this dimension, 
but also the intensity and latitude of acceptance parameters. 
Overall, the findings of this chapter reinforced the distinction between the 
two forms of ambivalence. However, it did so in a manner that departed from the 
operationalist conventions. This distinction is framed in terms of ambivalence as a 
property of an attitude and as a meta-psychological judgement. Conclusions 
regarding the relationships between these were limited by measurement problems. 
However, a significant relationship between the evaluation parameter and meta-
psychological ambivalence was established. This finding provides further validation 
of the conceptualisation of the evaluative dimension that has been explored 
throughout this thesis and its relationship with ambivalence. Furthermore, it provides 
further validation of the measures developed in Chapter 4 to reflect this 
conceptualisation. 
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Other results provided preliminary evidence that the relationships between 
ambivalence and other attitude parameters are worth investigating. The attitude 
intensity parameter, in particular, appears relevant to distinguishing between 
indifference and ambivalence. However, the findings starkly demonstrate that these 
relationships can only be thoroughly explored if the measures of these parameters are 
constructed with the same rigour displayed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
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Chapter 6 – Conclusions and future directions for 
ambivalence research 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This thesis aimed to investigate the implications of ambivalence for the 
conceptualisation and measurement of attitudes. Firstly, this involved providing 
evidence that ambivalence is consistent with a bipolar conceptualisation of attitudes, 
despite the consensus within the mainstream attitude literature that it is not 
(Cacioppo et al., 1997; Conner & Armitage, 2008; Thompson et al., 1995). Secondly, 
it involved the construction and validation of attitude scales sensitive to both 
ambivalent evaluations and the quantitative assumption. Thirdly, these scales were 
used to investigate the latent structure of attitudes and its relationship with meta-
psychological judgements of ambivalence. 
The results for the first two sets of analyses validated the predictions that 
ambivalence is consistent with the unidimensional, bipolar and quantitative 
conceptualisation of attitudes, albeit in a different form to the general understanding. 
Additionally, they provided further validation of unfolding measurement models in 
the attitude context. These models alleviate many of the problems faced by the 
ubiquitous method of summated ratings, including the assessment of ambivalent 
evaluations. 
 The conclusions drawn from the third set of analyses were far more limited. 
Specifically, the results highlighted the importance of rigorously considering 
measurement issues for all attitude parameters, which is testament to the attempt to 
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break away from the operational biases of this literature. Nonetheless, these analyses 
presented preliminary validation of these scales’ ability to measure ambivalent 
evaluations, and therefore provide further evidence for this thesis’ novel 
conceptualisation of the evaluative dimension. 
 This chapter will critically examine these issues further and make suggestions 
for future research and clarification. Whilst some aspects of this discussion will 
undermine earlier work, a major theme throughout all of the chapters has been that 
attitude researchers should be far more critical of their assumptions. Thus, it is 
internally consistent that this thesis concludes with such critical reflection. This will 
include a deeper consideration of the bipolar and quantitative assumptions.  
 
6.2 The conceptualisation of the bipolar evaluative dimension 
In Chapter 2, both a conceptual argument and empirical evidence were presented to 
demonstrate the consistency between the bipolar conceptualisation of attitudes and 
ambivalent evaluations. Specifically, it was argued that the middle-region of the 
bipolar evaluative dimension should be conceptualised as the location for ambivalent 
attitudes. However, this leaves the question of where to locate indifferent attitudes, 
which are typically located at this middle-point (Andrich et al., 1997).  
The suggested solution was that indifferent attitudes do not belong on the 
evaluative dimension at all, as they are defined by a lack of evaluation. Whilst this 
conceptual point is hard to argue with, it leaves the practical problem of where 
indifferent individuals locate their attitudes when forced to do so. Chapter 5 
attempted to clarify this issue by investigating the relationship between the 
evaluative dimension and the attitude intensity parameter. The results were 
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inconclusive, however, the suggestion was that individuals with low intensity do not 
necessarily locate themselves at the centre of the evaluative dimension and that the 
intensity parameter shows promise for distinguishing between ambivalent and 
indifferent individuals. Clearly, further research is required to draw any firmer 
conclusions, but it serves as a reminder that attitudes should not simply be thought of 
as a single point on the evaluative dimension. Other parameters must be considered 
to fully capture their diversity (Davies, 2004; Krosnick et al., 1993; Visser et al., 
2006). 
 
6.2.1 Ambivalence and uncertainty 
As part of this, future research must investigate uncertainty as an evaluative state 
(Andrich et al., 1997; Dubois & Burns, 1975). The issue of uncertainty is quite 
distinct from the issue of indifference, as it is not concerned with the absence of an 
evaluation. When a person is uncertain about an attitude issue they may care deeply 
about it, but their lack of consideration, ignorance, or complexity of the issue leads to 
an uncertainty. In an unfolding context, this would equate to an unwillingness to 
commit to any one ideal-point. Their attitude may therefore be better understood as 
an interval, which encompasses a number of points (Johnson, 2007). This is a crucial 
issue, as some individuals may interpret ambivalent attitude statements as uncertain 
in nature. Thus, in this thesis, respondents who were unable or unwilling to commit 
to an evaluative position may have located themselves at the centre.  
 In fact, this potential confounding of ambivalence and uncertainty can be 
identified in the scales constructed in Chapter 3. In the binary tree method, the 
number of predicates used to construct a statement may be interpreted as affecting 
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the specificity of it. For example, take the two statements, ‘euthanasia is immoral and 
should be prohibited in most circumstances’, and, ‘euthanasia is very immoral and 
should always be prohibited and treated as a criminal offence in most 
circumstances’. The semantic content of these two statements not only differs in 
terms of the unfavourability implied by them, but also in terms of their specificity, as 
the latter is a more specific attitude, i.e., it additionally specifies that euthanasia 
should be treated as a crime.  
If the structure of the binary tree is taken to be reflective of the structure of 
evaluative judgements, then the specificity of the statements could be taken to 
indicate how certain the attitudes they reflect are. This is because the addition of 
predicates may reflect a more extensive consideration of the issue and the more exact 
specification of an ideal-point. This point alludes to an earlier discussion in Chapter 
5, which addressed the latitude of acceptance parameter and whether it should be 
considered an item or person parameter.  It was argued that it should be considered 
both as the items are intended as analogues of the attitudes and concluded that this 
should be considered when constructing statements. It appears that this consideration 
should be done with respect to the specificity of the statements.  
For example, the statement, ‘I believe euthanasia is morally acceptable’, is 
favourable, but not very specific. It could be envisaged as not representing a point on 
the favourable part of the evaluative dimension, but rather an interval (Johnson, 
2007). Therefore, individuals with attitudes at a range of different points may agree 
with it. The statement, ‘I believe euthanasia is morally acceptable and should always 
be an option’, represents a more favourable and more specific attitude. By the same 
reasoning, it may be seen as representing a smaller interval toward the more 
favourable end of the dimension. Thus, there would be a smaller range of people 
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with different attitudes who would agree with it. Finally, the statement, ‘I believe 
euthanasia is morally acceptable, should always be an option, and should even be 
encouraged’, reflects a very favourable and very specific attitude. Thus, it may 
represent an even smaller interval toward the extremely favourable end of the 
dimension. An individual’s attitude would have to be located at a far more specific 
part of the evaluative dimension for them to agree with it. 
In Chapter 3, all of the statements taken from the middle part of the binary 
tree were less specific than the statements taken from the extremes. Thus, the former 
were potentially not only reflecting ambivalent evaluations, but also less specific 
evaluations, which may be interpreted as reflecting uncertainty. Future research is 
needed to clarify the effect of the specificity of the statements, particularly with 
respect to ambivalent and uncertain evaluations. Johnson’s (2007) reformulation of 
Coombs’ (1964) procedure to represent attitudes as intervals, rather than points, 
provides the opportunity to do this. 
Uncertain evaluations may also be elucidated by other attitude parameters. 
Similar to the latitude of acceptance, the latitude of non-commitment was identified 
by the social-judgment theorists and was used to describe the area of the evaluative 
dimension that the individual does not find acceptable or objectionable (Krosnick et 
al., 1993). It seems reasonable that an uncertain individual will score highly on this 
parameter as their uncertainty may lead them to neither agree nor disagree with the 
attitude items. However, this would have to be partnered with some level of attitude 
intensity to signify that they are not indifferent. Another relevant parameter 
identified by the attitude strength literature is attitude knowledge. This addresses the 
amount of knowledge an individual possesses about the issue being evaluated (Visser 
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et al., 2006). It seems reasonable that uncertainty may correspond with ignorance 
about the issue.  
However, uncertainty may not always emerge from ignorance, as in some 
cases it may be attributable to the complexity of the issue. For example, I may be 
uncertain about my attitude toward nuclear power because I am so well informed 
with respect to arguments from either side that I am unable to differentiate which I 
prefer. Additionally, uncertainty may stem from a researcher trying to force an 
attitude into unidimensional space when an individual identifies a number of 
independent dimensions, e.g., environmental impact of radioactive waste vs. 
environmental impact of lower carbon dioxide emissions. This individual would not 
consider themselves ambivalent as their judgements stem from independent 
dimensions and thus are not conflicting. This highlights how subtle the distinction 
between ambivalence and uncertainty can be. If an individual does perceive the issue 
as involving a number of independent dimensions, it may be more appropriate to 
investigate their evaluation utilising a multidimensional unfolding model, such as 
Coombs’ (1964) deterministic version or De Soete et al.’s (1986) probabilistic 
version, in order to uncover these distinct dimensions. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the differentiation between ambivalence and 
indifference requires further investigation. The current discussion highlights the 
importance of distinguishing between ambivalence and uncertainty. In both cases, 
the distinction must consider the structure of the evaluative dimension and a number 
of other attitude parameters as well as the implications for item construction. This is 
further complicated by the potential independence of positive and negative 
evaluations raised in Chapter 2. The results throughout this thesis demonstrate that 
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ambivalence may not necessitate the abandonment of a bipolar conceptualisation, but 
there may be other compelling reasons to do so. 
 
6.2.2 A bivariate understanding of the evaluative dimension 
Just as the complexity of an issue may necessitate the conceptualisation of evaluative 
space as multidimensional, a number of researchers have called for a bivariate 
understanding of the evaluative dimension due to the independence of the positive 
and negative substrates (Cacioppo et al., 1997; Ito, Larsen, Smith & Cacioppo, 1998; 
Scott, 1968). Typically, ambivalence is argued to necessitate this, but this thesis has 
provided evidence that this is not necessarily the case. 
Nonetheless, Cacioppo et al. (1997) draw their argument from emerging 
evidence that positive and negative evaluations are underpinned by independent 
motivational systems, namely the approach and avoidance systems. The approach 
system is argued to underpin positive evaluations, whereas the avoidance system 
underpins negative evaluations. The distinction between these two is supported by an 
increasing amount of neurological evidence, which indicate distinct brain regions’ 
associations with each (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Cacioppo et al., 1997; Larsen, 
Norris & Cacioppo, 2003).  
Furthermore, this bivariate understanding provides more flexibility than the 
bipolar conceptualisation presented in this thesis, as it allows for an uncoupled 
relationship between positive and negative evaluations. It is empirically possible that 
an increase or decrease in positivity may not affect levels of negativity, and vice-
versa. A bivariate understanding is required to capture such a relationship. In fact, 
research has provided evidence of this relationship between positive and negative 
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affective processes (Larsen, McGraw, Mellers & Cacioppo, 2004; Larsen, Norris, 
McGraw, Hawkley & Cacioppo, in press). However, it remains to be seen whether 
this is the case for cognitive evaluations. 
The discussion in Chapter 2 highlighted that even though positive and 
negative evaluations may be underpinned by demonstrably independent motivational 
systems, this does not entail the conclusion that the evaluations themselves are 
independent. This was explained with reference to the mixer tap analogy in Section 
2.7.2. Additionally, Borsboom, Mellenbergh and Van Heerden (2003, p. 215) point 
out that the investigations of these systems have been dominated by what he terms a 
“strong uniformity assumption”. That is to say, there is an assumption that the 
evaluative system is either univariate or bivariate for everyone. However, there is no 
a priori reason to assume that this structure is equivalent for everyone without 
extensive within-persons analyses to substantiate such a claim.  
Furthermore, there has been no distinction between what he terms “locally 
homogeneous” and “locally heterogeneous” constructs (Borsboom et al., 2003, p. 
215). Locally homogeneous constructs are structurally identical both between and 
within subjects, whereas locally heterogeneous constructs are not. All investigations 
of the independence of positive and negative evaluations have relied upon variation 
between-subjects to substantiate their models. Such data do not entail within-subjects 
conclusions and thus, not only does it remain to be seen whether this structure is the 
same for all individuals, but also whether it applies to the individual case at all. Thus, 
for the moment, there appears to be no compelling reason to accept Cacioppo et al.’s 
(1997) bivariate understanding over the bipolar conceptualisation. But, this remains 
an open question. Interestingly, this same criticism of fallaciously drawing within-
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subjects conclusions from between-subjects data applies to the quantitative 
conclusions made in this thesis and others like it. 
 
6.3 Quantitative attitudes as locally homogeneous, locally heterogeneous or 
locally irrelevant constructs 
Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrated a method to construct and validate sets of attitude 
statements sensitive to both ambivalent evaluations and the ubiquitous assumption of 
the quantitative structure of attitudes. In doing this, it extended upon the findings of 
Chapter 2 by reaffirming the location of ambivalent attitudes as proximal to the 
centre of a demonstrably quantitative dimension. This is a very rare example of this 
assumption being tested and was essential for the statistical analyses employed in 
Chapter 5. However, the above discussion highlights how the conclusions drawn 
from this analysis must be treated with caution. 
The conceptualisation of attitudes as within-persons constructs and 
quantitatively structured is almost universal in attitude research. The former 
assumption appears self-evident, although they may manifest in between-subjects 
form as what have been termed ‘group attitudes’ (Jackson et al., 1996). But, as 
previously discussed, the latter is far from self-evident. Even when it has been tested, 
there has been a lack of clarity regarding whether this quantitative structure solely 
exists at the between-subjects level or if it extends to the within-persons level, i.e., 
whether it is locally heterogeneous or homogeneous in Borsboom et al.’s (2003) 
terms.  
In the case of this thesis and other similar studies, conclusions regarding 
quantitative structure were drawn from between-subjects data. The quantitative J-
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scale was established by fitting each individual’s preference order, or qualitative I-
scale, to the single-path condition and checking this single-path solution for 
contradictions via the double-cancellation condition. Thus, all that was demonstrated 
within the individual was that their attitude was ordinal, i.e., qualitatively structured. 
This limitation equally applies to tests of quantitivity in the context of probabilistic 
models (Karabatsos, 2001; Kyngdon & Richards, 2007). In order to make 
substantiated conclusions regarding the quantitative structure of an individual’s 
attitude, such analyses must be performed at the individual level. Therefore, whether 
a quantitative attitude is a locally heterogeneous or homogeneous construct requires 
further investigation. 
This is further complicated by the consideration of locally irrelevant 
constructs (Borsboom et al., 2003). This term is used to describe a construct that is 
completely abstracted from the individual and only accounts for between subjects 
variation. A simple example of this would be ‘sportiness’ with respect to cars. This is 
not a property or a process of any individual car. Rather, it is a construction used to 
describe the differences between these properties/processes. If quantitative attitudes 
are to be shown relevant to the individual case, then variation at the individual level 
must be observed. 
 Michell (1973) and Davies (2004) provide some insight in to this issue of 
quantitative structure of attitudes at the individual level. In addition to preference 
judgements, their research involved participants providing similarity judgements of 
the statements to test each individual’s perception of the locations of the statements 
on the dimension. Their results indicated that the ordered metric solutions obtained 
from the between-subjects preference data and the within-subjects similarity data 
tended to differ. Whilst these results do not bode well for the quantitative assumption 
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at the individual level, they do not directly address the issue of attitudinal variation 
within the individual. 
The observation of such variation may require assessing individuals’ attitudes 
longitudinally, relying upon their natural variation and checking whether this 
variation is consistent with quantitative assumptions. This means that the changed 
preference order must be consistent with the single-path condition determined by the 
between-subjects analysis. Alternatively, individual variation could be observed on a 
single-occasion by experimentally manipulating the attitude.  
There is a long history of literature examining attitude change procedures 
(McGuire, 1969; Olson & Zanna, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Wood, 2000). 
These procedures typically involve some variation of presenting an individual with 
persuasive information or relying upon individuals’ need for social acceptance or 
both. These methods could be employed to create within-person variation and again 
the change in the individual preference orders could be checked with respect to the 
quantitative assumptions. This discussion of differences between attitudes alludes to 
another issue that brings further doubt to the quantitative conceptualisation of 
attitudes. 
 
6.3.1 Are attitudes qualitative or quantitative? The difference is in the differences. 
From the analyses presented in Chapter 4, it seemed reasonable to conclude that even 
at the individual level, the attitudes examined were ordinally structured. As 
previously discussed, ordinal structure is necessary, but not sufficient for 
quantitivity, as the latter also possesses additivity (Michell, 1990). As part of this, 
Michell (2006) points out that if the evaluative dimension or the other attitude 
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parameters are genuinely quantitative, then the differences between the degrees of 
these variables must be homogeneous. For example, differences between degrees of 
length are all lengths, although the differences need not be homogeneous with the 
degrees themselves. This observation helps drag this issue from the abstract realm, of 
which it must seem to attitude researchers given their lack of education of rigorous 
measurement theory, to one of substantive significance.  
 The implication of this is that the determinant of the differences between 
attitudes at both an individual and aggregated level must be homogeneous if they are 
in fact quantitative constructs. Thus, that which constitutes the difference between an 
extremely positive attitude and a moderately positive attitude must be of the same 
kind as that which constitutes the difference between a moderately positive attitude 
and an ambivalent attitude. This leaves the attitude researcher thinking in such vague 
terms as the subtraction of ‘favourability’ when attempting to understand the 
difference between an individual who possesses an attitude that is mildly racially 
prejudiced and an individual who is a member of the Ku Klux Klan.  
 The attitude change literature referred to earlier demonstrates the diversity of 
influences that may bring about differences in attitudes. Specifically, one method 
that is successful for one individual may not be successful for another, and similarly, 
that which successfully changes an individual’s attitude toward one issue, may not be 
successful for a different issue (Wood, 2000). It may be the case that the effect of 
these diverse influences on attitude change is mediated by some unidimensional, 
quantitative construct such as ‘favourability’. However, it also seems a reasonable 
conjecture that these influences themselves constitute the differences. In this case, 
the differences between attitudes both within and between individuals are 
heterogeneous. Clearly, any firmer conclusion must be supported by more rigorous 
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theory and future research in to the determinant(s) of these differences (Michell, 
2008b). 
 The problem is, thinking in purely quantitative terms, as attitude researchers 
tend to do, precludes this research. It may be the case that these differences are 
homogeneous, but such a conclusion can only be drawn if attitude researchers are 
open to the acknowledgement that it may be heterogeneous. Without this 
acknowledgement, researchers are potentially ignoring some rich detail of attitudes 
under the guise of ‘measurement’. If these differences are found to be heterogeneous, 
then the conclusion must be that the attitude is at most ordinally structured.  
 As Michell (2004b) argues, ordinal structure should not be seen as the poorer 
cousin of quantitative structure. Ordinal and partially ordered structures are just as 
amenable to rigorous, mathematical analyses. This has been demonstrated in the 
fields of linguistics and logic. Ultimately, attitude scientists should be solely 
concerned with the correspondence between their models and reality. The choice 
between qualitative or quantitative methodology should be determined by the nature 
of the subject-matter and not tied to any particular philosophical viewpoint (Michell, 
2004b). If attitudes are in fact qualitative constructs, as the above discussion 
conjectures, then they should be investigated accordingly. Clearly, this issue requires 
further investigation, as it goes to the heart of our substantive understanding of 
attitudes. 
 A crucial implication of the above discussion is when psychometric models 
and statistical analyses that make quantitative assumptions are utilised, such as those 
used throughout this thesis and particularly in Chapter 5, the researcher can easily 
draw conclusions which are determined by the methodology, rather than by the 
construct (Michell, 2009). This is obviously at odds with rigorous scientific inquiry 
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and is an issue that has periodically risen in the psychometric and psychological 
statistics literature. 
 
6.4 Asking ordinal questions does not require quantitative methods 
Chapter 5 attempted to rigorously investigate the relationship between ambivalence 
as a property of an attitude and as a meta-psychological judgement. It utilised 
structural equation modelling to do this as this method attempts to reveal the 
relationships between latent variables rather than observed measures. As previously 
discussed, a key assumption of this statistic methodology is that the observed 
measures and latent variables are quantitatively structured. This assumption seemed 
reasonable based upon the results of Chapter 4 and Appendix E. 
 However, given the current discussion, it may be the case that statistical 
analyses that only make ordinal assumptions are more warranted. In psychology, the 
development of ordinal, or non-parametric statistics has lagged well behind their 
quantitative counterparts despite a brief period of popularity during the middle of the 
20th century (Cliff, 1996; Cliff & Keats, 2003). Even in the case of SEM where the 
issue of ordinal structure has been considered, the pernicious effect of 
Pythagoreanism continues. The assumption is that even though our crude indicators 
of a variable may be ordinal, the variable itself is quantitative. In the case of 
attitudes, this assumption is highly questionable. 
 Also, this debate has hinged around a more pragmatic point that parametric 
and non-parametric statistics tend to provide very similar conclusions, whether the 
data are demonstrably non-quantitative or not (Baker, Hardyck & Petrinovich, 1966; 
Borgatta & Bohrnstedt, 1980; Stevens, 1951). Michell (1986) makes the point that 
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prescriptions regarding statistical analyses are not helpful, and the more fundamental 
point is that in applying a certain analysis the researcher makes an assumption 
regarding the structure of the variable. The pervasive use of parametric statistics adds 
an additional layer to the Pythagorean bias of psychology and ultimately 
psychologists must be more mindful of the assumptions they are making. The 
assumption of quantitivity is routinely mentioned, but rarely tested or even 
questioned.  
This poses the question of whether the conclusions of this thesis regarding the 
implications of ambivalence would be any different if the attitude parameters 
addressed are only ordinally structured. 
 
6.4.1 The bipolar conceptualisation of attitudes and the relationship between the 
ambivalences: An ordered approach 
Cliff (1996) points out that despite the ubiquitous assumption of quantitative 
psychological constructs, most of the empirical questions posed by psychologists are 
ordinal in nature. The first general aim of this thesis was to investigate the bipolar 
evaluative dimension to test whether ambivalence was at odds with it. It was 
conceptualised that ambivalence is consistent with such a dimension and quantitative 
language was introduced by the prediction that ambivalent evaluations would be 
located at the centre of the dimension. This notion of centrality implies a distance 
between the poles of which there is a central point and this necessitates quantity.  
 However, even when the quantitative assumption is removed, the general aim 
is still met. Specifically, the Coombs (1964) unfolding analyses in Chapter 4 
provided evidence that ambivalent evaluations fit in to a strictly ordered dimension, 
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whereby negative evaluations display less favourability than ambivalent evaluations, 
which in turn display less favourability than positive evaluations, i.e., negative < 
ambivalent < positive. Note how this ordinal understanding reinforces the notion that 
indifferent attitudes, which are defined by the absence of an evaluation, cannot be 
accommodated by a unidimensional conceptualisation. It would not make sense to 
state that negative evaluations display less favourability than indifferent evaluations, 
as these evaluations are neither favourable nor unfavourable. 
 The second general aim was to rigorously design attitude scales and utilise 
these scales to provide evidence that these evaluative dimensions were quantitatively 
structured. Given the number of statements in each scale, this was solely contingent 
upon satisfying the double cancellation condition. As aforementioned, the double 
cancellation condition is just one of an entire hierarchy of cancellation conditions of 
which only triple cancellation has been further elucidated (Kyngdon & Richards, 
2007). It remains to be seen how rigorous the double cancellation condition is as a 
test of additivity. Thus, it may be more likely that the results of Chapter 4 provided 
evidence that the evaluative dimension was strictly ordered. This in itself is a rare 
achievement in psychology as evidenced by the ubiquity of probabilistic item-
response models, which were for the most part initiated by individuals consistently 
violating ordinal assumptions in their response patterns (Michell, 2004a). 
 The third general aim was to utilise these scales to investigate the relationship 
between ambivalence as a property of an attitude and as a meta-psychological 
judgement. Upon closer inspection, the hypotheses of Chapter 5 were ordinal in 
nature. Specifically, it predicted that particular levels of one attitude parameter 
would correspond to greater or lesser levels of some other parameter. Furthermore, it 
predicted that particular levels of each parameter would lead to greater or lesser 
  
 
217 
levels of meta-psychological ambivalence9. Given that the questions were ordinal, 
there was no reason to invoke quantitative methods. This point was eloquently 
expressed by Boring (1920, as cited in Michell, 2008c, p. 15) who said, “It is 
senseless to seek in the logical process of mathematical elaboration a psychologically 
significant precision that was not present in the psychological setting of the 
problem”.  
 However, as alluded to earlier, ordinal methods for analysing psychological 
data have lagged behind quantitative methods, particularly in the multivariate 
context. A major premise of Chapter 5 was to attempt to investigate the relationships 
between the latent variables rather than their indicators in order to escape the 
operationalist bias present in the ambivalence literature. To date, no equivalent of 
structural equation modelling that only makes ordinal assumptions with respect to 
both manifest and latent variables has been developed (Jöreskog, 1990; Rizopoulos 
& Moustaki, 2008; Shi & Lee, 1998). This is perhaps unsurprising given Michell’s 
(2009) observation that there is a very long history in psychology of fallaciously 
concluding that a variable is quantitative when only presented with ordinal evidence. 
Given its systemic nature in psychometrics, he terms this “the psychometricians’ 
fallacy” (p. 41).  
 Consequently, it is unknown whether the same conclusions would be drawn 
from Chapter 5 if the variables were treated as purely ordinal. However, the size of 
the linear relationship found between the evaluative dimension and meta-
psychological ambivalence utilising SEM suggests that a systematic ordinal 
relationship would be found. Future research must seriously address whether it is 
                                                
9 Note that the problematic nature of the causal assumption inherent in this statement 
was addressed in the discussion of Chapter 5 and further research was recommended 
to substantiate it. 
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necessary to treat these attitude parameters quantitatively, and if not, investigate 
these relationships utilising ordinal psychometric and statistical methods.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
This thesis reinforces a major theme in the attitude literature over the past decade 
that ambivalence has been ignored for too long. It points out that this was not always 
the case and the widespread adoption of Likert’s (1932) methodology was a major 
contributor to this ignorance. Even upon re-emerging as an issue in the attitude 
literature, the adapted methodology led researchers to conclude that ambivalence was 
inconsistent with the traditional, bipolar conceptualisation of attitudes. This thesis, 
by its use of unfolding methodology, provided evidence that this is an incorrect 
assumption and showed that ambivalent evaluations may be measured in the true 
sense. Furthermore, conceptualising attitudes in unfolding terms helped to 
distinguish the operative understanding of ambivalence that is prevalent in the 
literature. This was reframed in terms of the actual parameters of an attitude and as a 
meta-psychological judgement. Although the findings for the relationships between 
these parameters and ambivalence were inconclusive, this understanding provides 
promise for more rigorous research in to this issue in the future. 
In conclusion, an attempt has been made to investigate ambivalent attitudes 
being mindful of the numerous psychometric assumptions being made. The use of 
unfolding theory has been integral to this process. Despite the shortcomings 
addressed in this concluding chapter, such a consideration has helped illuminate the 
richness and complexity of the attitude concept, which ambivalence is testament to. 
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Thus, it stands as an encouragement to all attitude researchers to embrace the 
challenge of measurement, rather than operationalising it away. 
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Appendix A: Example screenshots and instructions for each 
task 
A.1 Tasks from Chapter 2 
The following figures provide illustrative examples of the electronic presentation of 
each task and the instructions utilised in the bipolar conceptualisation study of 
Chapter 2. The demographic questionnaire presented in Figure A1 was utilised in all 
studies presented throughout the thesis. 
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Figure A.1. Screenshot of demographic questionnaire utilised in all studies 
throughout the thesis. 
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Figure A.2. Screenshot of item rating task for the positive subscale of the BEAMs. 
 
The presentation of the negative and ambivalent subscales of the BEAMs was 
equivalent, with the exception of the items and where the word ‘positive’ appears in 
the instructions. 
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A.2 Tasks from Chapter 3 
The following figure provides an illustrative examples of the electronic presentation 
of the task and the instructions utilised in the issues selection study of Chapter 3. 
 
 
Figure A.3. Screenshot of task presented in Chapter 3 to select the issues participants 
consistently felt ambivalent toward. 
 
This task was equivalent for the other issues investigated. 
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A.3 Tasks from Chapter 4 
The following figures provide illustrative examples of the electronic presentation of 
each task and the instructions utilised in the statement validating studies of Chapter 
4. 
 
 
Figure A.4. Screenshot of the ordering pair comparison task utilised in Study 1 in 
Chapter 4. 
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Figure A.5. Screenshot of the ordering rating task utilised in Study 1 in Chapter 4. 
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Figure A.6. Screenshot of the pair comparison preference task utilised in Studies 2 
and 3 in Chapter 4. 
 
 
The presentation of the pair comparison task in Studies 2 and 3 in Chapter 4 was 
equivalent in Chapter 5. 
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A.4 Tasks from Chapter 5 
In addition to the pair comparison task presented in the previous section, the 
following figures provide illustrative examples of the electronic presentation of each 
task and the instructions utilised in Chapter 5. 
 
 
Figure A.7. Screenshot of the rating preference task utilised in Chapter 5. 
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Figure A.8. Screenshot of the bivariate positive rating task utilised in Chapter 5. 
 
 
The bivariate negative rating task was identical, but with the word ‘negative’ 
interchanged for ‘positive’. 
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Figure A.9. Screenshot of the attitude intensity subjective rating task utilised in 
Chapter 5. 
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Figure A.10 Screenshot of the ‘conflict’ meta-psychological ambivalence rating task 
utilised in Chapter 5. 
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Figure A.11. Screenshot of the latitude of acceptance task utilised in Chapter 5. 
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Appendix B: Complete correlational and factor analyses of 
Chapter 2 
Table B.1 
Inter-correlations between positive (1-8) and negative (9-16) subscale items of the 
BEAMs for the abortion issue 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. favorable 1      
2. appealing 0.66 1     
3. pleasant 0.17 0.33 1    
4. agreeable 0.53 0.45 0.09 1   
5. approving 0.65 0.52 0.13 0.73 1  
6. rewarding 0.46 0.46 0.23 0.35 0.60 1 
7. delighted 0.36 0.46 0.31 0.22 0.41 0.58 
8. comfortable 0.35 0.42 0.21 0.39 0.39 0.33 
9. undesirable -0.46 -0.57 -0.24 -0.38 -0.42 -0.37 
10. negative -0.60 -0.36 -0.15 -0.46 -0.54 -0.36 
11. unlikable -0.60 -0.42 -0.12 -0.45 -0.59 -0.35 
12. unhappy -0.40 -0.35 -0.17 -0.35 -0.47 -0.35 
13. opposing -0.40 -0.30 -0.03 -0.36 -0.47 -0.25 
14. bad -0.51 -0.38 -0.03 -0.44 -0.54 -0.34 
15. unattractive -0.29 -0.27 0.00 -0.21 -0.31 -0.21 
16. unsatisfying -0.26 -0.34 -0.06 -0.22 -0.33 -0.25 
  7 8 9 10 11 12 
7. delighted 1      
8. comfortable 0.12 1     
9. undesirable -0.31 -0.37 1    
10. negative -0.23 -0.29 0.60 1   
11. unlikable -0.27 -0.34 0.62 0.84 1  
12. unhappy -0.24 -0.41 0.60 0.55 0.59 1 
13. opposing -0.13 -0.26 0.55 0.62 0.69 0.58 
14. bad -0.20 -0.26 0.62 0.77 0.76 0.56 
15. unattractive -0.10 -0.24 0.53 0.55 0.59 0.44 
16. unsatisfying -0.26 -0.23 0.56 0.40 0.48 0.64 
  13 14 15 16   
13. opposing 1      
14. bad 0.77 1     
15. unattractive 0.55 0.53 1    
16. unsatisfying 0.60 0.57 0.44 1   
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Table B.2 
Inter-correlations between positive (1-8) and negative (9-16) subscale items of the 
BEAMs for the Aboriginal Australians issue. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. favorable 1      
2. appealing 0.62 1     
3. pleasant 0.57 0.51 1    
4. agreeable 0.51 0.41 0.68 1   
5. approving 0.49 0.47 0.61 0.67 1  
6. rewarding 0.56 0.58 0.56 0.46 0.52 1 
7. delighted 0.49 0.58 0.49 0.44 0.49 0.57 
8. comfortable 0.29 0.53 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.46 
9. undesirable -0.30 -0.23 -0.24 -0.31 -0.35 -0.29 
10. negative -0.37 -0.37 -0.46 -0.42 -0.47 -0.33 
11. unlikable -0.26 -0.31 -0.33 -0.40 -0.47 -0.28 
12. unhappy -0.01 -0.11 -0.07 -0.11 -0.23 -0.15 
13. opposing -0.18 -0.13 -0.15 -0.27 -0.36 -0.10 
14. bad -0.28 -0.16 -0.33 -0.32 -0.38 -0.20 
15. unattractive -0.12 -0.20 -0.15 -0.27 -0.30 -0.14 
16. unsatisfying -0.16 -0.10 -0.25 -0.28 -0.21 -0.11 
  7 8 9 10 11 12 
7. delighted 1      
8. comfortable 0.56 1     
9. undesirable -0.17 -0.12 1    
10. negative -0.16 -0.27 0.61 1   
11. unlikable -0.09 -0.25 0.56 0.76 1  
12. unhappy -0.14 -0.28 0.54 0.39 0.29 1 
13. opposing -0.06 -0.10 0.59 0.54 0.58 0.38 
14. bad -0.04 -0.15 0.63 0.63 0.61 0.41 
15. unattractive -0.07 -0.17 0.56 0.48 0.57 0.34 
16. unsatisfying -0.05 -0.14 0.53 0.50 0.43 0.41 
  13 14 15 16   
13. opposing 1      
14. bad 0.60 1     
15. unattractive 0.47 0.56 1    
16. unsatisfying 0.47 0.65 0.44 1   
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Table B.3 
Inter-correlations between positive (1-8) and negative (9-16) subscale items of the 
BEAMs for the homosexuality issue. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. favorable 1      
2. appealing 0.62 1     
3. pleasant 0.57 0.51 1    
4. agreeable 0.51 0.41 0.68 1   
5. approving 0.49 0.47 0.61 0.67 1  
6. rewarding 0.56 0.58 0.56 0.46 0.52 1 
7. delighted 0.49 0.58 0.49 0.44 0.49 0.57 
8. comfortable 0.29 0.53 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.46 
9. undesirable -0.30 -0.23 -0.24 -0.31 -0.35 -0.29 
10. negative -0.37 -0.37 -0.46 -0.42 -0.47 -0.33 
11. unlikable -0.26 -0.31 -0.33 -0.40 -0.47 -0.28 
12. unhappy -0.01 -0.11 -0.07 -0.11 -0.23 -0.15 
13. opposing -0.18 -0.13 -0.15 -0.27 -0.36 -0.10 
14. bad -0.28 -0.16 -0.33 -0.32 -0.38 -0.20 
15. unattractive -0.12 -0.20 -0.15 -0.27 -0.30 -0.14 
16. unsatisfying -0.16 -0.10 -0.25 -0.28 -0.21 -0.11 
  7 8 9 10 11 12 
7. delighted 1      
8. comfortable 0.56 1     
9. undesirable -0.17 -0.12 1    
10. negative -0.16 -0.27 0.61 1   
11. unlikable -0.09 -0.25 0.56 0.76 1  
12. unhappy -0.14 -0.28 0.54 0.39 0.29 1 
13. opposing -0.06 -0.10 0.59 0.54 0.58 0.38 
14. bad -0.04 -0.15 0.63 0.63 0.61 0.41 
15. unattractive -0.07 -0.17 0.56 0.48 0.57 0.34 
16. unsatisfying -0.05 -0.14 0.53 0.50 0.43 0.41 
  13 14 15 16   
13. opposing 1      
14. bad 0.60 1     
15. unattractive 0.47 0.56 1    
16. unsatisfying 0.47 0.65 0.44 1   
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Table B.4 
Varimax factor loadings of the 22 BEAMs items for the abortion issue. 
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
favorable -0.52 0.59 0.03 
appealing -0.30 0.73 -0.08 
pleasant 0.12 0.56 -0.10 
agreeable -0.47 0.50 0.06 
approving -0.54 0.62 -0.01 
rewarding -0.21 0.72 -0.10 
delighted -0.04 0.71 -0.10 
comfortable -0.29 0.47 -0.09 
undesirable 0.62 -0.37 0.29 
negative 0.83 -0.23 0.06 
unlikable 0.85 -0.25 0.13 
unhappy 0.62 -0.28 0.34 
opposing 0.81 -0.05 0.28 
bad 0.86 -0.15 0.16 
unattractive 0.67 0.01 0.29 
unsatisfying 0.57 -0.13 0.39 
muddled 0.02 -0.01 0.84 
jumbled 0.15 0.09 0.82 
tense 0.28 -0.19 0.66 
conflicted 0.10 -0.25 0.78 
divided 0.19 -0.03 0.77 
contradictory 0.26 -0.12 0.68 
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Table B.5 
Varimax factor loadings of the 22 BEAMs items for the Aboriginal Australians issue. 
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
favorable -0.24 0.72 0.22 
appealing -0.09 0.77 -0.09 
pleasant -0.24 0.76 0.03 
agreeable -0.32 0.70 -0.01 
approving -0.35 0.71 -0.01 
rewarding -0.11 0.77 0.00 
delighted 0.14 0.80 -0.13 
comfortable 0.06 0.70 -0.31 
undesirable 0.70 -0.20 0.32 
negative 0.74 -0.35 0.17 
unlikable 0.79 -0.26 0.09 
unhappy 0.30 -0.12 0.65 
opposing 0.68 -0.08 0.34 
bad 0.83 -0.15 0.10 
unattractive 0.70 -0.09 0.16 
unsatisfying 0.64 -0.07 0.33 
muddled 0.44 0.04 0.50 
jumbled 0.45 0.02 0.51 
tense 0.23 0.08 0.69 
conflicted 0.16 -0.02 0.82 
divided 0.08 -0.14 0.75 
contradictory 0.47 -0.08 0.43 
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Table B.6 
Varimax factor loadings of the 22 BEAMs items for the homosexuality issue. 
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
favorable -0.26 0.70 0.04 
appealing -0.10 0.76 -0.01 
pleasant -0.15 0.85 -0.03 
agreeable -0.28 0.70 -0.10 
approving -0.44 0.53 -0.20 
rewarding -0.18 0.82 -0.12 
delighted 0.08 0.80 0.08 
comfortable -0.36 0.64 -0.02 
undesirable 0.73 -0.30 0.26 
negative 0.83 -0.21 0.18 
unlikable 0.75 -0.26 0.23 
unhappy 0.72 -0.13 0.36 
opposing 0.76 -0.12 0.30 
bad 0.85 -0.15 0.19 
unattractive 0.65 -0.33 0.21 
unsatisfying 0.60 -0.16 0.24 
muddled 0.08 -0.22 0.82 
jumbled 0.14 -0.24 0.82 
tense 0.39 0.17 0.66 
conflicted 0.33 0.13 0.73 
divided 0.29 0.07 0.57 
contradictory 0.33 -0.02 0.61 
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Appendix C: Conflicting evaluations of the issue selection 
study of Chapter 3 
C.1 Conflicting evaluations for the abortion issue 
What is best for the child ... free choice versus responsibility 
I believe that no body should be denied the right to live but at the same time feel for 
teenagers who have been raped and fall pregnant as I also feel sorry for teenage parents, 
as most of the time this is not the best situation for a child to be brought up in 
I feel that a woman should be able to decide whether she wants a child or not, and that it 
would be very cruel for a child to be born into a family that doesn't want it, but don't see 
killing a baby as a good thing, when there are options of adoption and alike. 
'Speak for those with no voice' etc vs. babies born into environments unfit for their growth 
and basic rights 
My belief that you should have a freedom to choose conflicts with the obvious ethical 
dilemmas of abortion 
My belief in the baby's right and the value of life conflicts with my sympathy for the 
mother in terms of her preparedness for the baby and the problem with bringing an 
unwanted child into the world, for the mother and baby's sake. 
My belief that one should not bring a child into the world under circumstances 
My feelings relating to free will and bodily autonomy conflict with my feelings relating to 
morality 
I am very adamant on this issue, the choice to have an abortion is one that should not be 
taken away, as a young woman I especially sympathise with this, also I believe that 
ultimately it is the woman’s choice, her body and her life...there is a small part of me that 
feels much sadness on the issue, but that is quickly overridden with the possibility that I 
may have to in some way make that choice, and I want to know that I have every 
possibility presented. 
I believe it should be for those who cannot support a family, not because they don’t feel 
like having a baby. 
This conflicts with my Christian (Catholic) beliefs 
My belief in abortion conflicts with concerns that this procedure is used flippantly and as 
a casual form of contraception rather than a last resort 
My belief people need to be careful, but in situations of rape I can understand the reasons 
to do it. 
I believe that women should have the right to make decisions about their bodies but at the 
same time I wonder whether abortion is taking a human life. 
I don't like abortion but I understand that sometimes people find themselves in less than 
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desirable situations. It is a personal choice up to each person to make. I can see both sides 
of the argument. 
I don't believe in abortion, however, in some cases such as rape, or knowing that your 
child will have a disability, abortion should be considered. 
It's a woman's choice. Not a male's. If the woman does not feel she will deal with having a 
child, then it's best she don't, because its not worth the baby's trauma of growing up with a 
mother that can't handle being a mother. 
I believe that women have the right to decide if they wish to keep a baby or not especially 
if they feel they cannot give the baby a good home. Some pregnancies may be a result of 
rape so giving birth to the rapists child would not allow the women to fully get over her 
ordeal if every time she looks at the child she remembers what happened. Women should 
be able to make this decision, as she will be the carer for the rest of her life. 
Pos: Abortion is one's own right, in cases such as rape, where a child could be disabled, or 
where the parents would be unable to properly support the child, abortion seems an 
acceptable practice. Neg: The Bible does suggest that abortion is unacceptable. 
I believe that every woman should be given the choice to abort if absolutely necessary but 
I feel that it should only be approved where there is no alternative and it is a desperate 
situation. 
 
C.2 Conflicting evaluations for the euthanasia issue 
Free choice versus religion 
My belief is that it is sometimes 'fairer' to put a person out of pain, but can see the issues 
in legalising euthanasia in that it is someone taking another’s life. 
Life as precious and killing immoral vs. a life in extreme pain worse than death and free 
choice 
My belief that you should be able to maintain a certain quality of life conflicts with 
ethical issues of having someone prescribe your death 
My belief in the value of life conflicts with my feelings of sympathy for people who wish 
to die. 
I belief one should decide whether they are to remain alive, in circumstances were they 
are experiencing so much pain they have no will to live, no one wants to see someone 
suffer 
My feelings of free will conflict with my beliefs relating to morality 
I believe in freedom of choice, if a person is suffering to the point of not being able to 
bear it, they should be able to end their own life, but it conflicts with my knowledge that 
often people are not of sound minds when going through certain stages of their life, and 
that the consequences are irreversible. 
Should be used if for people who are extremely sick and who wish it upon themselves but 
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not for innocent people with no health problems 
Mainly I believe in the right to choose, but could be misused. 
This conflicts with my feeling of fairness and equity 
My belief in euthanasia conflicts with concerns that this privilege may be misused either 
to murder or aid suicide 
I believe that euthanasia should be available although I’m not totally sure about it is a 
contentious issue. 
I understand that one might want to end their life due to great suffering however the idea 
scares me and makes me wonder where it stops, where the boundaries are placed. 
Conflicting because if someone is in pain and suffering, they should have the right to end 
their life, but on the flip side, what gives anyone the right to end someone's life, even if it 
is at their request. I agree with both sides of the argument. 
I once upheld the view that euthanasia is wrong due to my religious beliefs but after 
seeing 'Million Dollar Baby' my views have changed and I’m a little unsure. 
I generally support the idea, I don't know if it could be practically implemented. 
I believe that people should be able to choose to die, yet they may not be in a proper state 
to truly judge the circumstances. Plus, it’s unfair on doctors and family members who are 
called upon to aid in the death. 
Predominantly positive I think for those with little quality of life it sho7uld be their right 
to leave the world peacefully and by choice. My problem with it is the regret that can be 
felt after making a decision, no one can ever be so certain they want to live, but this is 
coming from an 18yr old so for me life has so much left it is hard to imagine 
I'm indifferent about this issue, because I think u can only comment on it if u have been in 
that situation or know someone that has. I would like to think that everyone should live if 
they can, but I could understand a person with a terminal illness or completely paralysed 
wanting to die because of major depression. 
I believe that if someone is in alot of pain and they have tried all their options with no 
success and no hope then they have the right to decide if they want to die. Then again no 
one has the right to take someone’s life if they are in for example a comma or if they are 
unable to communicate and do not have their permission. 
Pos: When people become older and are forced to live with suffering and pain, maybe it 
would be easier to grant them euthanasia to alleviate their pain. Also, if someone wishes 
not to live, shouldn't they be able to die? Neg: It goes against the Bible. 
Everyone has the right to die, but this needs to be monitored 
I believe that people with terminal illnesses or who are living in a permanent vegetative 
state should be allowed to terminate their own life, however I believe that the use of 
euthanasia in any other situation is unacceptable. 
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C.3 Conflicting evaluations for the Aboriginal Australians issue 
My belief of inequality and self-determinism 
I believe Aboriginal Australian should possess equal rights and should be free from 
persecution, oppression and discrimination 
They have rights as people vs. their rights are perhaps too often placed ahead of those of 
the majority white population. 
My belief that they deserve rights conflicts with providing 'reverse discrimination' 
I am not in the position to judge the free will of another person. Therefore I have no 
conflicting beliefs or feelings about it. 
My only concern is the fact that a proportion of the general public is so resentful to the 
welfare benefits they receive 
My belief is that while fair treatment is a responsibility and a right, it is earned and should 
not be expected if certain behaviour doesn't warrant it, that being said equality should be 
assured to all. 
I believe that aboriginals have got many rights and are entitled to them but have focused on 
feeling sorry for themselves for too long. 
My belief that everything is caused conflicts with my feeling of my rights as a person with 
a racial background 
My support of the rights of aboriginal Australians is often conflicting with negative 
stereotypes and a lack of understanding 
I believe they don’t have enough acceptance or respect as a different race in human 
society. Yet it is nice to seem them glorified at rare times, but it is not done enough. 
Australia as a nation has come along way over the years and therefore aboriginal rights 
have also evolved, positively, however the treatment of aboriginals before this evolution 
was extremely poor. 
While officially aboriginal Australians have had equal rights for some time, it does not 
seem to have helped them as a community especially in some rural areas where living 
conditions are well below the national average. 
I'm happy with how far Australia has come in terms of the right of Aboriginal Australians, 
however the way we dealt with them in the past is not something to be proud of. 
I know that Aboriginals were the original owners of this land but it would be very difficult 
for us, the ancestors of the white settlers, to just leave and start a fresh. It has been just too 
long. Though I believe we should have never have taken the land off the Aboriginals in the 
first place as we had no more right to live here than the Aboriginals. 
Pos: Because Aborigines have been wrongfully thrown out of their own land and have 
become a worse race because of such actions.  Neg: Even though Aborigines have been 
displaced, they have the ability to fight for their rights and maintain a moral high ground, 
though many have taken to violence and alcoholism during their struggles, and have 
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affiliated them with a negative stereotype. 
My beliefs are strongly felt due to my feelings of equality. 
System doesn’t work, but they abuse the system 
My feeling that everyone deserves equal rights is conflicted in this situation by a question 
of what equal rights are. I feel that some aboriginals are now being afforded greater or 
lesser rights as way of compensation 
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Appendix D: Pilot study of attitude scales constructed by 
the binary tree method  
 
The statements presented in Figures D1, D2 and D3 were constructed in accordance 
with the scaling constraint overviewed in Section 3.5. The following study was 
carried out to test individuals’ perceptions of the ordering of the statements. 
D.1 Method 
Participants 
 
All participants (n=25) were first-year Psychology students at the University of 
Sydney who received partial course credit. There were 15 females and 12 males and 
the mean age was 20.4 (SD = 3.50). 22 of the 25 participants indicated English was 
their first language and all indicated English was their best language. The Mean 
rating of their ability to understand English was 4.79 out of 5 (SD = .55).  
 
Materials 
 
The main materials were the attitude scales presented in Figures D1, D2 and D3. The 
questionnaires were presented via computer using the Quask Formartist survey 
software (http://www.quask.com). Participants indicated their perception of the 
ordering of the statements via pair comparison judgements. The pair comparisons 
were counterbalanced using the optimum orders of Ross (1939). 
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MoA = morality of abortion 
MA = morally acceptable 
UC = universal choice 
AP = always prohibited 
E = encouraged 
C = crime 
A = all circumstances 
M = murder 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Abortion is extremely morally acceptable and should be a universal choice 
encouraged in all circumstances 
B. Abortion is very morally acceptable and should be a universal choice that is 
encouraged, but not in all circumstances 
C. Abortion is very morally acceptable and should be a universal choice, but I do not 
believe that it should ever be encouraged 
D. Abortion is quite morally acceptable, but should not be a universal choice 
E. Abortion is quite immoral, but should not be prohibited in some circumstances 
F. Abortion is very immoral and should be prohibited, but should not be treated as a 
crime 
G. Abortion is very immoral and should be both prohibited and treated as a crime, 
but not as a form of murder 
H. Abortion is extremely immoral and should be prohibited, treated as a crime and as 
a form of murder 
  
 
Figure D.1. Binary tree and resulting statements for the morality of abortion issue.  
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MoE = morality of euthanasia 
MA = morally acceptable 
UC = universal choice 
AP = always prohibited 
E = encouraged 
C = crime 
A = all circumstances 
M = murder 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Euthanasia is extremely morally acceptable and should be a universal choice 
encouraged in all circumstances 
B. Euthanasia is very morally acceptable and should be a universal choice that is 
encouraged, but not in all circumstances 
C. Euthanasia is very morally acceptable and should be a universal choice, but I do 
not believe that it should ever be encouraged 
D. Euthanasia is quite morally acceptable, but should not be a universal choice 
E. Euthanasia is quite immoral, but should not be prohibited in some circumstances 
F. Euthanasia is very immoral and should be prohibited, but should not be treated as 
a crime 
G. Euthanasia is very immoral and should be both prohibited and treated as a crime, 
but not as a form of murder 
H. Euthanasia is extremely immoral and should be prohibited, treated as a crime and 
as a form of murder 
  
 
Figure D.2. Binary tree and resulting statements for the morality of euthanasia issue.  
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EoA = equality of Aboriginal 
     Australians 
HE = helped to become more equal 
EA = more economic assistance 
AR = always responsible for disadvantage 
PI = more political influence 
CU = can’t understand their anger 
SL = sacred land to self-govern 
AI = always inferior 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Aboriginal Australians should be helped to become more equal and thus receive more 
economic assistance, political influence and should be given land to self-govern 
B. Aboriginal Australians should be helped to become more equal and thus receive greater 
economic assistance and political influence, but they should not be given land to self-govern 
C. Aboriginal Australians should be helped to become more equal and thus receive greater 
economic assistance, but they should not have more political influence 
D. Aboriginal Australians should be helped to become more equal, but they do receive more 
economic assistance than they deserve 
E. Aboriginal Australians should not be helped to become more equal, but they are not solely 
responsible for their social disadvantage 
F. Aboriginal Australians should not be helped to become more equal and are responsible for 
their own disadvantage, but I can understand their anger  
G. Aboriginal Australians should not be helped to become more equal as they are 
particularly responsible for their disadvantage and I cannot understand their anger, but I do 
not believe they are inferior 
H. Aboriginal Australians should not be helped to become more equal as they are extremely 
responsible for their own disadvantage and thus I cannot understand their anger and I believe 
they are inferior 
  
 
Figure D.3. Binary tree and resulting statements for the equality of Aboriginal 
Australians issue.  
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Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups ranging from 2 to 8 individuals in size. At the 
beginning of the testing session, participants were given a general introduction to the 
purpose of the study as well as the relevant ethical information. In addition, they 
were instructed to carefully follow all instructions provided and to ask for 
clarification from the experimenter if they were unsure about either of the tasks. 
Participants then completed the three tasks via computer. Upon completion they were 
provided with a thorough debriefing of the study. 
D.2 Results and Discussion 
There were two types of errors possible in individuals’ ordering judgements in this 
task, intransitive judgement and ordering errors.  
For the morality of abortion issue, 17 out of 25 (67%) individuals indicated a 
perception of the ordering consistent with the predicted statement ordering. There 
were 10 intransitive judgement errors and 29 ordering errors. So, 39 of the 700 
(5.57%) pair comparisons made across all participants were inconsistent with the 
predicted ordering of the statements. 
For the morality of euthanasia issue, 16 out of 25 (64%) individuals indicated 
a perception of the ordering consistent with the predicted statement ordering. There 
were 11 intransitive judgement errors and 32 ordering errors. So, 43 of the 700 
(6.14%) pair comparisons made across all participants were inconsistent with the 
predicted ordering of the statements.  
For the equality Aboriginal Australians issue, 14 out of 25 (56%) individuals 
indicated a perception of the ordering consistent with the predicted statement 
ordering. There were 14 intransitive judgement errors and 28 ordering errors. 
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Consequently, 42 of the 700 (6%) pair comparisons made across all participants were 
inconsistent with the predicted ordering of the statements. 
 These systematically high levels of ordering errors indicated problems with 
the semantic ordering of the statements across the three issues. These errors are set 
out in Table D.1. 
 For the abortion issues, the ordering errors were particularly clustered around 
the CD (34%), CE (17%) and DE (17%) statement pairs. It appears that the weight of 
the’ do not believe that it should be encouraged’ predicate of Statement C made it 
appear more negative toward a significant number of respondents than Statement D, 
and to a lesser extent Statement E. This predicate was appended to Statement D in 
the statements presented in Chapter 3 to correct for this. Furthermore, it appears that 
the ‘should not be a universal choice’ predicate of Statement D made it appear more 
negative than Statement E for a substantial number of respondents. Given this, the 
unfavourable nature of Statement E was emphasised for the statements presented in 
Chapter 3 by changing the predicate to, ‘prohibited in most circumstances’. Further 
general changes were made to the statements presented in Chapter 3 to accentuate 
the ordering. The pattern of ordering errors for the euthanasia statements was very 
similar and so equivalent changes to the abortion issue were applied in Chapter 3. 
 For the Aboriginal Australians issues, the majority of ordering errors were 
committed on the EF (43%) and BC (25%) statement pairs. It appears that for a 
significant proportion of respondents the semantic weight of the ‘can understand 
their anger’ predicate of Statement F made it appear more positive than Statement E. 
Thus, it was appended to Statement E in Chapter 3. Furthermore, the ordering of 
Statements B and C was emphasised by changing the predicate of Statement B to 
read, ‘should be given free use of their sacred land’.  
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Table D.1  
Intransitive judgement (Int.) and ordering (O.) errors in ordering judgements of the 
Abortion (AN), Euthanasia (EU) and Aboriginal Australians (AA) statements. 
  AN EU AA 
Statement Pairs Int. O. Int. O. Int. O. 
AB 0 3 0 3 0 1 
AC 0 1 3 1 1 0 
AD 0 0 1 0 3 0 
AE 1 0 0 0 0 0 
AF 2 0 0 0 1 0 
AG 1 0 0 0 1 0 
AH 1 0 0 0 0 0 
BC 0 1 0 3 1 7 
BD 1 2 1 0 1 0 
BE 1 0 0 0 2 0 
BF 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BG 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BH 1 0 0 0 0 0 
CD 0 10 0 11 1 2 
CE 1 5 4 4 0 2 
CF 0 0 1 0 0 0 
CG 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CH 0 0 0 0 1 0 
DE 0 5 0 6 0 1 
DF 0 0 1 0 0 1 
DG 0 0 0 0 1 0 
DH 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EF 0 0 0 1 0 12 
EG 1 0 0 1 0 0 
EH 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FG 0 2 0 1 1 1 
FH 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GH 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Total 10 29 11 32 14 28 
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Appendix E: Validation of attitude intensity and subjective 
ambivalence scales 
 
In addition to the sets of attitude statements constructed in Chapter 3, it was 
necessary to construct scales to assess the attitude intensity parameter and subjective 
reports of ambivalence10, which were raised in Chapters 1 and 2. Measure of these 
will be utilised in the analyses of Chapter 5, which assumes that they are 
quantitatively structured, and thus responses to them must also be shown to be 
conform to Coombs’ (1964) model. Like the attitude statements in Chapter 3, these 
scales were constructed utilising the binary tree method.  
 
E.1 The construction and validation of the attitude intensity and subjective 
ambivalence scales 
 
E.1.1 The attitude intensity scale 
 
This scale was adopted from the work of Davies (2004). She demonstrated that this 
scale successfully ordered individuals’ levels of attitude intensity. The scale was 
designed to firstly differentiate individuals who indicate that they feel indifferent 
toward or do not care about the issue from those who indicate that they do care. 
Then, further levels were added to distinguish between the different strengths of 
                                                
10 Referred to as meta-psychological ambivalence in Chapter 5. 
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caring. This was done in accordance with the scaling constraint explained in Section 
3.5. The derivation and items of the scale are presented in Figure E.1 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AI = attitude intensity 
I = Indifferent toward the issue 
DC = Do not particularly care about the issue 
NA = Do not care a lot about the issue 
NP = Do not care passionately about the issue 
NS = Do not feel more strongly about the issue than any other 
 
A. I feel complete indifference toward this issue. 
B. I do not particularly care about this issue. 
C. I care about this issue 
D. I care a lot about this issue. 
E. I feel passionately about this issue. 
F. I feel more strongly about this issue than any other. 
 
 
Figure E.1. Binary tree and resulting statements for the attitude intensity scale. 
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E.1.2 The subjective ambivalence scale 
This scale was based upon the single-item rating tasks typically used to assess 
subjective reports of ambivalence (Conner & Armitage, 2008). These tasks ask 
individuals to report how ‘mixed’, ‘conflicted’ or ‘indecisive’ their attitude is toward 
the issue. Specifically, the ‘mixed’ item was the focus as it was particularly 
consistent with the conceptualisation of ambivalence presented in previous chapters. 
As with the attitude intensity scale, this was done in accordance with the scaling 
constraint explained in Section 3.5. The derivation and final items of the scale are 
presented in Figure E.2. Again some license is taken with the wording of the items in 
order to ensure their ordering is accurately interpreted. For example, Statement D 
does not include the ‘very mixed, but not extremely mixed’ wording suggested by 
the binary tree as it relies upon the difference in the semantic strength between the 
adverbs ‘very’ and ‘extremely’ to imply the ordering. This simplifies the 
interpretation of the statement.  
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SA = Subjective ambivalence 
M = Attitude is mixed 
P = Particularly  
V = Very 
E = Extremely 
I = Impossible to be more mixed 
 
A. My attitude toward this issue is not mixed at all. 
B. My attitude toward this issue is not particularly mixed. 
C. My attitude toward this issue is mixed. 
D. My attitude toward this issue is very mixed. 
E. My attitude toward this issue is extremely mixed. 
F. It is impossible for my attitude toward this issue to be any more mixed. 
 
 
Figure E.2. Binary tree and resulting statements for the subjective ambivalence scale. 
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E.1.3 Method 
Participants 
All participants (n=55) were first-year Psychology students at the University of 
Sydney who received partial course credit. There were 32 females and 23 males and 
the mean age was 20.13 (SD = 4.27). 37 of the 55 participants indicated English was 
their first language and 47 indicated English was their best language. The Mean 
rating of their ability to understand English was 4.68 out of 5 (SD = .52).  
 
Materials 
The materials were the attitude intensity and subjective ambivalence scales presented 
in Figures E.1 and E.2. The questionnaires were presented via computer using the 
Quask Formartist survey software (http://www.quask.com). Participants indicated 
their preferences of the attitude scale statements via pair comparison judgements. 
They were instructed for each pair of statements to choose the one that most reflected 
the state of their attitude toward abortion. This issue was selected as the analyses of 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 indicated that a significant proportion of people tend to care 
about this issue and it is also subject to a lot of ambivalent evaluations. The pair 
comparisons were counterbalanced using the optimum orders of Ross (1939).  
 
Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups ranging from 2 to 8 individuals in size. 
Participants were given a general introduction to the purpose of the study as well as 
the relevant ethical information at the beginning of the session. It was stressed to 
them that they must follow the instructions carefully and to ask the experimenter if 
any clarification of the task was required. Participants then completed the two tasks 
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via computer. Upon completion they were provided with a thorough debriefing of the 
study. 
E.1.4 Results and Discussion 
For the attitude intensity scale, 53 (3.4%) judgements were intransitive, constituting 
66% of the overall error rate. The BF (21%) and AE (18%) statement pairs 
demonstrated the highest prevalence of intransitive judgements. Ten (0.6%) 
judgements were folding errors, constituting 13% of the overall error rate. Five of 
these errors involved the DE statement pair. Finally, there were 17 (1.1%) single-
path errors, constituting 21% of the overall error rate. There was no clear localization 
of these errors. This was an overall error rate of 5.1%. The single-path and resulting 
ordered metric solution is presented in Figure E.3. 
 The inter-statement midpoint ordering of the attitude intensity scale was also 
found to satisfy the cancellation condition. This test is presented in Figure E.4. These 
results indicate that this scale accords with Coombs’ (1964) unidimensional 
unfolding model. This supports the assumption that the attitude intensity parameter is 
quantitatively structured and provides evidence that it is appropriate to include it in 
the SEM analyses of Chapter 5. It should be noted that Davies (2004) only found this 
scale to be ordinal. However, she relied upon rankings of the scale and this 
methodology has been shown to be subjected to far more erroneous judgements 
because of its more taxing nature (Michell, 1994, 1998). 
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Figure E.3. The single-path through the proximity graph for the attitude intensity 
scale with black arrows marking the dominant path and green arrows marking the 
arbitrary path, the frequency of the preference orders and the ordered-metric solution 
obtained from the midpoint ordering. 
 AB              AC       BC AD     BDAEAFBECDBF     CE   CF       DE   DF          EF 
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Figure E.4. Tests of double cancellation for the attitude intensity scale. 
 
  
For the subjective ambivalence scale, 42 (2.7%) judgements were 
intransitive, composing 51% of the overall error rate. The highest prevalence was for 
the BF (32%) and AE (16%) statement pairs. Six (0.4%) judgements were in 
violation of the folding condition, making up 7% of the overall error rate. Three of 
these were for the AB statement pair. Thirty-five (2.3%) judgements were in 
violation of the single-path condition, constituting 42% of the overall error rate. The 
single-path errors were most prevalent with the AF and BE statement pairs. This was 
an overall error rate of 5.4%. 
The inter-statement midpoint ordering of the subjective ambivalence scale 
was also found to satisfy the cancellation condition. This test is presented in Figure 
E.5. These results indicate that this scale accords with Coombs’ (1964) 
unidimensional unfolding model. This supports the assumption that the attitude 
intensity parameter is quantitatively structured and provides evidence that it is 
appropriate to include it in the SEM analyses of Chapter 5. 
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Figure E.5. The single-path through the proximity graph for the subjective 
ambivalence scale with black arrows marking the dominant path and green arrows 
marking the arbitrary path, the frequency of the preference orders and the ordered-
metric solution obtained from the midpoint ordering. 
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Figure E.6. Tests of double cancellation for the subjective ambivalence scale. 
 
Although the above results provide evidence that the attitude intensity and 
meta-psychological ambivalence parameters are both ordinally and additively 
structures, further research is obviously required. The current study only utilised 
these scales with respect to a single attitude issue and the generalisability of the 
findings given the small sample size is questionable. Nonetheless, any attempt to test 
this assumption is novel in the SEM literature. 
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Appendix F: Rating judgements analysis from Chapter 5 
 
Table F.1 
Frequencies of folding (F.) and single-path (SP) errors for the rating judgements of 
Chapter 5 for the abortion (AN), euthanasia (EU) and Aboriginal Australians (AA) 
issues. 
 AN EU AA 
Statement 
Pairs F. SP F. SP F. SP 
AB 4 0 15 0 7 0 
AC 1 0 3 0 1 0 
AD 0 1 1 0 1 0 
AE 0 0 3 2 0 1 
AF 0 1 0 1 0 1 
BC 2 0 3 0 4 1 
BD 0 1 1 3 1 0 
BE 0 0 0 2 0 0 
BF 0 1 0 2 0 1 
CD 0 6 0 0 4 5 
CE 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CF 0 1 0 0 0 0 
DE 0 0 1 0 17 0 
DF 2 0 5 0 3 0 
EF 17 0 20 0 7 0 
Total 26 11 52 10 45 9 
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F.1 Explanation of scoring the rating preference orders 
As explained in Chapter 5, the scoring of the rating preference orders is more 
complicated as ties are permitted, i.e., the same rating may be provided to more than 
one statement. So, if for the abortion issue a participant provided a rating of ‘9’ for 
Statements A and B, and a rating of ‘7’ for C, ‘5’ for D, ‘2’ for E and ‘1’ for F, they 
would be allocated the preference order (AB)CDEF. The brackets acknowledge that 
the ratings do not differentiate a preference for A or B. Consequently, their 
preference order could be interpreted as ABCDEF or BACDEF. According to the 
ordered metric solution provided in Figure F.1, the ABCDEF preference order covers 
the interval between the locations of Statement A and the AB midpoint. Typically it 
is allocated the value for the midpoint of that interval, which in this case would be 
0.75. The BACDEF preference order covers the interval between the locations of the 
AB and AC midpoints, and thus would be allocated a value of 3.5. Thus, the 
(AB)CDEF preference order covers the interval between the locations of Statement 
A and the AC midpoint, and would be allocated the value 2.75. 
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Figure F.1. Ordered-metric solution obtained from the midpoint ordering implied by 
the rating judgements for the Abortion issue. 
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Appendix G: Ethics approval 
All research studies were carried out in accordance with the approved protocol from 
the University of Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee. Figure G.1 presents a 
copy of the original letter of approval. All subsequent studies were done on the basis 
of modifications to this protocol. 
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Figure G.1. Copy of original ethics approval letter. 
